Book Description

Elimination of fratricide in war is arguably an impossible task, but the Services have yet to support a true "joint" approach to alleviating friendly fire casualties. Currently, there is no universal system for either target identification or identification of friendly forces. The problem is largely due to insufficient training, inadequate integration of Service systems, and outdated tactics and doctrine. "The problem (is one) that falls between the services, in this case, primarily Army ground troops and Air Force and Navy fliers, and therefore a matter that is not the immediate responsibility and priority of any single service bureaucracy" (Wood: 18). In the absence of a strong proponent for fratricide prevention, each Service expects the others to take the lead in resolving acknowledged shortfalls in adapting training, doctrine, and acquisition strategy to protect ground forces from friendly fire. Only a true "joint" approach to the problem can overcome Service reluctance to change. To initiate close air support (CAS) interoperability reform in an age of increasingly high-technology weaponry, the military must establish a single entity as the principal agent for fratricide prevention. The Secretary of Defense should charge U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) with the responsibility to refine joint CAS doctrine, improve joint CAS training, and develop a common positional picture to reduce fratricide.