› › Evidence Of Informed Trading Prior To Earnings Announcements

Evidence of Informed Trading Prior to Earnings Announcements

Author : John Affleck-Graves

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Page : 22 pages

File Size : 24,53 MB

Release : 2014

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Book Description

This study examines transactions in stocks during the thirty trading days prior to earnings announcements. Using two methodologies, we find evidence of informed trading for initiators of large transactions (presumably institutions) but not for initiators of small transactions (presumably individuals). Specifically, we find that, relative to a control period, initiators of large transactions tend to buy (sell) stocks prior to earnings announcements that exceed (fall short of) analyst forecasts. In addition, the fraction of total stock price movement that occurs on large transactions is substantially higher during the pre-announcement period than during the control period. Results of both tests suggest, contrary to previous research, that some large traders have and use superior private information prior to large earnings surprises.



The Signal Quality of Earnings Announcements

Author : Lu Xie

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Page : pages

File Size : 45,89 MB

Release : 2020

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This study examines the revealed preference of informed traders to infer the extent to which earnings announcements are informative of subsequent stock price responses. From 2011 to 2015, a cartel of sophisticated traders illegally obtained early access to firm press releases prior to publication and traded over 1,000 earnings announcements. I study their constrained profit maximization: which earnings announcements they chose to trade vs. which ones they forwent trading. Consistent with theory, these traders targeted more liquid earnings announcements with larger subsequent stock price movement. Despite earning large profits overall, the informed traders enjoyed only mixed success in identifying the biggest profit opportunities. Controlling for liquidity differences, only 31% of their trades were in the most extreme announcement period return deciles. I model the informed traders' tradeoff between liquidity and expected returns. From this model, I recover an average signal-to-noise ratio of 0.4. I further explore two potential economic sources of this noise: (i) ambiguous market expectations of earnings announcements and (ii) heterogeneous interpretations of earnings information by the marginal investor. Empirically, I document that the informed traders avoided noisier earnings announcements as measured by both sources of noise.



Individual and Institutional Informed Trading in Competing Firms Around Earnings Announcements

Author : Priyantha Mudalige

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Page : 44 pages

File Size : 27,62 MB

Release : 2016

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Book Description

This study investigates individual and institutional trading activities in competing firms to infer informed trading. We find evidence for individual and institutional informed trading in competing firms around earnings announcements. The evidence is stronger prior to announcements than after announcements. Magnitude of institutional (individual) net order flow coefficient decreases (increases) with lag length, suggesting that institutional trading captures information faster than individual trading. Individual net order flow transmit information cross-stock when competitor is a small firm while institutional net order flow conveys information cross-stock irrespective of firm size. Our results will be informative for regulators with regard to insider trading laws and provide insights for market participants on the impact of individual and institutional trading on cross-stock price discovery process.



Informed Trading Behavior of Institutions and Individuals Around Earnings Announcements

Author : Yu-Chen Wei

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Page : pages

File Size : 47,13 MB

Release : 2018

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Book Description

This study constructs the institutional- and individual-based probability of informed trading (PIN) by adjusting Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002) and investigates the impact of the informed trading behaviors of institutions and individuals on the post-announcement drift around the earnings announcement. The differences between this study and the previous literatures lie in that the investor types of informed traders are distinguished as institutions and individuals. Besides, the trading date effect is considered to examine the informed trading behaviors. The findings show that the informed trading behaviors of institutions and individuals can be distinguished. If there are informed traders involves in the stocks, the cumulative abnormal returns after the earnings announcement may be higher than the other stocks with no informed traders. Some individuals may possess relevant information that may prompt them to trade prior to or after the earnings announcement. The findings of the study may contribute to the government regulations and portfolio selections.



Informed Trading Before Positive Vs. Negative Earnings Surprises

Author : Tae Jun Park

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Page : pages

File Size : 25,62 MB

Release : 2014

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This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around the announcements of positive or negative earnings surprises. Using Korean data over the period of 2001-2010, we find that information asymmetry is larger before negative earnings surprises (earnings shock) among investors and that the trading volume decreases only before earnings shock announcements due to the severe information asymmetry. We also find that institutions sell their stocks prior to earnings shock announcements whereas individual and foreign investors do not anticipate bad news. Finally, we find that institutional trade imbalance is positively related to the post-announcement abnormal returns of negative events. This study complements and extends prior literature on informed trading around earnings announcements by documenting evidence that domestic institutions exploit their superior information around particularly earnings shock announcements.



