Book Description

This dissertation consists of four essays in macro-finance, focusing on the cause and effect of asset prices, inequality, and welfare. In particular, these essays highlight the role of institutions and structural changes in shaping outcomes of asset markets and of the macro-economy. The two overarching objectives of these essays are to analyze mechanisms of asset price movements and to understand how these asset price movements affect the daily lives of people. The four chapters of this dissertation examine the implications of inertia and stock market non-participation for equity prices, risk sharing, and wealth inequality; causal effects of Chinese Communist Party's cadre promotion system on land prices in China; interconnection between homeownership and marriage; fiscal responses to income inequality shocks. The first chapter quantifies the general equilibrium effects of financial innovation that increases access to equity markets. I study an overlapping generations model with both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, solved with machine learning techniques. A benchmark economy with limited stock market participation and rebalancing frictions matches the current dynamics of macro aggregates, equity and bond returns, as well as wealth and portfolio concentration. A counterfactual experiment shows how widespread adoption of target date funds would improve risk sharing, reduce inequality, and generate substantial welfare gains for households in the bottom 90% of wealth distribution. The equity premium drops from 6.4% to 1.7%, while the standard deviation of equity returns stabilizes from 21.9% to 14.6%. Welfare implications vary with risk aversion and age. In general, the bottom 90% benefit from improved access to equity markets and better risk sharing, while the top 10% su↵er losses in wealth accumulation. Outcomes are very close between an economy with target date funds and one without any participation costs or rebalancing frictions. The second chapter identifies the causal effect of the Chinese Communist Party's performance- based promotion system to the country's real estate boom from 2003 to 2015. City-level leaders prioritizing economic growth allocate land at discounted prices to industrial firms rather than housing developers. Our analysis reveals that personal connections with provincial superiors are crucial for promotion and hence affect local land and housing supply. When city leaders share the same hometown as newly appointed provincial leaders, their chances of promotion increase by 15%, and GDP performances no longer matters. This connection reduces the need for industrial land allocation, resulting in a higher residential land supply in the city. In addition, cities with leaders who have hometown connections experience significantly higher supplies of residential land, and housing price growth rates are also 5% lower in these cities. The third chapter studies the phenomenon of marriage house in China and its effects on demo- graphics and homeownership. We first show empirical evidence for the complementarity between marriage and homeownership: single males with a marriage house (a house where the newlywed can move into) have 70% higher odds of getting married compared to their counterparts who do not have a marriage house. In addition, the timing of home purchase exhibits a clear cut-o↵ around the time of marriage, with the probability of purchasing a house peaking 0-2 years before marriage and slumping immediately after the time of marriage. Moreover, in the cross section, county house prices and average age at marriage are highly correlated in both level and in growth rate. We then quantify the marriage related incentives for homeownership using a lifecycle consumption-savings model with housing demand and ownership-dependent marriage shocks. In a counterfactual world where the marriage-house complementarity is absent, 45% of households under age 45 would delay their home purchases. Removing the marriage house friction from the marriage market would have slowed down the rise in age at first marriage by 40% between 1995 and 2010. Our results suggest that policies directed at either housing affordability or demographics can have significant consequences for both marriage and housing markets in China. Using data on U.S. state and federal taxes and transfers over the last quarter century, the fourth chapter estimates a regression model that yields the marginal effect of any shift of market income share from one quintile to another on the entire post tax, post-transfer income distribution. We identify exogenous income distribution changes and account for reverse causality using instruments based on exposure to international trade shocks, international commodity price shocks and national industry demand shocks, as well as lagged endogenous variables, with controls for the level of income, the business cycle and demographics. We find attenuation initially increases in quintile rank, peaks at the middle quintile and then falls for higher income quintiles, consistent with median voter political economy theory and the Stiglitz Director's law. We also provide evidence of considerable and systematic spillover effects on quintiles neither gaining nor losing in the "experiments, " also favoring the middle quintile. "Voting" and "income insurance" coalition analyses are presented. We find a strong negative relationship between average real income and the degree to which taxes and transfers are heavily redistributive.