Effects of the Unemployment Insurance Work Test on Long-Term Employment Outcomes


Book Description

Does requiring job seekers to be available and searching for work affect job quality? We examine the effects of this unemployment insurance (UI) work test on long-term employment outcomes. Adding administrative wage records to the Washington Alternative Work Search (WAWS) experiment, we examine effects on earnings, hours worked, employment, and job match quality in the nine years following the experiment. Among UI recipients as a whole, the effects of the work test were negligible, counter to the hypothesis that the work test may harm long-term earnings. But for permanent job losers, the work test reduced time to reemployment by 1-2 quarters, and increased job tenure with the first post-claim employer by about 2 quarters. Also, we find that the work test selected lower-wage workers into reemployment. Accordingly, the work test may be an important policy for improving the reemployment prospects of lower-wage, permanent job losers.













The effect of the unemployment insurance wage replacement rate on reemployment wages: A dynamic discrete time hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity


Book Description

This study estimates the effect of the unemployment insurance wage replacement rate on reemployment wages in the U.S. using the sample of men in the 1996 and 2001 Surveys of Income and Program Participation. I model employment search behavior in a dynamic discrete time hazard setting with three possible outcomes: finding a full-time job, finding a part-time job, or staying unemployed (continuing the job search). I find that reemployment wages decrease with the unemployment insurance wage replacement rate. Furthermore, the wage replacement rate depresses the prospect of finding full-time work while increasing the prospect of finding part-time work.




The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits


Book Description

The Great Recession has renewed interest in Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs around the world. At the same time, there have been important advances in both theory and measurement of UI. In this paper, we first use the theory to present a unified treatment of the welfare effects of UI benefit levels and durations and derive convenient expressions of the disincentive effect of UI. We then discuss recent estimates of the effect of UI benefit levels and durations on labor supply based, to a large extent, on high-quality research designs and administrative data. We relate these estimates directly to the sufficient statistics identified by the model. We also discuss several active and open areas of research on UI. These include the effect of UI on aggregate labor market outcomes, the effect of UI on job outcomes, the long-term effects of UI, the effects of UI under non-standard behavioral assumptions, and the interactions of UI with other programs. While our review of the new experimental estimates confirms the range of negative labor supply effects of the previous literature, we show based on the model that these estimates are imperfect proxies for the actual disincentive effects. We also isolate several important areas in need for additional research, including estimates of the social value of UI as well as the effects of UI in less-developed countries.