Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies


Book Description

This is an essential work of Tibetan Buddhist thought written by an influential scholar of the twentieth century. From the same Nyingma school as the great Tibetan philosopher Mipam, Botrul in this text provides a systematic overview of Mipam's teachings on the Middle Way. Presenting the Nyingma tradition within a rich constellation of diverse perspectives, Botrul contrasts Nyingma views point-by-point with positions held by other Tibetan schools. Botrul's work addresses a wide range of complex topics in Buddhist doctrine in a beautifully structured composition in verse and prose. Notably, Botrul sheds light on the elusive meaning of "emptiness" and presents an interpretation that is unique to his Nyingma school. Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies exemplifies the vigorous tradition of Tibetan Buddhist scholarship and is widely studied in the contemporary monastic colleges of Tibet, India, and Nepal. Douglas Samuel Duckworth's translation will make this work widely available in English for the first time, and his thoughtful commentary will provide insight and context for readers.




Freedom from Extremes


Book Description

What is emptiness? This question at the heart of Buddhist philosophy has preoccupied the greatest minds of India and Tibet for two millennia, producing hundreds of volumes. Distinguishing the Views, by the fifteenth-century Sakya scholar Gorampa Sonam Senge, is one of the most important of those works, esteemed for its conciseness, lucidity, and profundity. Freedom from Extremes presents Gorampa's elegant philosophical case on the matter of emptiness here in a masterful translation by Geshe Lobsang Dargyay. Gorampa's text is polemical, and his targets are two of Tibet's greatest thinkers: Tsongkhapa, founder of the Gelug school, and Dolpopa, a founding figure of the Jonang school. Distinguishing the Views argues that Dolpopa has fallen into an eternalistic extreme, whereas Tsongkhapa has fallen into nihilism, and that only the mainstream Sakya view - what Gorampa calls "freedom from extremes" - represents the true middle way, the correct view of emptiness. Suppressed for years in Tibet, this seminal work today is widely regarded and is studied in some of Tibet's greatest academic institutions. Gorampa's treatise has been translated and annotated here by two leading scholars of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, and a critical edition of the Tibetan text on facing pages gives students and scholars direct access to Gorampa's own words. Jose Cabezon's extended introduction provides a thorough overview of Tibetan polemical literature and contextualizes the life and work of Gorampa both historically and intellectually. Freedom from Extremes will be indispensable for serious students of Madhyamaka thought.













Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works, Volume VI


Book Description

This book completes a landmark six-volume translation of the major writings of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), a philosopher and historian of culture who continues to have a significant influence on philosophy, hermeneutics, and the theory of the human sciences. These volumes make available to English readers texts that represent the full range of Dilthey's work. The works in this volume present Dilthey's most deeply held views about philosophy and how it can guide human practices. System of Ethics (1890) argues that Humean sympathy motivates us only externally and must be replaced with the internally motivated fellow-feeling of solidarity that respects others as ends in themselves. The Essence of Philosophy (1907) demonstrates how philosophy has developed from its traditional metaphysical role to the epistemological and encyclopedic functions that ground and order the natural and human sciences. The work also discloses an orientational function of philosophy that is explored further in "The Types of World-View and Their Development" (1911). Philosophical world-views are important in that they address the existential needs and riddles that grow out of life experience and are not solved by any of the sciences. In addition, the book features three other significant essays. "Present Day Culture and Philosophy" (1898) concerns the challenges to philosophy posed by contemporary culture. "Dream" (1903) is about the thinkers portrayed in Raphael's School of Athens and Dilthey's worries about them breaking up into three divergent groups. Finally, "The Problem of Religion" (1911) considers how religiosity can still inform lived experience in secular times.




Alasdair MacIntyre's Views and Biological Ethics


Book Description

Some of the most fundamental questions which moral philosophers have been grappling with include: What makes us moral beings? Is morality a product of culture or nature or both? Are ethical norms and principles universal and unchanging or are they relative, being rooted in specific socio-political and historical contexts? Can ethical conclusions be derived from descriptive statements? This book addresses these and similar questions through a comparative study between Alasdair MacIntyre’s views and biological ethics. It discusses how both MacIntyre’s views and biological ethics highlight the importance of human biology for human morality. Based on this discussion, the book proposes that both the rational and the biological (including the emotional) dimensions of humans have to be considered in order to understand the complex and multi-layered phenomenon of human morality. As such, it will prove to be a valuable resource for undergraduate and postgraduate students of moral philosophy, especially those interested in studying the biological approach toward ethics, Thomistic Aristotelian ethics and metaethics.




Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy


Book Description

An examination of ancient Greek philosophical conceptions of pleasure, which is the first book to compare them to contemporary conceptions.




Epistemic Responsibility for Undesirable Beliefs


Book Description

This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an “undesirable belief” will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable.