Author : William Spaniel
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 375 pages
File Size : 19,84 MB
Release : 2023-10-31
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1009318543
The first comprehensive textbook on crisis bargaining for graduate and advanced undergraduate students, and a reference for researchers.
Author : Scott Gehlbach
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 289 pages
File Size : 12,4 MB
Release : 2021-09-30
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1108482066
An accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics, fully updated and now including a chapter on nondemocracy.
Author : Rebecca B. Morton
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 340 pages
File Size : 49,88 MB
Release : 1999-08-28
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1139427733
At present much of political science consists of a large body of formal mathematical work that remains largely unexplored empirically and an expanding use of sophisticated statistical techniques. While there are examples of noteworthy efforts to bridge the gap between these, there is still a need for much more cooperative work between formal theorists and empirical researchers in the discipline. This book explores how empirical analysis has, can, and should be used to evaluate formal models in political science. The book is intended to be a guide for active and future political scientists who are confronting the issues of empirical analysis with formal models in their work and as a basis for a needed dialogue between empirical and formal theoretical researchers in political science. These developments, if combined, are potentially a basis for a new revolution in political science.
Author : Evelyn C. Fink
Publisher : SAGE
Page : 84 pages
File Size : 46,68 MB
Release : 1998-05-26
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 9780761910169
PLEASE UPDATE SAGE UK AND SAGE INDIA ADDRESSES ON IMPRINT PAGE.
Author : Glenn Herald Snyder
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 596 pages
File Size : 38,9 MB
Release : 2015-03-08
Category : Law
ISBN : 1400871182
How do nations act in a crisis? This book seeks to answer that question both theoretically and historically. It tests and synthesizes theories of political behavior by comparing them with the historical record. The authors apply theories of bargaining, game theory, information processing, decision-making, and international systems to case histories of sixteen crises that occurred during a seventy-five year period. The result is a revision and integration of diverse concepts and the development of a new empirical theory of international conflict. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author : David A. Baldwin
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 810 pages
File Size : 22,42 MB
Release : 2017-03-02
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1351879731
International relations theory is a diverse and constantly evolving area of scholarly research reflecting the fluctuations in world politics. This volume brings together a number of the most important research papers published on this subject during the last sixty years. Divided into five thematic sections, this work provides the reader with a comprehensive overview of developments and debates in this area of study. Topics covered include the history and development of alternative approaches to international relations theory; the importance of domestic politics in shaping a state's foreign policy; the absence of a global 'government' and the meaning and implications of this 'state of international anarchy'; power and its role as a variable in international relations theory and the challenges of state security, war and peace. The introduction anchors the collection, putting the articles within the context of the evolution of this field to date.
Author : Branislav L. Slantchev
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 328 pages
File Size : 50,51 MB
Release : 2011-02-03
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1139493051
Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused.
Author : Michael E. Brown
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 156 pages
File Size : 25,36 MB
Release : 2000-07-18
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780262265256
Opposing views on the merits of formal rational choice approaches as they have been applied to international security studies. Formal theories and rational choice methods have become increasingly prominent in most social sciences in the past few decades. Proponents of formal theoretical approaches argue that these methods are more scientific and sophisticated than other approaches, and that formal methods have already generated significant theoretical progress. As more and more social scientists adopt formal theoretical approaches, critics have argued that these methods are flawed and that they should not become dominant in most social-science disciplines. Rational Choice and Security Studies presents opposing views on the merits of formal rational choice approaches as they have been applied in the subfield of international security studies. This volume includes Stephen Walt's article "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," critical replies from prominent political scientists, and Walt's rejoinder to his critics. Walt argues that formal approaches have not led to creative new theoretical explanations, that they lack empirical support, and that they have contributed little to the analysis of important contemporary security problems. In their replies, proponents of rational choice approaches emphasize that formal methods are essential for achieving theoretical consistency and precision.
Author : James D. Morrow
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 400 pages
File Size : 48,90 MB
Release : 2020-05-05
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 0691213208
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
Author : Scott Gates
Publisher : University of Michigan Press
Page : 193 pages
File Size : 44,81 MB
Release : 2010-08-27
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 0472027530
To study the strategic interaction of individuals, we can use game theory. Despite the long history shared by game theory and political science, many political scientists remain unaware of the exciting game theoretic techniques that have been developed over the years. As a result they use overly simple games to illustrate complex processes. Games, Information, and Politics is written for political scientists who have an interest in game theory but really do not understand how it can be used to improve our understanding of politics. To address this problem, Gates and Humes write for scholars who have little or no training in formal theory and demonstrate how game theoretic analysis can be applied to politics. They apply game theoretic models to three subfields of political science: American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. They demonstrate how game theory can be applied to each of these subfields by drawing from three distinct pieces of research. By drawing on examples from current research projects the authors use real research problems--not hypothetical questions--to develop their discussion of various techniques and to demonstrate how to apply game theoretic models to help answer important political questions. Emphasizing the process of applying game theory, Gates and Humes clear up some common misperceptions about game theory and show how it can be used to improve our understanding of politics. Games, Information, and Politics is written for scholars interested in understanding how game theory is used to model strategic interactions. It will appeal to sociologists and economists as well as political scientists. Scott Gates is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University. Brian D. Humes is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
