Social Emulation, the Evolution of Gender Norms, and Intergenerational Transfers


Book Description

In this dissertation, I develop theoretical models and an empirical study of the role of social interactions, the evolution of social norms, and their impact on individual behavior. Although my models are consistent with individual utility maximization, they generally emphasize social factors that channel individual decisions and/or shape individuals' preferences. I apply this approach to three different issues: labor supply, fertility decisions, and intergenerational transfers, generating predictions that are more consistent with observed empirical patterns of behavior than standard neoclassical approaches that assume independent preferences, perfect information, and efficient markets. In the first essay, I explain the long-run evolution of working hours during the 20th century in developed countries: the substantial decline for the first three quarters of the 20th century and the deceleration or even reversal of the fall in working hours in the last quarter. I develop a model of the determination of working hours and how this process is affected by both the conflict between employers and employees and the employees' desire to emulate the consumption standards of the rich reference group. The model also explores the effects of direct and indirect policies to limit hours advocated by political representations of workers such as trade unions or leftist parties. In the second essay, I study the coevolution of gender norms and fertility regimes. Since the 1990s, a new pattern of positive correlation between fertility rates and female labor force participation emerged in developed countries. This recent trend seems inconsistent with conventional economic approaches that explain fertility decline as a result of the increasing opportunity costs of childrearing, predicting a negative correlation between fertility and women's labor force participation. To address this puzzle, I develop a model of the evolution of gender norms and fertility in various economic environments influenced by the level of women's wages. Randomly matched spouses make choices related to fertility - labor supply and the division of household labor - based on their preferences shaped by gender norms. In the model, norm updating is influenced by both within-family payoffs and conformism payoffs from social interactions among the same sex. The model shows how changes in economic environments and the degree of conformism toward norms can alter fertility outcomes. The results suggest that the asymmetric evolution of gender norms between men and women could contribute to very low fertility, explaining the positive correlation between fertility and women's labor force participation. Finally, I estimate the effect of exogenously introduced public pensions for the elderly on the amount of private transfers they receive. There has been a long debate whether public transfers crowd out private transfers. Previous empirical studies on this issue suffer from the endogeneity of income that contaminates estimates. I use an exogenously introduced public transfer, the Basic Old Age Pension in Korea, to test the crowding out hypothesis. A considerable proportion of the elderly population, especially women living without a spouse, do not experience the crowding out effect and moreover, among those who do, the size of the effect is relatively small. The results support the redistribution effect of the Basic Old Age Pension targeting the poor elderly in Korea.




Social Dynamics


Book Description

This collection of essays presents a variety of approaches to understanding the dynamics of human interaction.




Essays on Genetic Evolution and Economics


Book Description

Ever since Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species in 1859, genetic evolutionary theory has increasingly served as the foundation for fields that deal with organisms that arose by natural selection. This thesis argues that economic theory should integrate with Darwinian theory through the creation of a "genetic evolutionary economics". The promise of genetic evolutionary economics is a better understanding of human nature and, consequently, a more accurate and comprehensive economic science. Economic theory rests on a set of assumptions about human nature. These economic axioms concern human genes, but there is no explicit connection between genetic evolution and economic theory. As a result, human behavior and economic predictions of that behavior diverge in a variety of important settings. Why, for example, do most people save too little for the future when economics assumes that they will save enough? Chapter 2 discusses the difficulties inherent in the standard economic approach. Natural selection theory, the chapter argues, is the best tool for refining the axioms of economics. Genetic evolutionary economics allows the derivation of parameters that are intractable with standard economic techniques. There is, for instance, an ancient debate within economics about the role of self-interest in human affairs. Chapter 3 builds a genetic evolutionary model relevant to this issue, and concludes that a Darwinian lens removes many of the apparent paradoxes. Genetic evolutionary economics is a scientific endeavor. As such, it produces specific, testable hypotheses concerning behavior in economically relevant situations. Chapter 4 reports on a theoretical and experimental investigation of gift giving. A genetic evolutionary model organizes the existing data on gift giving and makes novel, testable predictions. Laboratory experiments, performed to test the theory, confirm the evolutionary model's predictions.




Essays on the Economics of Social Interactions


Book Description

This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays on the economics of social interactions. The first chapter is coauthored with Lorenzo Verstraeten. Knowing that Individuals interact with their peers, we study how a social planner can intervene, changing these interactions, in order to achieve a particular objective. When the objective is welfare maximization, we describe the interventions for games of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. We show that, for strategic complements, the planner uses resources to target central players; while she divides individuals into separated communities in the case of strategic substitutes. We study which connections she targets in order to achieve these goals. The second chapter is coauthored with Lorenzo Verstraeten and analyzes a model of contagion on social network. We ask how a social planner should intervene to prevent contagion. We characterize the optimal intervention and the cost associated. We discuss the intuition behind the choice of the planner and we provide comparative static on the cost of intervention for different type of network. In the third chapter I develop a theoretical study about groups relationship and ask whether intragroup cooperation crowd-out intergroup cooperation. I consider a gift-giving game where cooperation endogenously arises, within and across groups. Cooperation is sustained through peer punishment with the help of a group specific monitoring technology. I specify under which conditions cooperation crowding-out occur. I identify two classes of equilibrium: a Sorting equilibrium where guilty players prefer to be matched outside their group due to a less efficient Out-Group monitoring technology, and a Non Sorting equilibrium where the higher level of In-Group cooperation makes it more attractive for everybody. I then compare their welfare properties and draw conclusions on optimal punishment levels.







