Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis


Book Description

This radically new work provides an innovative approach to the question of why the Suez Crisis erupted. Bertjan Verbeek here applies foreign policy analysis framework to British decision making during the crisis, providing the first full foreign policy analysis of this important event. Moreover, the book offers a new interpretation on British decision-making during the crisis. Many existing studies of Suez emphasise the role of the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and often focus on the matter of collusion with Israel. This study demonstrates that small group dynamics in the institutional context of cabinet decision-making in the British political system are much more important. This study offers the possibility of determining more precisely the interrelationship between systemic constraints on states' behaviour and the actual behaviour of states under such constraints.




Whitehall and the Suez Crisis


Book Description

This review of the Suez Crisis gives a chapter each to such key players as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Secretary to the Cabinet. It incorporates 1956 releases from the Public Record Office to reassess the role of officials and the process of policymaking.




Decision Making in a Crisis


Book Description




Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez


Book Description

This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.




The Suez Crisis


Book Description

This introduction to Suez covers the background to the crisis, the invasion, and its aftermath. The Suez-Crisis provides: * key documents, as primary sources, incorporated in the text * an extensive range of other source material, including images * analysis of the significance of the sources discussed, and their usefulness as historical evidence * commentary on the historical context of the crisis * an analysis of the wider implications of the crisis, particularly for Britain




Britain Alone


Book Description

NEW AND UPDATED EDITIONA magisterial and profoundly perceptive survey of Britain's post-war role on the global stage, from Suez to Brexit. 'The fullest long-run political and diplomatic narrative yet of Britain's fateful, tragi-comic road to Brexit.'DAVID KYNASTON'An instant classic . . . Stephens is a master of historical codebreaking.'PETER HENNESSEYAward-winning Financial Times journalist Philip Stephens paints a fascinating portrait of sixty years - from Suez to Brexit - as Britain struggles to reconcile its waning power with its past glory. Drawing on decades of personal contact and interviews with senior politicians and diplomats in Britain, the United States and across the capitals of Europe, Britain Alone is a magisterial and deeply perceptive history of our nation and how we arrived at the state we are in.'Commanding . . . Rarely if ever, in the history of the British state since 1707, has one half of Britain's ruling elite committed an act of policy viewed with such absolute contempt by the other half; and rarely has that contempt been expressed with such elegance, such fluency, and such a devastating wealth of supporting detail, as in this mighty survey.' SCOTSMAN'Profoundly knowledgeable.' CHRIS PATTEN'Compelling.' LAWRENCE FREEDMAN'A fascinating history.' IRISH TIMES'A magnificent, exhilarating book' PROSPECT




The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis


Book Description

Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from pers




The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis


Book Description

Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from personal interviews with many of the key players, Kunz focuses on how economic diplomacy determined the course of events during the crisis from start to finish. In doing so, she provides both an excellent case study of the role of economic sanctions in international relations and a solid treatment of the American use of such sanctions against a Middle Eastern country. The crisis was prompted by the Eisenhower administration's decision not to fund the Aswan High Dam, triggering the takeover of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Responding to events, the American government imposed economic sanctions against Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel, with varying degrees of success. Because of its weakened financial position and misguided decisions, Kunz says, the government of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proved most vulnerable to these tactics. Indeed, American economic pressure caused the British government to withdraw its troops ignominiously from Egypt. France, on the other hand, had borrowed sufficiently prior to the crisis to be able to withstand American pressure. For Israel, Kunz says, the threat of sanctions symbolized the Eisenhower administration's wrath. Israel could forego American funds, but, dependent on the goodwill of a great power for survival, it could not take a stand that would completely alienate the United States. Only Egypt proved immune to financial warfare. Kunz also illuminates the general diplomacy of the Suez crisis. The American government was determined neither to alienate moderate Arab opinion nor to become too closely intertwined with Israel. As such, this account has significant lessons for American policy. Originally published in 1991. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.




British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis


Book Description

This book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time. Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this study identifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed by the Suez Crisis.




Britain's Withdrawal From East of Suez


Book Description

After 1945, Britain maintained a great chain of overseas military outposts stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. Commonly termed the `east of Suez' role, this chain had long been thought to be crucial for the country's security and its vitality. Nonetheless, British leaders eventually decided to abandon this network of bases. This study provides the most comprehensive explanation of this pivotal decision to date, while also offering insight into the processes of foreign policy change and the decline of great powers.