Financial Crisis Containment and Government Guarantees


Book Description

ÔThis enlightening volume provides an invaluable guide for those perplexed by the seemingly intractable problems of financial crises, sovereign distress, and government guarantees. Contributors include an all-star cast of leading figures in the field. Highly recommended.Õ Ð Geoffrey Miller, New York University, US ÔThe history of the 2007Ð09 and possibly beyond near-global financial crisis needs to be examined carefully in order to identify and understand the causes, the transmission across countries, the harm to macroeconomies, the public policies adopted, the effectiveness of such policies, and the lessons to be learned to prevent or at least mitigate future such crises. This volume contributes to this task. It brings together under one cover the analyses of the various aspects of the crisis by experts in each area. It should be priority reading for serious students of the crisis.Õ Ð George G. Kaufman, Loyola University Chicago, US ÔThe combination of the skills of the lawyer and of the economist has proved increasingly fruitful, developing both understanding and policy in many areas of life, such as accident prevention, crime prevention, and healthcare. This book follows the precedent of these areas and assembles a group of lawyers and economists who by their contributions, consider how best to deal with financial crises, and how to make their future occurrence less likely. It is both intellectually stimulating and practically important. The authors and editors are to be congratulated.Õ Ð Geoffrey Wood, Cass Business School and University of Buckingham, UK Financial Crisis Containment and Government Guarantees analyses the international communityÕs commitment to forging enhanced, well thought-out, mechanisms for containing systemic risks in the context of a highly interconnected global financial framework which incorporates ongoing financial innovation. While use of government guarantees is a central theme, the book also analyses the roles played by prudential regulators, central banks, deposit insurers and treasuries in dealing with the crisis. The book examines how governments, central banks, regulators and deposit insurance agencies have worked together to contain the global financial crisis. Additionally, it focuses on efforts to overcome ongoing obstacles, as well as the most important proposals to improve safety nets, both at the national level and internationally. This concise and detailed book will strongly appeal to students in law, economics and finance, law practitioners, policymakers in central banks and ministries of finance, as well as deposit protection agencies and regulatory agencies.




Special Feature


Book Description




The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report


Book Description

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.




Crisis and Response


Book Description

Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.




Financial Crisis Management


Book Description

Essay from the year 2011 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: Distinction, University of Warwick (School of Law), course: International Banking Regulation, language: English, abstract: The recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 (the crisis) has been dramatised as the worst crisis since the great de- pression in the 1930s. Prompt regulatory response was required in order to contain the spread of fear and stop the mistrust with the ultimate goal to restore the confidence into the financial institutions and markets as well as prevent the collapse of the real economy. Financial crises containment can be defined as the enhancement of “... soundness and stability of the banking ...” which is essential to “...ensure legal certainty and to restore confidence in financial markets” Regulators have a whole set of tools to respond to crises, using an existing regime and or implementing a special resolution regime. Latter has a broad span reaching from capital injections to expropriation. Undoubtedly, the measures raise legal questions regarding their raison d’être and liability of those exercising the measures. Moreover, the measures have individual merits and demerits varying in respect of their costs and perspective of the market participants. The purpose of this essay is to analyse these responses. Therefore, different measures will be identified and evaluated in light of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council’s common principles for action 5 and the Commission Communication of State Aid 6 which have been determined as representative guidelines for policy makers in drafting a response regime. It will be concluded that there is no clear cut answer to which are the most successful measures; nevertheless, there is empirical evidence of which are the most favoured responses by regulators. The measures will be in response to an acute crisis, ie the prevention and resolution of a crisis will not be treated in this essay. In addition, the responses will be limited to the European Union. The next chapter is dived in 5 parts exploring mechanisms to contain financial crises. It represents a sequence that has been observed in the recent crisis in Europe. Chapter 3 gives an outlook. The last chapter concludes.







Systemic Financial Crises


Book Description

This book analyzes government policies to contain and resolve systemic financial crises.




Transparency, Risk Management and International Financial Fragility


Book Description

Discussions of the role of derivatives and their risks, as well as discussions of financial risks in general, often fail to distinguish between risks that are taken consciously and ones that are not. To understand the breeding conditions for financial crises, the prime source of concern is not risk per se, but the unintended, or unanticipated accumulation of risks by individuals, institutions or governments including the concealing of risks from stakeholders and overseers of those entities. This report, the fourth in the ICMB/CEPR series of Geneva Reports on the World Economy, analyses specific situations in which significant unanticipated and unintended financial risks can accumulate. The focus is, in particular, on the implicit guarantees that governments extend to banks and other financial institutions, and which may result in the accumulation, often unrecognised from the viewpoint of the government, of unanticipated risks in the balance sheet of the public sector. that a government's exposure to risk arising from a guarantee is non-linear. For instance, in the case of a government which guarantees the liabilities of the banking system, the additional liability transferred onto the government's balance sheet by a 10% shock to the capital of firms is larger the lower that capital is to start with. Recognising this non-linearity in the transmission of risk exposures is essential to the reduction of the accumulation of unanticipated risks on the government's balance sheet. Analyses of recent international financial crises recognise that the implicit guarantees governments extend to banks and corporations create the potential to greatly weaken their balance sheets. exist, rather than on measurement of the exposures they create. This report offers just such a framework for measuring the extent of a government's exposure to risk and how that exposure changes over time. The report also discusses ideas on how risk exposures can be controlled, hedged and transferred through the use of derivatives, swap contracts, and other contractual agreements.




Getting the Dog to Bark


Book Description

Fiscal reporting is intended to warn of fiscal crises while there is still time to prevent them. The recent crisis thus seems to reveal a failure of fiscal reporting: before the crisis, even reports on fiscal risk typically did not mention banks as a possible source of fiscal problems. One reason for silence was that the risk arose partly from implicit guarantees, and governments may have feared that disclosure would increase moral hazard. The crisis cast doubt, however, on the effectiveness of silence in mitigating risks. This paper discusses how fiscal risks from the financial sector could be discussed in reports on fiscal risk, with a view to encouraging their mitigation.




The Financial Crisis of 2008


Book Description

Supported by ten years of research, Wigmore has gathered extensive data covering the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recovery to provide the first comprehensive history of the period. Financial crises cannot occur unless institutional investors finance the bubbles that created them. Wigmore follows the trail of data putting pressure on institutional investors to achieve higher levels of returns that led to over-leverage throughout the financial system and placed such a burden on recovery. Here is a 'very good picture - and painful reminder - of the crisis' evolution across multiple asset classes, structures, participants, and geographies.' This work serves as a critical analysis of modern portfolio management and an important reference work for financial professionals, academics, investors, and students.