Double Zero and Soviet Military Strategy
Author : Dennis M. Gormley
Publisher :
Page : 288 pages
File Size : 26,76 MB
Release : 1990
Category : Europe
ISBN :
Author : Dennis M. Gormley
Publisher :
Page : 288 pages
File Size : 26,76 MB
Release : 1990
Category : Europe
ISBN :
Author : Vasiliĭ Danilovich Sokolovskiĭ
Publisher :
Page : 276 pages
File Size : 39,89 MB
Release : 1972
Category : Strategy
ISBN :
Author : David M. Glantz
Publisher : Taylor & Francis
Page : 328 pages
File Size : 40,50 MB
Release : 1991
Category : History
ISBN : 9780714640778
David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 532 pages
File Size : 39,69 MB
Release : 1989
Category : Military art and science
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 92 pages
File Size : 20,37 MB
Release : 1994
Category : Military art and science
ISBN :
Author : Colonel David M Glantz
Publisher : Pickle Partners Publishing
Page : 84 pages
File Size : 35,98 MB
Release : 2015-11-06
Category : History
ISBN : 1786250438
In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.
Author : David Glantz
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 515 pages
File Size : 31,26 MB
Release : 2003-02-27
Category : History
ISBN : 1135774994
Volume I covers in detail the background, strategic regrouping, and strategic planning and conduct of the offensive.
Author : G. S. Isserson
Publisher :
Page : 111 pages
File Size : 17,91 MB
Release : 2013
Category : Military art and science
ISBN : 9780989137232
Author : David Glantz
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 291 pages
File Size : 48,24 MB
Release : 2013-11-05
Category : History
ISBN : 1135183546
First Published in 1991. This book addresses a critical aspect of Soviet maneuver theory that has been almost totally neglected in Western analysis, specifically, Soviet concern for tactical maneuver. Since the 1930s, the Soviets have consistently argued that operational maneuver can be successful only if conducted in conjunction with equally successful tactical maneuver, carried out primarily by forward detachments. Forward detachments, the primary tactical maneuver forces tasked with performing critical combat functions, emerged in theory in the 1930s and flourished on the basis of virtually untested concepts until the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet mobile force structure was destroyed in a matter of weeks. Forward detachments again emerged after the Stalin grad Operation in 1943, when the Soviet General Staff required their use to spearhead all operations by mobile forces. After mid-1943, forward detachments led the operations of all tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, particularly during exploitation operations. By war's end all forces, mobile and rifle alike, employed forward detachments to lead their operations during the exploitation stage of operations. Forward detachments preempted enemy defenses and collectively formed a coordinated network of forward mobile units which provided coherence to the vast array of advancing Soviet mobile and rifle forces. In the late 1960s, the forward detachment received renewed attention as a critical element which could assist in the conduct of operational maneuver. Today, the Soviets believe that forward detachment operations are the key to conducting successful operations on a battlefield increasingly threatened by deadly high-precision weaponry. Tailored, flexible, battalion-size forward detachments, along with their operational counterparts (corps and brigades), may, in fact, be the model upon which the future Soviet force structure will be based. This volume surveys in detail the conceptual and organizational evolution of the forward detachment as the premier Soviet tactical maneuver force. It vividly demonstrates why forward detachments are suited by their versatile nature to be a precursor of future restructured Soviet units in general.
Author : Alexander Hill
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 757 pages
File Size : 41,62 MB
Release : 2019-02-07
Category : History
ISBN : 1316720519
In a definitive new account of the Soviet Union at war, Alexander Hill charts the development, successes and failures of the Red Army from the industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s through to the end of the Great Patriotic War in May 1945. Setting military strategy and operations within a broader context that includes national mobilisation on a staggering scale, the book presents a comprehensive account of the origins and course of the war from the perspective of this key Allied power. Drawing on the latest archival research and a wealth of eyewitness testimony, Hill portrays the Red Army at war from the perspective of senior leaders and men and women at the front line to reveal how the Red Army triumphed over the forces of Nazi Germany and her allies on the Eastern Front, and why it did so at such great cost.