Book Description

Globalization has been an important force in shaping the world economy and the way people live their lives in the past few decades. It has had sizable importance in the economic growth of many countries through the increase in trade, investment, new job creation, etc. While globalization has brought many benefits, it has also created many challenges such as the increase of the vulnerability of countries to crises, and the challenges of policy management of groups of sovereign countries. This dissertation, composed of three chapters, investigates some macroeconomic issues of the international economy. The first chapter proposes a method to access the channel through which the business cycle propagates to an economy and across countries. The second chapter investigates the fiscal rule design for integrated economies constituted in an economic and monetary union. The last chapter evaluates the effect of roadblocks, time delays, and bribes on interstate roads on regional trade integration in West Africa. In the first chapter, I have developed a method that can provide insights to researchers to better specify their quantitative models in international business cycle studies. The guidance comes from the application of an accounting procedure based on a prototype model of international growth that includes wedges capturing all the potential frictions and distortions of markets. For each country, I include an efficiency wedge, labor wedge, investment wedge, government wedge, preference wedge, and foreign asset wedge. I then demonstrate the method by applying it to the US and Canada during the Great Recession (2007-2008). I found that the economic downturns in both countries during this period were primarily due to the US investment wedge, US labor wedge, and US efficiency wedge, with the Canada investment wedge playing a secondary role. These results suggest that the crisis originated in the US and was propagated to Canada. The second chapter investigates the fiscal rule design for an economic union with an application to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) which has an integrated capital market and a common fiscal rule. I document a significant heterogeneity in government revenue, spending, and debt across WAEMU countries. Then, in this chapter, I present a quantitative analysis of the fiscal rule in WAEMU and propose an optimal reform using a theoretical framework that models fiscal policy under present-biased governments facing shocks to their fiscal needs. The model highlights a trade-off between government flexibility in responding to shocks and a commitment to limit the incentive to overborrow. I find that the current 3\% deficit limit rule, which is uniform across all WAEMU countries, improves welfare for the citizens of all countries compared to a scenario with no fiscal rule. However, country-specific fiscal rules would lead to a Pareto improvement over the current uniform rule. The optimal deficit limit for each country would depend on the volatility of the shocks to its spending needs and the strength of the political-economic and monetary-economic frictions of its government. In addition, by imposing a uniform fiscal rule on all members, WAEMU foregoes 24\% of the welfare gains that could be achieved with a country-specific fiscal rule. In summary, I show that while WAEMU countries benefit from having a common fiscal rule, a tailored approach that considers the specific characteristics of each member country would enhance welfare even further. The third chapter (\emph{co-authored with Idossou Marius Adom}) explores the effects of roadblocks, time delays, and bribes along interstate roads on the regional trade integration in West Africa. Indeed, it is a well-known fact that regional trade within Africa is low compared to other regions in the world. In this paper, we rely on the Improved Road-Transport Governance reports to construct a novel data set that measures trade-related roadblocks, time delays, and bribes on eight interstate roads in Western Africa between 2006 and 2013 to investigate their effects on bilateral trade in the region. These interstate roads connect three landlocked countries -- Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali -- to other coastal countries. We document that roadblocks, delays, and bribes are pervasive on the roads. During goods transportation, trucks experience up to more than 25 controls, are delayed by up to more than 5 hours, and pay between 45 and 115 US dollars bribe. Our empirical analyses show that the delays seriously impede bilateral trade between the connected countries while corruption tends to match the ``grease the wheels'' theory.