The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law


Book Description

Identifies and evaluates the psychological choices implicit in the rules of evidence Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.




Foundations of Evidence Law


Book Description

This book examines systematically the underlying theory of evidence in Anglo-American legal systems and identifies the defining characteristics of adjudicative fact-finding. Stein develops a detailed innovative theory which sets aside the traditional vision of evidence law as facilitating the discovery of the truth. Combining probability theory, epistemology, economic analysis, and moral philosophy; he argues instead that the fundamental purpose of evidence law is to apportion the risk oferror in conditions of uncertainty. Stein begins by identifying the domain of evidence law.He then describes the basic traits of adjudicative fact-finding and explores the epistemological foundations of the concept. This discussion identifies the problem of probabilistic deduction that accompanies generalizations to which fact-finders resort. This problem engenders paradoxes which Stein proposes to resolve by distinguishing between probability and weight. Stein advances the principle of maximal individualization that does not allow factfinders to make a finding against a person when the evidence they use is not susceptible to individualized testing.He argues that this principle has broad application, but may still be overridden by social utility. This analysis identifies allocation of the risk of error as requiring regulation by evidence law. Advocating a principled allocation of the risk of error, Stein denounces free proof for allowing individual judges to apportion this risk asthey deem fit.He criticizes the UK's recent shift to a discretionary regime on similar grounds. Stein develops three fundamental principles for allocating the risk of error: the cost-efficiency principle which applies across the board; the equality principle which applies in civil litigation; and the equal best principle which applies in criminal trials. The cost-efficiency principle demands that fact-finders minimize the total cost of errors and error-avoidance.Under the equality principle,fact-finding procedures and decisions must not produce an unequal apportionment of the risk of error between the claimant and the defendant. This risk should be apportioned equally between the parties. The equal best principle sets forth two conditions for justifiably convicting and punishing a defendant. The state must do its best to protect the defendant from the risk of erroneous conviction and must not provide better protection to other individuals. Regulating both the admissibility of evidence and its sufficiency, these principles explain and justify many existing evidentiary rules. Alex Stein is Professor of Law at the Benjamin N.Cardozo School of Law,New York.




Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law


Book Description

Philosophy has a strong presence in evidence law and the nature of evidence is a highly debated topic in both general and social epistemology; legal theorists working in the evidence law area draw on different underlying philosophical theories of knowledge, inference and probability. Core evidentiary concepts and principles, such as the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and others, reply on moral and political philosophy for their understanding and interpretation. Written by leading scholars across the globe, this volume brings together philosophical debates on the nature and function of evidence, proof, and law of evidence. It presents a cross-disciplinary overview of central issues in the theory and methodology of legal evidence and covers a wide range of contemporary debates on topics such as truth, proof, economics, gender, and race. The volume covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation. Divided in to five parts, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.




Evidentiary Foundations


Book Description

Irish Law Based on the 6th edition of Professor Imwinkelried's authoritative American text, Evidentiary Foundations, and amended for the Irish market, this title is a practical guide which explains how the various evidentiary doctrines are applied on a daily basis in the Irish courts. Combining discussion of law and practice, the authors outline a step-by-step approach to laying the necessary foundations for the introduction of items of evidence. Using hypothetical examples, the title illustrates how the substantive rules of evidence convert into concrete lines of questioning in the courtroom. This is the first book of its kind on the Irish market and will provide invaluable practical guidance for practitioners and students of the law of evidence.




Foundations of Digital Evidence


Book Description

This book provides you with a legal and practical approach to the new world of digital information. It has been described as a must have for litigation lawyers, corporate counsel and records managers who want to understand how to appropriately handle the digital information of an enterprise. The book provides an overview and history of digital evidence, as well as a thorough discussion of relevant issues, including how you can view and understand informational records, how to ensure that any digital record is authentic, identity issues and more.




Texas Evidentiary Foundations


Book Description




Military Evidentiary Foundations


Book Description




Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law


Book Description

"Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law presents a cross-disciplinary overview of the core issues in the theory and methodology of adjudicative evidence and factfinding, assembling the major philosophical and interdisciplinary insights that define evidence theory, as related to law, in a single book. The volume presents contemporary debates on truth, knowledge, rational beliefs, proof, argumentation, explanation, coherence, probability, economics, psychology, bias, gender, and race. It covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory, and inference to the best explanation. The volume’s contributions come from scholars spread across three continents and twelve different countries, whose common interest is evidence theory as related to law"-- from publisher's website.




The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law


Book Description

Identifies and evaluates the psychological choices implicit in the rules of evidence Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.




Foundations of Evidence Law


Book Description

Alex Stein examines the underlying theory of evidence in Anglo-American legal systems. Combining probability theory epistemology, economic analysis and moral philosophy, he argues that the fundamental purpose of evidence law is to apportion the risk of error in conditions of uncertainty.