Essays in International Macroeconomics


Book Description

This dissertation consists of two essays in international macroeconomics. The first essay shows that optimal fiscal and monetary policy is time consistent in a standard small open economy. Further, there exist many maturity structures of public debt capable of rendering the optimal policy time consistent. This result is in sharp contrast with that obtained in the context of closed-economy models. In the closed economy, the time consistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policy imposes severe restrictions on public debt in the form of a unique term structure of public debt that governments can leave to their successors at each point in time. The time consistent result is robust: optimal policy is time consistent when both real and nominal bonds have finite horizons. While in a closed economy, governments must have both nominal and real bonds, and have at least real bonds over an infinite horizon to render optimal policy time consistent.







Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Dynamic Economies


Book Description

Over the past twenty five years, fiscal and monetary authorities around the world have pursued policies roughly consistent with the insights from optimal monetary and fiscal policy. In the area of monetary policy, the modern consensus is to set policy rules so that nominal interest rates and inflation are low. In the area of fiscal policy, statutory corporate income tax rates have decreased sharply in OECD countries on average over time. Typically, theoretical models in the literature usually examine either monetary or fiscal policies in isolation, but not both of them simultaneously. This book presents two alternative dynamic, general equilibrium models where the prescriptions from optimal monetary and fiscal policies are simultaneously examined. These models offer some new insights on the interaction of such policies, especially in terms of their effects on household s welfare. A third chapter examines optimal fiscal policy in the context of preference reversals. This book should be especially useful for policymakers in the area of macroeconomics and researchers working in the field.




Essays on Monetary and Fiscal Policy


Book Description

My dissertation investigates the transmission of monetary and fiscal policy using both empirical and theoretical frameworks. Chapter 1 examines how the number of products sold by a firm affect its decisions regarding price setting and information acquisition. Using a firm-level survey from New Zealand, I show that firms that produce more goods have both better information about aggregate inflation and more frequent but smaller price changes. To characterize the implications of these empirical findings for the ability of monetary policy to stimulate the economy, I develop a new dynamic general equilibrium model with rationally inattentive multi-product firms that pay a menu cost to reset their prices. I show that the interaction of the menu cost and rational inattention frictions leads firms to adopt a wait-and-see policy and gives rise to a new selection effect: firms have time-varying inaction bands widened by their subjective uncertainty about the economy such that price adjusters choose to be better informed than non-adjusters. This selection effect endogenously generates a distribution of desired price changes with a majority near zero and some very far from zero, which acts as a strong force to amplify monetary non-neutrality. I calibrate the model to be consistent with the micro-evidence on both prices and inattention and find two main quantitative results. First, the new selection effect, coupled with imperfect information of price setters, leads to real effects of monetary policy shocks in the one-good version of the model that are nearly as large as those in the Calvo model. Second, in the two-good version of the model, as firms optimally choose to have better information about monetary shocks, the real effects of monetary policy shocks decline by 20%. In Chapter 2, joint with Hassan Afrouzi, we develop a general equilibrium flexible price model with dynamic rational inattention in which the slope of the Phillips curve is endogenous to systematic aspects of monetary policy. This Phillips curve is flatter when the monetary policy is more hawkish: rationally inattentive firms find it optimal to ignore monetary policy shocks when the monetary authority commits to stabilize nominal variables. Moreover, an unexpectedly more dovish monetary policy leads to a completely flat Phillips curve in the short-run and a steeper Phillips curve in the long-run. We also develop a tractable method for solving general dynamic rational inattention models in linear quadratic Gaussian setups. Chapter 3 asks whether the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus policy depends on the degree of economic income inequality. Many previous works about state-dependence of fiscal multiplier have focused on the degree of slack in the economy. In a surge of concerns about rising inequality of the U.S., I use rich historical state-level data on military procurement and inequality to find the relationship between the degree of income inequality and the local government spending multipliers. I show that the effects of government spending shocks on output are larger in low-inequality states than in high-inequality states. In contrast, I find no evidence that employment multipliers differ by the extent of income inequality. These results are robust to various specifications and other sources of inequality data. I also estimate aggregate output multipliers using historical military spending and income inequality data. I find the evidence that aggregate output multipliers are high when the income inequality is low. Thus, both local and aggregate multipliers are significantly affected by the degree of income inequality of an economy. I consider a variety of potential theoretical explanations for the results, including heterogeneous within-sector inequality and distributional effects of government spending shock, but find that none can adequately explain this finding













