Quartermaster Force Provider Company (FM 4-20. 07 / FM 42-424)


Book Description

Field manual (FM) 4-20.07, “Quartermaster Force Provider Company,” provides insight, general data and operational information for the commanders, supervisors, and personnel assigned or attached to a Quartermaster (QM) Force Provider Company. This manual also serves as a guide for commanders, supervisors, and other personnel concerned with Force Provider operations in general. It addresses the key aspects of performing the company's critical wartime mission to “Provide Force Provider Support” and accomplishing the unit's mission essential task list (METL). The METL consists of tasks categorized into the following missions: Deploy unit, Establish unit area, Defend assigned area, Conduct Force Provider operations, Relocate unit, Redeploy unit. Commanders must bear in mind the stressful effects of combat as they plan and conduct operations. The pressures that battlefield chaos and destruction place on Soldiers have always been great. Unit discipline, realistic field training, deliberately fostered unit cohesion, and solid bonding between leaders and subordinates can reduce the effects of this stress in part, but nothing can eliminate it. The commander who understands this and protects his Soldiers through strong, positive, and caring leadership, proper mental, physical and training preparation, and simple decisive plans will win (FM 3-0). The purpose of the Force Provider program is to improve the quality of life for deployed Soldiers by reducing the stressors of combat. Under force health protection (FHP), combat and operational stress control (COSC) training is provided to assist Soldiers in preventing combat and operational stress reactions (COSRs) and other stress related illnesses. The Force Provider system also enables the reduction of stress. During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Army realized that it could do more to improve the quality of life for the deployed Soldier. Many Soldiers used makeshift and field expedient latrines and showers. The Army recognized the importance of combating stress and sleep deprivation, while offsetting COSR and conserving fighting strength. Its answer was to set up the Force Provider program. The concept of Force Provider was initially tested in the Bosnia area of operations. Doctrine, training, and system requirements were then developed as a result of lessons learned to improve the quality of life for the deployed Soldier. In addition to this FM, ARTEP 42-424-30-MTP has been developed and is available through normal distribution. Training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) for unit training (Chapter 5, ARTEP 42-424-30-MTP) are also available in the Army Systems Approach to Training (ASAT) program. The Force Provider Product Manager office at Soldier System Command (SSCOM), maintains a homepage for related issues. Force Provider units are expected to be an essential component of joint, multinational, and expeditionary operations - fully capable of responding to requirements along its entire operational mission continuum: Soldier sustainment, humanitarian and civic assistance, disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuation operations. Future Force Provider operations must provide scalable and modular base camps to support operations such as combat (forward operating bases/FOBs), reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), rest and refit, intermediate staging bases (ISB), redeployment, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, homeland defense, and peacekeeping/enforcement.







Army Logistician


Book Description













Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers


Book Description

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.