Book Description

We are beginning to realize the emergence of a new age--the information age. On the one hand, the full dimensions of this new age, if indeed it is such, are unknown. On the other hand, the authors argue that enough is known to conclude that the conduct of war in the future will be profoundly different. Paradoxically, however, they claim that the nature of war will remain basically the same. In this monograph, General Sullivan and Colonel Dubik examine that paradox and draw some inferences from it. When societies and states changed from an agrarian base to an industrial base, the way they made war also changed. Industrial nations furnished their armies with tools very different from those produced by agrarian nations: the machine gun, steam and petroleum powered engines, the railroad, telegraph, radios, aircraft, and much more. Furthermore, industrial armies changed in organization. Their leadership requirements were different and they developed new operational concepts. The nature of war, however, did not change. In spite of the "new" industrial technology, war remained a human endeavor and very much as Carl von Clausewitz described it in the early 18th century; subject to emotion and characterized by death and destruction. Human fears, bravery, sacrifice and courage operated within the realm of fog, friction and uncertainty. Great captains were masters of both the science and art of war. The root causes of war also stayed the same. People, whether heads of states or leaders of other kinds of groups, still started wars as a result of fear, hatred, greed, ambition, revenge or a host of other "nonrational" considerations. The authors of this study suggest that today we stand at what many consider the threshold of the information age, an age that has already begun to transform the conduct of warfare just as the industrial age did earlier. New weapons systems, organizations, and operational concepts will emerge, just as they did in response to industrialism. No one knows the full details of what the information age will bring, but the authors demonstrate that the future is sufficiently clear to move the Army in the right direction. Also clear is the fact that Clausewitz is still relevant to the study of war because while the conduct of war will change, the nature of war will be the same. This monograph explains the governing concepts of the industrial age and how they affected the concept of war. Then it describes the concepts emerging to govern the information age and suggests ways in which these concepts may affect the conduct of war. Finally, the monograph discusses those steps that the Army is taking to position itself to exploit what are becoming the dominant military requirements of the information age: speed and precision. Specifically, the authors discuss the ways in which the Army has changed its strategic systems over the past several years so that the Army operational and tactical forces will be able to "see" a situation, decide, adapt, and act faster and more precisely than their opponent. These changes will give strategic planners, and operational and tactical commanders, a new set of information age tools to use in theater and on the battlefield. The net result: more flexibility, more versatility, faster decision making, and broader scope of weapons systems at their immediate disposal.