Digital Insiders and Informed Trading Before Earnings Announcements

Author : Henk Berkman

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Page : 45 pages

File Size : 29,88 MB

Release : 2019

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Book Description

While it is widely acknowledged that companies face increasing cybersecurity risk stemming from hackers stealing customer information, a relatively unknown cybersecurity risk is from information leakage and subsequent trading by digital insiders - hackers who target corporations to obtain non-public corporate information for illegal trading. We use a firm-specific measure of cybersecurity risk mitigation based on textual analysis of 10-Ks to proxy for the organization's ability to reduce the probability of digital insider trading. We find that a larger share of new earnings information is incorporated into prices prior to earnings announcements for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores. We also find that pre-announcement trading by short sellers is more predictive of earnings surprises for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation. Further, on days closer to earnings announcements, firms with relatively low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores experience a larger increase in bid-ask spreads, particularly the adverse selection component. These results suggest that weak cybersecurity risk mitigation provides opportunities for acquisition of private information and that trading by privately informed traders is more likely in stocks of firms with higher exposure to cybercrimes.



So What Orders Do Informed Traders Use? Evidence from Quarterly Earnings Announcements

Author : Hsiao-Fen Yang

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Page : pages

File Size : 42,18 MB

Release : 2011

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This paper examines what orders informed traders use before quarterly earnings announcements. In particular, we investigate whether informed traders prefer median orders and market orders right before quarterly earnings announcements. Quarterly earnings announcements are anticipated events. Because informed traders expect their information advantage will disappear after the announcements, this information event provides a unique opportunity to test whether informed traders become more impatient and use more aggressive orders when the announcement is approaching. Our results show that when the information will be released soon but there is still enough time for the execution (from day -10 to day -6), informed investors use small orders and limit orders to trade stealthily and reduce price risk. Within five days right before the announcements, informed investors trade more aggressively. They start using large market orders to ensure the execution and high profits. Our findings that informed traders change their preference for order type and order size over time shed new light on the ongoing debate on the order submission strategies by informed traders.



Passive Informed Trading Around Earnings Announcements

Author : Brian Roseman

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Page : 47 pages

File Size : 34,17 MB

Release : 2018

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Using a sample of NASDAQ firms we investigate informed trading in the limit order book (LOB) prior to earnings announcements. Consistent with recent limit order theory, and in contrast to classic adverse selection models, we show that informed traders supply liquidity. Relative to a sample of low-shock announcements as a control, we find that for high-shock firms, the spread is lower, the correlation of bid and ask depth is higher, the implied cost of trading is lower, and the information share of component of the limit order book is higher, relative to low-shock earnings announcements.



Informed Trading Before Positive Vs. Negative Earnings Surprises

Author : Kyojik Song

Publisher :

Page : 42 pages

File Size : 49,31 MB

Release : 2017

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Book Description

This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions have informational advantage before negative earnings surprises but not before positive earnings surprises since the positive news tend to leak to market before the event. Using unique Korean data over the period of 2001-2010, we find that trading volume decreases only before the negative event due to information asymmetry among investors. We also find that institutions sell the stock before the negative earnings surprises but individual investors do not anticipate the bad news, and that trade imbalance by the institutions is positively related to the announcement abnormal returns of the negative events. The evidence is consistent with our conjecture that the domestic institutions exploit their superior information around the negative earnings surprises. Our results also show that foreign investors do not have any informational advantage compared to local investors on the upcoming earnings news.



The nature of informed option trading

Author : Marco Klapper

Publisher : GRIN Verlag

Page : 68 pages

File Size : 45,10 MB

Release : 2013-09-25

Category : Business & Economics

ISBN : 365650444X

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Book Description

Master's Thesis from the year 2013 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: 8.5 (A+), Erasmus University Rotterdam (Rotterdam School of Management), language: English, abstract: This thesis examines the kind of information “informed” traders have prior to a takeover announcement using options of target firms. I find that option liquidity rises before a takeover announcement, indicating the presence of informed traders. Using 2,390 M&A events, I show that the implied volatility (IV) skew and the relative option-to-stock trading volume O/S predict negatively on target announcement returns, but that the difference between implied volatilities of calls and puts (IV spread) has no predictive power. The main results indicate that the predictive power of these three informed option trading proxies increases if target management is entrenched and if the bidder and the target are in the same industry. I conclude that informed trading is partially driven by industry insiders with specific knowledge about the future acquisition. However, the results are only significant for one or two informed option trading proxies at a time.