Book Description

Last year, we testified before your Subcommittees that DoD'S planned investments in aircraft were not achievable within likely future budgets and appear to be inconsistent with the current security environment. DoD, however, maintained that its aircraft investment strategy was realistic. We have continued to evaluate DoD'S aircraft procurement programs and remain concerned that DoD cannot achieve its plans within likely future budgets. Our recently completed and ongoing evaluations, and those by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), continue to raise questions about DoD's ability to execute its planned aircraft investment strategy. For example, in all but 2 years between fiscal year 2000 and 2015, the total funding required for the 15 programs we evaluated exceeds the funding historically spent on aircraft purchases, as a percentage of DoD's overall budget. For several of those years, the funding required to achieve DoD's planned aircraft acquisitions approaches the percentage of the budget reached during the peak Cold War spending years of the early to mid-1980s. In addition, we doubt DoD's ability to execute its aircraft investment plans because (1) overall defense funding is not expected to increase, (2) the amount of savings from infrastructure reductions and acquisition reforms is uncertain, and (3) inflation indexes used to develop aircraft budget estimates are understated.