The Encyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice; Under the Codes and Practice Acts, at Common Law, in Equity and in Criminal Cases Volume 8


Book Description

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1897 edition. Excerpt: ...of the sheriff to take the undivided share of the debtor without reference to the partnership account, but that a court of equity would take the account and ascertain what the sheriff ought to sell. Me. 89, which case is cited in New. hall v. Buckingham, 14 111. 405. Maryland.---Upon this question, see ihe obittr dictum of Dorsey, J., in M'Elderry v. Flannagan, I Har. & G. (Md.) 30S. Michigan.--Hutchinson v. Dubois, 4; Mich. 143, it would seem is an authority against the right of the officer to take possession of the firm's property. Without expressly passing upon the question, the court says: " A levy cannot touch a specific proportion of the goods, nor the whole, because others have property in every part as well as the whole, cuupled with a right, resting in contract, to use them for the purposes for which the partnership was instituted." Citing Church v. Knox, 2 Conn. 514, and Sirrine v. Briggs, 31 Mich. 443, in which cases the precise point determined was that the sheriff could not levy upon specific articles, and that he should have levied upon the partner's interest in the whole stock; Tappan v. Blaisdell, 5 N. H. 193; Atkins v. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 195, in which cases the right of the sheriff to take possession of the whole property was recognized; Reinheimer v. Hemingway, 35 Pa. St. 432; Deal v. Bogue, 20 Pa. St. 228; Knerr v. Hoffman, 65 Pa. St. 126. Minnesota.--Barrett v. McKenzie, 14 Minn. 20; Caldwell v. Auger, 4 Minn. 217; Wickham v. Davis, 24 Minn. 167. Mississippi.--Under Code 1880, 1770 (following the Codes of 1871 and 857), by which it was provided that the sheriff might levy upon property in which the defendant had an interest, but which was not exclusively in his own possession, without actually...




The Encyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice; Under the Codes and Practice Acts, at Common Law, in Equity and in Criminal Cases Volume 7


Book Description

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1897 edition. Excerpt: ... ferry across the Delaware, one of whom held a New Jersey charter for his end of the ferry, and the other a Pennsylvania charter for his end, could not properly join in an action lor damages to the ferry caused by a bridge; but that, their chartered interests not being joint, separate actions must be brought. An Objection that Parties are Improperly Joined as plaintiffs should be made when the petition for the appointment of viewers is presented or, at the very latest, when the issue is framed by the court. Ehret v. Schuylkill River East Side R. Co., 151 Pa. St. 158. 6. Alabama.--To authorize one to be made a party in highway and ferry cases, he must have a private right, as an individual proprietor, which he can vindicate by suit, and the record must show his interest. Creswell r. Greene County, 24 Ala. 282. California.--A person through whose lands a proposed road will pass is beneficially interested, and is a proper party to contest the legality of the proceedings for the establishment of the road. Damrell z. San Joaquin County, 40 Cal. 154. Connecticut.--A cemetery association instituted a proceeding under the statute for enlarging its territory by taking adjoining lands owned in severalty by different persons. It was held that all the owners, though having no joint interest, were properly made defendants together. Evergreen Cemetery Assoc, v. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551. Indiana.--One through whose lands a drain will run must be a party to the proceedings by notice or otherwise, and, unless this appear on the trial, the whole proceeding must fail. Wright v. Wilson, 95 Ind. 408. Where the proceedings are instituted by the party seeking the condemnation, it goes without saying that the owner of the land sought to be taken must be made a...







The Encyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice; Under the Codes and Practice Acts, at Common Law, in Equity and in Criminal Cases Volume 6


Book Description

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1896 edition. Excerpt: ...was shown by the certificate of the clerk, this was held sufficient compliance with a statute in Georgia (September 16, 1883) which required the postmaster to indorse upon the package its reception by due course of mail, and to at once deliver the package to the clerk of the court. Killian v. Augusta, etc., R. Co., 78 Ga. 749. Name of Clerk Misspelled.--Where a statute does not require the name of the clerk to be contained in the address on the return, the mere fact of addressing the commission and deposition to "L. Enos Greene," instead of to " Zenos Greene," is immaterial. Rust v. Eckler, 41 N. Y. 488. 1. Morgan v. Jones, 44 Conn. 225; Van Sickle v. Gibson, 40 Mich. 170; Ward v. Ely, 1 Dev. (N. Car.) 372; Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. (Pa.) 323 Deposition Delivered In Person.--Where depositions were taken by a justice of the peace, and his certificate showed that they had never been out of his possession or altered until he delivered them to the clerk of the court, they were held not to be inadmissible because the justice failed to comply with a statutory requirement relating to commissions, and directing that they be placed in an envelope and sealed, and the seal indorsed with the name of the commissioner and the style of the cause. Hutson v. Hutson, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 354. Evidence of Sealing.--The certificate of the clerk that a deposition was opened and filed by him is prima facie evidence that it was duly sealed up in conformity with the requirements of the statute. Rodn v. Hapgood, 8 Gray (Mass.) 394. Hutilatedor Unsealed Return.--Where it appeared that the envelope in which a deposition was contained was badlymutilated, being open half its length, on each side and at each of the four corners, and not having the...




Thinking Like a Lawyer


Book Description

This primer on legal reasoning is aimed at law students and upper-level undergraduates. But it is also an original exposition of basic legal concepts that scholars and lawyers will find stimulating. It covers such topics as rules, precedent, authority, analogical reasoning, the common law, statutory interpretation, legal realism, judicial opinions, legal facts, and burden of proof. In addressing the question whether legal reasoning is distinctive, Frederick Schauer emphasizes the formality and rule-dependence of law. When taking the words of a statute seriously, when following a rule even when it does not produce the best result, when treating the fact of a past decision as a reason for making the same decision again, or when relying on authoritative sources, the law embodies values other than simply that of making the best decision for the particular occasion or dispute. In thus pursuing goals of stability, predictability, and constraint on the idiosyncrasies of individual decision-makers, the law employs forms of reasoning that may not be unique to it but are far more dominant in legal decision-making than elsewhere. Schauer’s analysis of what makes legal reasoning special will be a valuable guide for students while also presenting a challenge to a wide range of current academic theories.