Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry


Book Description

April 1995 Both inspections and the threat of inspections reduce pollution emissions. Moreover, inspections induce plants to report their emissions levels more frequently to regulators. Since the early 1970s, industrial countries have enacted (or amended) many environmental laws and regulations to control and improve air and water quality. Developing countries are increasingly enacting similar legislation. But imposing a ceiling on a plant's emissions does not guarantee reduced emissions or an improved environment. Ensuring the attainment of the regulation's objectives requires monitoring the behavior of the regulated facility and enforcing environmental standards. Most of the literature in environmental economics is theoretical and simply assumes that polluters comply with regulations. Although monitoring and enforcement problems are clearly a pitfall of environmental regulation, little empirical work has been done about the effect of current monitoring strategies on pollution emissions. Laplante and Rilstone supply an empirical framework for measuring the impact of environmental inspections on plant emissions. They apply it to pulp and paper plants in Quebec for which reliable data were available. The results suggest that both inspections and the threat of inspections reduce pollution emissions. They also show that a plant's decision whether to report its emissions levels to the regulator is not random. Inspections improve the frequency of reporting. This paper--a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to investigate the impact of regulation on environmental performance. Benoit Laplante may be contacted at [email protected].




Does Regulation Kill Jobs?


Book Description

As millions of Americans struggle to find work in the wake of the Great Recession, politicians from both parties look to regulation in search of an economic cure. Some claim that burdensome regulations undermine private sector competitiveness and job growth, while others argue that tough new regulations actually create jobs at the same time that they provide other benefits. Does Regulation Kill Jobs? reveals the complex reality of regulation that supports neither partisan view. Leading legal scholars, economists, political scientists, and policy analysts show that individual regulations can at times induce employment shifts across firms, sectors, and regions—but regulation overall is neither a prime job killer nor a key job creator. The challenge for policymakers is to look carefully at individual regulatory proposals to discern any job shifting they may cause and then to make regulatory decisions sensitive to anticipated employment effects. Drawing on their analyses, contributors recommend methods for obtaining better estimates of job impacts when evaluating regulatory costs and benefits. They also assess possible ways of reforming regulatory institutions and processes to take better account of employment effects in policy decision-making. Does Regulation Kills Jobs? tackles what has become a heated partisan issue with exactly the kind of careful analysis policymakers need in order to make better policy decisions, providing insights that will benefit both politicians and citizens who seek economic growth as well as the protection of public health and safety, financial security, environmental sustainability, and other civic goals. Contributors: Matthew D. Adler, Joseph E. Aldy, Christopher Carrigan, Cary Coglianese, E. Donald Elliott, Rolf Färe, Ann Ferris, Adam M. Finkel, Wayne B. Gray, Shawna Grosskopf, Michael A. Livermore, Brian F. Mannix, Jonathan S. Masur, Al McGartland, Richard Morgenstern, Carl A. Pasurka, Jr., William A. Pizer, Eric A. Posner, Lisa A. Robinson, Jason A. Schwartz, Ronald J. Shadbegian, Stuart Shapiro.




The Political Economy of Environmental Justice


Book Description

The environmental justice literature convincingly shows that poor people and minorities live in more polluted neighborhoods than do other groups. These findings have sparked a broad activist movement, numerous local lawsuits, and several federal policy reforms. Despite the importance of environmental justice, the topic has received little attention from economists. And yet, economists have much to contribute, as several explanations for the correlation between pollution and marginalized citizens rely on market mechanisms. Understanding the role of these mechanisms is crucial to designing policy remedies, for each lends itself to a different interpretation to the locus of injustices. Moreover, the different mechanisms have varied implications for the efficacy of policy responses—and who gains and loses from them. In the first book-length examination of environmental justice from the perspective of economics, a cast of top contributors evaluates why underprivileged citizens are overexposed to toxic environments and what policy can do to help. While the text engages economic methods, it is written for an interdisciplinary audience.




Environmental Law Regulations of Pesticide Usage: Challenges of Enforcement and Compliance in the Shinyanga Region, Tanzania


Book Description

The lack of compliance and enforcement of agricultural chemical use legislation in Tanzania has raised concerns due to the significant environmental and public health threats that result from the unregulated discharge of industrial effluents. The utilization of the 'Table of Eleven' tool, a behaviour-analysis model providing insight into the level of legislative compliance, makes it possible to explore motives that encourage farmers to comply with, or violate, the existing agricultural chemical use legislation. This paper discusses how the application of the 'Table of Eleven' tool has enabled the government of Tanzania to reveal strong and weak points pertaining to the compliance and enforcement of the agricultural chemical use legislation. As a result, it is clear that more attention is needed to improve comprehension of the legislation and to increase the use of incentives and economic instruments. Future steps should include applying this knowledge to the development of environmental indicators.







Green Leviathan


Book Description

The US, Switzerland and Canada are wealthy democracies that should be conducive to effective decentralized or cooperative environmental policy-making. However, a closer examination of their environmental policy over many decades finds no evidence that these approaches have worked. So does it matter which level of government makes policy? Can cooperation between sub-national governments protect the environment? Building on comparative case studies on air and water pollution and making use of extensive historical material, Inger Weibust questions how governance structure affects environmental policy performance in the US, Switzerland, Canada and the European Union. The research breaks new ground by studying formal and informal environmental cooperation. It analyzes whether federal systems with more centralized policy-making produce stricter environmental policies and debates whether devolution and the establishment of subsidiaries will lead to less environmental protection. An essential insight into the complexities of policy-making and governance structures, this book is an important contribution to the growing debates surrounding comparative federalism and multi-level governance.







Introduction to the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy


Book Description

"An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy" emphasises the importance of institutional design in addressing social problems. Three important issues concerning institutional design are: policies, instruments, and enforcement. This volume surveys each of the issues, and emphasises the common themes arising in optimal institutional design. These themes include the cost of complex institutional design, and the role of private institutions attaining social objects. This book will be particularly useful to law schools, departments of government, policy or economics, environmental managers and insurance companies.