Book Description

This dissertation consists of three independent papers dealing with three different research questions in the area of corporate finance. Despite the different topics all three papers have one main commonality: their focus on empirical identification. In the first paper, Competing with Superstars, we investigate the effect of superstar CEOs on their competitors. Exploiting shocks to CEO status due to prestigious media awards, we document a significant positive stock market performance of competitors of superstar CEOs subsequent to an award. The effect is more pronounced for competitors who have not received an award themselves, who are geographically close to an award winner and who are not entrenched. We observe an increase in risk-taking, operating performance and innovation activity of superstars' competitors as potential channels for this positive performance. Our results suggest a positive overall welfare impact of corporate superstar systems due to the incentivizing effect on superstars' competitors. The second paper, Unionization and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, investigates the effect of unionization on financial reporting quality. We establish causality by applying a regression discontinuity design exploiting the discontinuity generated by labor union elections that pass or fail by a small margin. Unionized firms improve their financial reporting quality by 2.6% the year after the election compared to nonunionized firms. The effect is mainly attributable to companies which understate their income. The effect is more pronounced in states with right to work laws and for companies with higher information asymmetry. Our results suggest that unions monitor companies if it potentially increases their rent seeking profits. In the third paper, Are There Peer Effects In Innovation?, we investigate how companies react to their peers' innovation activities, such as new patents. Exploiting exogenous.