Non-Equilibrium Social Science and Policy


Book Description

The overall aim of this book, an outcome of the European FP7 FET Open NESS project, is to contribute to the ongoing effort to put the quantitative social sciences on a proper footing for the 21st century. A key focus is economics, and its implications on policy making, where the still dominant traditional approach increasingly struggles to capture the economic realities we observe in the world today - with vested interests getting too often in the way of real advances. Insights into behavioral economics and modern computing techniques have made possible both the integration of larger information sets and the exploration of disequilibrium behavior. The domain-based chapters of this work illustrate how economic theory is the only branch of social sciences which still holds to its old paradigm of an equilibrium science - an assumption that has already been relaxed in all related fields of research in the light of recent advances in complex and dynamical systems theory and related data mining. The other chapters give various takes on policy and decision making in this context. Written in nontechnical style throughout, with a mix of tutorial and essay-like contributions, this book will benefit all researchers, scientists, professionals and practitioners interested in learning about the 'thinking in complexity' to understand how socio-economic systems really work.




Economics in the Shadows of Darwin and Marx


Book Description

'Almost 150 years after their major works were published Darwin and Marx stand alone as the premier theorists of the evolution of complex living systems. Hodgson's unique contribution in these essays is to capture the spirit of these two great thinkers in their ability to see universal principles in particular contextual frameworks. Using an evolutionary and institutional approach to examine a variety of theoretical issues Hodgson avoids both the postmodern disease of extreme relativism and the rigidity of insisting on "one true religion" for economic theory. This book is a major contribution to the current revolution in economic theory.' - John M. Gowdy, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, US Economics in the Shadows of Darwin and Marx examines the legacies of these two giants of thought for the social sciences in the twenty-first century.




Institutions and Evolution of Capitalism


Book Description

In just over 30 years, Geoff Hodgson has made substantial contributions to institutional economics, evolutionary economics, economic methodology, the history of economic thought and social theory. To mark his seminal work, this volume brings together original contributions by world-leading scholars in specific areas that have played a significant role in influencing his thinking or represent key debates to which he has contributed. Building on some of the most significant philosophical and methodological foundations underlying Hodgson's work, the volume is organised around the recurring themes of institutions, evolution and capitalism.




Essays on Social Change and Economic Development


Book Description

This dissertation contributes toward our understanding of social change and socio-economic development. Chapter 1 introduces multiple key factors driving social change and leading to economic and social development. In Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, by analyzing historical natural experiments, I study the role of information, social interactions, and human capital in social changes, and their relationship with economic and social development. Chapter 2, "Political Information, Social Interactions, and Protest in Late Imperial China", investigates how information and social interactions drive social change by leading to collective actions (protests). A modern communication infrastructure allows information to reach people through the news media, while social interactions are needed to coordinate social movements. The postal system's rapid construction in 1903-1910 in China let newspapers spread information directly to an increasing portion of the population. The change in information diffusion coincided with intensive media attention on revolutionary activities before the Revolution of 1911. I find that the construction of more post offices in a place led to more protests in the years with more reports about revolutionary activities in newspapers. I further disentangle the roles of direct information diffusion and social interactions. I define a village network based on the village's location, the walking time between villages, and the village's dialect group. I build and estimate a game-theoretical model based on the village network. As political information directly changed the villages which had post offices nearby and could receive information, I also find a strong peer effect: a village was affected by its expectation of its neighbors' actions. The peer effect spread the direct impact of political information through social interactions. Chapter 3, "Wartime Social Interactions and Veteran Migration in The Post-American Civil War Era", explores the role of social interactions in social change and economic development after the American Civil War. I focus on temporary social interactions among African American veterans during the American Civil War (1861--1865), and examine the long-term impacts of temporary social interactions on veterans' migration and income in 1870--1900. I find that wartime social networks (veterans from the same company) persistently affected veterans' location choices in the post-Civil War period. By estimating discrete choice migration models, I quantified that the veterans were more likely to move to a county where men from their military company lived. I further show the long-term benefits of living together. Veterans earned higher incomes after the war if they lived in the same county with wartime friends who had higher incomes after the war. Chapter 4, "Temple Destruction, School Construction, and Modern Human Capital in 20th Century China" (jointly written with Shaoda Wang), studies how modern human capital emerged in early 20th-century China and its impacts on economic development. We documented a historical episode known as the Temple Destruction Movement (TDM), during which Chinese local governments appropriated huge amounts of Buddhist and Taoist temple assets to support the modernization of the local schooling system. We found that before the TDM, the initial stock of temple assets was uncorrelated with the levels and trends of human capital development. However, after the TDM started, regions with higher initial stocks of temple assets constructed more modern schools, enrolled more students in modern educational programs, and produced more modern elites.