Disproportional Ownership Structure and IPO Long-Run Performance of Entrepreneurial Firm in China


Book Description

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance in China. Although entrepreneurial firms underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Entrepreneurial firms with one share one vote structure outperform those with ownership control wedge by 30% for 3 years post-IPO in either buy-and-hold or cumulative monthly returns. Entrepreneurial firms with excess ownership control wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that entrepreneurial firms need to improve corporate governance such as disproportional ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.




Disproportional Ownership Structure and Pay-Performance Relationship


Book Description

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay-performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay-performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay-performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.




Does IPO Underpricing in China Explain a Firm's Long-Term Performance? An Empirical Study of IPOs in China with Corporate Governance Perspectives


Book Description

In excess of 1,500 firms have listed publicly on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China since 1990. With close to 20 years of unique IPO activity, China represents a rich source of data to explore the IPO aftermarket performance. The sample of this study includes 311 IPOs issued from 1999 to 2001. The period is studied because it was the most dynamic phase of IPO issues in the Chinese market in recent times after which the market subsequently became extremely volatile. The results of the study show that firms with higher initial IPO returns are valued more highly by investors, and are expected to provide superior returns in the long-run. The ownership structure has a bearing on the corporate governance of the firm and its objectives. Accordingly, the market in China values legal person and foreign ownership more than other forms of ownership and expect these to enhance performance long-term. Management ownership has a positive influence on performance as it related to State ownership, but not to legal person ownership. On the other hand, State ownership was negatively related to performance. The findings also show that the growth potential of a firm has a significant bearing on the long run performance of IPOs in China. Larger firms are considered more highly by the market in IPOs in China. A number of other variables, including aspects of corporate governance, are applied to the study and their results are reported.




Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies


Book Description

June 1997 Does the ownership structure of publicly listed firms in China affect their performance? Yes. Institutional shareholders seem to have a positive impact on corporate governance and performance; state ownership seems to lead to inefficiency; and an overly dispersed ownership structure can create problems in the Chinese setting. Xu and Wang investigate whether ownership structure significantly affects the performance of publicly listed firms in China and if so, in what way. With public listed stocks, one can quantify the ownership mix and concentration, which makes it possible to study this issue. The authors use the recent literature on the role of large institutional shareholders in corporate governance as a theoretical base. A typical listed stock company in China has a mixed ownership structure, with three predominant groups of shareholders- state, legal persons (institutions), and individuals- holding about 30 percent of the stock. (Employees and foreign investors together hold less than 10 percent.) Ownership is heavily concentrated: the five largest shareholders accounted for 58 percent of outstanding shares in 1995, compared with 57.8 percent in the Czech Republic, 42 percent in Germany, and 33 percent in Japan. Their empirical analysis shows that the mix and concentration of stock ownership do indeed significantly affect a company's performance: * There is a positive, significant correlation between concentration of ownership and profitability. * The effect of concentrated ownership is greater with companies dominated by institutions than with those dominated by the state. * The firms' profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of legal person (institutional) shares; it is either negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and with tradable A-shares held mostly by individuals. * Labor productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state shares increases. This paper- product of the Office of the Director, Economic Development Institute- part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand and disseminate various models of corporate governance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm's Performance (RPO 681-08).




Disproportional Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity in China


Book Description

This paper examines the effect that disproportional ownership has on stock market liquidity using a sample of Chinese listed firms. We find that the controlling shareholders' excess control rights are negatively associated with market liquidity. We also provide evidence to show that the negative relationship between disproportional ownership and liquidity is stronger when the firms' ultimate owner is the state or where legal protection for minority shareholders is weak; both of which result in a more severe agency problem. In addition, we find that as more non-tradable shares by controlling shareholders became tradable, the negative effect of disproportional ownership on liquidity became less. This relationship between disproportional ownership and liquidity remains even when the trading activities of controlling shareholders are controlled. We argue that in transition economies such as China, controlling shareholders usually have a strong incentive to disclose poor information in order to pursue their private benefit, which reduces market liquidity, while state ownership and weak shareholder protection makes this situation worse.




The Aftermarket Performance of Chinese IPOs


Book Description

In this thesis, I study the phenomena of initial underpricing and long-run underperformance of initial public offerings (IPO) in the Chinese A-share market. After giving an overview on existing literature and the characteristics of the Chinese IPO market, I examine a sample consisting of 196 A-share IPOs issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) during 2002 and 2004 and find that the average market-adjusted initial underpricing is 93.89% and that the average market-adjusted cumulative return and buy-and-hold return over the three years after listing are -20.77% and -24.07%, respectively, which are both significantly negative at 1% level. I then use a cross-sectional analysis to explain the initial underpricing of Chinese IPOs, showing that issuing companies with smaller offer sizes, lower offer prices and higher profitability have higher initial underpricing. Chinese IPO investors are also facing the winner's curse problem. The cross-sectional analysis of long-run performance shows that companies with lower initial underpricing perform better in the long-run and that long-run performance mainly depends on the operating performance of the companies. Government ownership has no significant impact on initial underpricing and long-run performance of IPOs in my sample.




Ownership Structure of the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market


Book Description

This paper provides a first look at the ownership structure in the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) of China which is a new market launched in 2009. By analyzing the unique dataset, I find that 46% of firms in our sample are created through pyramids. I identify the status of ultimate owner of each firm, and find that the ultimate owners in the GEM are entrepreneurs while in the main board the state is the ultimate owners in most of companies. My results suggest that pyramidal ownership structures have a detrimental effect on firm performance.




The Relationship Between Ownership Structure and Investment Efficiency in China-Funding on SOEs and Foreign Owned Enterprises


Book Description

China owes much of its great economic achievement to its investment-and-export led growth model. This study analyzes the impact of ownership structure on firms' investment efficiency. Using a firm-level dataset drawn from the World Bank's Enterprises Survey, the study finds that ownership structure contributes to firms' investment efficiency. State owned enterprises, in general, are less profitable than their domestic private and foreign owned competitors. Foreign owned enterprises face critical challenges due to economic distortions. The study also finds that, despite significant differences across ownership classifications, firm sector, size, management experience, employees training program and business obstacles also have an impact on firms' investment efficiency. Results of this analysis have important policy implications for the ongoing economic reforms in China.







The Overseas Listing Puzzle


Book Description

The “China concepts stock” in the U.S. has attracted a great deal of attention among international investors due to the fast growth in Chinese economy. This paper examines the aftermarket performance and the motivations to list in the U.S. for Chinese firms over 1993-2010 by considering the great impact of split-share structure reform in China. We find that the Chinese firms in the U.S. generally underperform the benchmark and industry peers in the post-IPO period of three years. The Chinese cross-listing ADRs show superior performance relative to the single-listings in the long run. It seems that more stringent listing requirements and accounting standards help to improve the corporate governance and operating performance of the Chinese firms. The evidence also supports that the Chinese issuers are motivated to cross-list in the U.S. due to over-investment incentives, leverage effects or free-cash-flow signaling, which is consistent with agency theory and signaling hypothesis.