Book Description

This dissertation consists of three chapters.In Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I contribute to the inconclusive literature on labor empow- erment and corporate innovation. The paper exploits a law that creates Labor-Controlled Firms (LCFs) for identification in a regression discontinuity design using administrative data that link employers, inventors, and patents in Germany. The law mandates that firms with more than 500 or 2,000 employees have a minority (33%) or parity (50%) share of labor-elected directors on their boards, respectively. Local average treatment effects on the number of patents and the forward citation-weighted number of patents per LCF are significantly positive at both the minority and parity cutoffs, although forward citations per patent are significantly negative at the parity cutoff. The results suggest that labor control causes innovative productivity to increase at the expense of a relative shift from exploratory toward exploitative search. Auxiliary tests support this conclu- sion. Labor control insures employed inventors against adverse labor market shocks, increasing firm-related specialization through longer employment spells while reducing the intensive margin of innovative labor supply. Moreover, inventors' marginal income per patent is insensitive to the quality of the patent when the employer is labor-controlled, suggesting a lack of financial incen- tives for exploratory search in LCFs. In Chapter 2, we estimates that shares in Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) offered a discount of 3% for each year during which these shares could not be resold. The discount can be substantially larger in offerings in which marketability is a greater concern. Our estimates make use of the duration of the resale restriction and information about the effects of a regulatory change. In 2008, the SEC amended Rule 144 to shorten the default statutory holding period. Our estimates are smaller than previous estimates and robust to various controls and endogeneity concerns. In Chapter 3, we offer evidence from acquisition decisions that suggests that antitakeover pro- visions (ATPs) may increase firm value when internal corporate governance is sufficiently strong. We document that, in Germany, firms with stronger ATPs, and particularly supermajority provi- sions, are better acquirers. Managers of high-ATP firms create value in acquisitions by making governance-improving deals. They are more likely to engage in acquisitions that reduce their own entrenchment level and less likely to invest in declining industries. The empirical evidence is consistent with a short-termist interpretation. Takeover threats can induce myopic investment decisions, which ATPs can mitigate. They also lead managers to engage more often in value- creating long-term and innovative investing, and increase their sensitivity to investment opportu- nities. Our findings contribute to a growing literature challenging conventional wisdom that the agency-increasing effect of ATPs empirically dominates the myopia-eliminating effect, suggesting that a more contextual view of the value implications of ATPs is necessary.