Book Description

The Department of Defense s (DOD) FY2007 budget proposes to cancel the F136 alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a program that was initiated by Congress in the FY1996 Defense Authorization Act, and which has received consistent congressional support since its inception. In FY1996, defense authorization conferees (H. Rept. 104-450, Sec. 213) expressed their concern over a lack of engine competition in the JSF program and directed DOD to ensure that the program provides for adequate engine competition. (p.706)1 In FY1998, authorization conferees (H. Rept. 105-340, Sec. 213) directed DOD to certify that the Joint Strike Fighter Program contains sufficient funding to carry out an alternate engine development program that includes flight qualification of an alternate engine in a joint strike fighter airframe. (p.33) Some have criticized DOD as being penny wise and pound foolish in its proposal to terminate the F136. Critics argue that this decision appears driven more by immediate budget pressures on the department rather than long term pros and cons of the F136 program. Others applaud this decision, and say that single source engine production contracts are the norm, not the exception. Long-term engine affordability, they claim, is best achieved by procuring engines through multiyear contracts from a single source. Cancelling the F-136 poses questions on operational risk and potential cost and savings. Additional issues include the potential impact this termination could have on the U.S. defense industrial base, and on U.S. relations with key allied countries. Finally, eliminating competitive market forces for DOD business worth billions of dollars may concern those who wish to reform DOD s acquisition system and conform to higher standards of accountability.