Essays in Monetary and Fiscal Policy


Book Description

This thesis is composed by four chapters on New Keynesian macroeconomics. Chapter 1 develops a small New Keynesian model augmented with a steady state level of public debt and a share of rule-of-thumb consumers (ROTC henceforth) as in Gal? etal. (2004; 2007). This chapter focuses on the consequences for the design of monetary and?scal rules, of the bifurcation on the demand side of the economy generated by the presence of ROTC, in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. When?scal policy follows a balanced budget rule, the share of ROTC determines whether an active and/or a passive monetary policy in the sense of Leeper (1991) guarantees determinacy. When a short run public debt asset is introduced, the amount of ROTC determines whether equilibrium determinacy requires a mix of active (passive) monetary policy and a passive (active) fiscal policy or a mix where both policies are active or passive. Chapter 2 studies the equilibrium determinacy of a New Keynesian model augmented with trend inflation, public debt and distortionary taxation. Both the level of long run inflation as well as the stock of steady state public debt have to be explicitly taken into consideration for the characterisation of the equilibrium dynamics between monetary and fiscal policy. Chapter 3 considers the implications of external habits for optimal monetary policy in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model, when those habits exist at the levelof individual goods as in Ravn et al. (2006). External habits generate an additional distortion in the economy, which implies that the flex-price equilibrium will no longer be efficient and that policy faces interesting new trade-offs and potential stabilisation biases. The endogenous mark-up behaviour, which emerges with deep habits, signi?cantly a?ects the optimal policy response to shocks and the stabilising properties of standard simplerules. Chapter 4 analyses both optimal monetary and?scal policy in a New Keynesian model augmented with deep habits and valuable government spending. We?find that, in line with the general consensus in the macro literature,?scal policy adds very little to optimal monetary policy as a stabilisation device.




Essays in Macroeconomic Theory


Book Description

This thesis investigates the design of appropriate institutions to ensure the good conduct of fiscal and monetary policy. The three chapters develop theoretical frameworks to address the time-inconsistency of policy plans or prevent the occurrence of self-fulfilling prophecies. Time-inconsistency refers to a situation where preferences over policy change over time. Optimal policy plans are not credible, since agents anticipate the implementation of another policy in the future. This issue is particularly pervasive to monetary policy, since nominal quantities (price level, interest rates, etc.) are very sensitive to expected policies, but predetermined to actual policy choices. The first chapter investigates how fiscal policy can mitigate the inflation bias of monetary policy in an economy with heterogeneous agents. Whenever there is a desire for redistribution, progressive fiscal helps to implement a policy mix less biased toward inflation. Importantly, even the richest supports some fiscal progressivity, since over their life cycle, they benefit from a more balanced policy-mix. A self-fulfilling prophecy, or coordination failure, refers to a situation where a more desirable economic outcome could be reached, but fail to be, by the only effect of pessimistic expectations. Self-fulfilling debt crises are a classical example: pessimistic investors bid down the price of debt, which increases the likelihood of default, which in turn justifies the initial decrease in price. The second chapter, co-authored with Russell Cooper, asks whether monetary policy can deter self-fulfilling debt crises. The analysis shows how a counter-cyclical inflation policy with commitment is effective in doing so. Importantly, it can be implemented without endangering the primary objective of monetary policy, to deliver an inflation target for instance. The third chapter, co-authored with Andrew Gimber, revisits the classic Laffer curve coordination failure: taxes could be low, but they are high because agents anticipate high tax rates. In a dynamic environment with debt issuance, the multiplicity of equilibria critically depends on inherited debt. At high levels of public debt, fiscal policy is pro-cyclical: taxes increase when output decreases, and self-fulfilling fiscal crisis can occur. Overall, this chapter sheds light on the perils of high level of public debt.