Antitrust Federalism


Book Description

This work examines the role that state antitrust law plays in our national competitve policy and surveys the similarities and differences between state and federal antitrust laws.










Federalism and State Antitrust Regulations


Book Description

This book discusses the protection of consumer's interests and welfare provided by the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890. Forms of indictments and complaints under the Act are provided in an appendix to the work.




Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US


Book Description

This book analyses multi-level governance in competition policy, or "antitrust federalism", in the US and the EU from a comparative perspective. The book compares how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. The book compares how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. The EU and the US stand among the strongest existing examples of multi-level polities and they developed mature competition policies. Despite such similarities, however, recent developments imply that they are moving in different directions in the field of antitrust federalism. Inspired by these divergent policy developments taking place at both sides of the Atlantic, the book addresses three principal research questions: firstly, what are the key similarities and differences between the US and the EU in terms of antitrust federalism; secondly, what are the reasons for differences (if any), and finally, can the US and the EU draw any policy lessons from each others' experiences in antitrust federalism? The book is essentially multidisciplinary in nature and it aims to initiate a dialogue between the law and political science literatures in its field.







Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US


Book Description

The EU and the US are the preeminent examples of multi-level polities and both have highly developed competition policies. Despite these similarities however, recent developments suggest that they are moving in different directions in the area of antitrust federalism. This book examines multi-level governance in competition policy from a comparative perspective. The book analyses how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. Inspired by the increasingly divergent policy developments taking place on both sides of the Atlantic, the author asks whether the EU and the US can draw policy lessons from each other’s experiences in antitrust federalism. Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US reveals the similarities and differences between the European and American models of antitrust federalism whilst employing policy network models in its comparative analysis of issues such as opacity and accountability in networks. The book is essentially multidisciplinary in its effort to initiate dialogue between the Law and Political Science literatures in this field. This book will be of particular interest to academics, students and practitioners of Competition Law, Constitutional Law and Political Science.




State Antitrust Law


Book Description




Free Market State (Of Mind)


Book Description

The Utah Constitution states that “[i]t is the policy of the state of Utah that a free market system shall govern trade and commerce in this state to promote the dispersion of economic and political power and the general welfare of all the people.” Utah's so-called Free Market Clause, adopted in 1992, is unique among the constitutions of the fifty states. Through an excavation of the historical record and contemporary literature, this article shows that the Free Market Clause owes its existence to the influence of Professor John J. Flynn of the University of Utah, whose pioneering work on antitrust federalism was rooted in Rawlsian notions of distributive justice and economic equality. One of the early critics of the Chicago School's output-based economic approach to antitrust analysis, Flynn actively sought to infuse antitrust regulation, primarily at the state level, with notions of wealth inequality, distributive justice and individual liberty. Yet in recent years conservative groups have taken up the Free Market Clause as a potential deterrent to progressive regulation. And in the three decades since it was enacted, the courts of Utah have all but forgotten the origin and purpose of this unique and empowering constitutional pronouncement, finding it to be non-self-executing and thereby non-judiciable. This Article, for the first time, unearths the forgotten intellectual history of Utah's Free Market Clause and explores its three principal applications: (1) an interpretive aid to Utah's Antitrust Act, which was modeled on the federal Sherman Antitrust Act, (2) a standalone constitutional claim against anticompetitive state regulations and private conduct, and (3) an alternative approach to federal antitrust analysis that supplements neoclassical economics with concerns over wealth inequality, distributive justice and individual liberty.




Federalism and Antitrust Reform


Book Description

Currently the Antitrust Modernization Commission is considering numerous proposals for adjusting the relationship between federal antitrust authority and state regulation. This essay examines two areas that have produced a significant amount of state-federal conflict: state regulation of insurance and the state action immunity for general state regulation. It argues that no principle of efficiency, regulatory theory, or federalism justifies the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which creates an antitrust immunity for state regulation of insurance. What few benefits the Act confers could be fully realized by an appropriate interpretation of the state action doctrine. Second, the current formulation of the antitrust state action doctrine creates approximately the correct balance between state and federal authority where competition is concerned, although both its clear articulation and active supervision prongs need to be strengthened and refined. In addition, basing state action immunity on the degree to which a state imposes the burden of in-state monopoly on out-of-state interests very likely comes with greater costs than any benefit that is likely to result.