Fuzzy Social Choice Models


Book Description

This book explores the extent to which fuzzy set logic can overcome some of the shortcomings of public choice theory, particularly its inability to provide adequate predictive power in empirical studies. Especially in the case of social preferences, public choice theory has failed to produce the set of alternatives from which collective choices are made. The book presents empirical findings achieved by the authors in their efforts to predict the outcome of government formation processes in European parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), the authors propose a new approach that reinterprets error in the coding of CMP data as ambiguity in the actual political positions of parties on the policy dimensions being coded. The range of this error establishes parties’ fuzzy preferences. The set of possible outcomes in the process of government formation is then calculated on the basis of both the fuzzy Pareto set and the fuzzy maximal set, and the predictions are compared with those made by two conventional approaches as well as with the government that was actually formed. The comparison shows that, in most cases, the fuzzy approaches outperform their conventional counterparts.




Application of Fuzzy Logic to Social Choice Theory


Book Description

Fuzzy social choice theory is useful for modeling the uncertainty and imprecision prevalent in social life yet it has been scarcely applied and studied in the social sciences. Filling this gap, Application of Fuzzy Logic to Social Choice Theory provides a comprehensive study of fuzzy social choice theory.The book explains the concept of a fuzzy max




Fuzzy Social Choice Theory


Book Description

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the social choice literature and shows, by applying fuzzy sets, how the use of fuzzy preferences, rather than that of strict ones, may affect the social choice theorems. To do this, the book explores the presupposition of rationality within the fuzzy framework and shows that the two conditions for rationality, completeness and transitivity, do exist with fuzzy preferences. Specifically, this book examines: the conditions under which a maximal set exists; the Arrow’s theorem; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the median voter theorem. After showing that a non-empty maximal set does exists for fuzzy preference relations, this book goes on to demonstrating the existence of a fuzzy aggregation rule satisfying all five Arrowian conditions, including non-dictatorship. While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only considers individual fuzzy preferences, this work shows that both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees, resulting in a social choice that can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial. Moreover, the median voter theorem is shown to hold under strict fuzzy preferences but not under weak fuzzy preferences. By providing a standard model of fuzzy social choice and by drawing the necessary connections between the major theorems, this book fills an important gap in the current literature and encourages future empirical research in the field.




Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory


Book Description

Decision making is certainly a very crucial component of many human activities. It is, therefore, not surprising that models of decisions play a very important role not only in decision theory but also in areas such as operations Research, Management science, social Psychology etc . . The basic model of a decision in classical normative decision theory has very little in common with real decision making: It portrays a decision as a clear-cut act of choice, performed by one individual decision maker and in which states of nature, possible actions, results and preferences are well and crisply defined. The only compo nent in which uncertainty is permitted is the occurence of the different states of nature, for which probabilistic descriptions are allowed. These probabilities are generally assumed to be known numerically, i. e. as single probabili ties or as probability distribution functions. Extensions of this basic model can primarily be conceived in three directions: 1. Rather than a single decision maker there are several decision makers involved. This has lead to the areas of game theory, team theory and group decision theory. 2. The preference or utility function is not single valued but rather vector valued. This extension is considered in multiattribute utility theory and in multicritieria analysis. 3.







Fuzzy Models in Economics


Book Description

This book offers a timely guide to fuzzy methods applied to the analysis of socioeconomic systems. It provides readers with a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the algorithms, including the theory behind them, as well as practical considerations, current limitations and solutions. Each chapter focuses on a different economic problem, explaining step by step the process to approach it, using the corresponding fuzzy tools. The book covers elements of intuitionistic fuzzy logics, fuzzy entropy and the fuzzy DEMATEL method, a fuzzy approach to calculate the financial stability index. It also reports on some new models of social, financial and ecological security, and on a novel fuzzy method for evaluating the quality of development of information economy.




Social Choice


Book Description

'Social Choice' is a comprehensive exploration of the key questions, concepts, terminology, methods and results of social choice theory.




Preferences and Decisions


Book Description

Decision making is an omnipresent, most crucial activity of the human being, and also of virtually all artificial broadly perceived “intelligent” systems that try to mimic human behavior, reasoning and choice processes. It is quite obvious that such a relevance of decision making had triggered vast research effort on its very essence, and attempts to develop tools and techniques which would make it possible to somehow mimic human decision making related acts, even to automate decision making processes that had been so far reserved for the human beings. The roots of those attempts at a scientific analysis can be traced to the ancient times but – clearly – they have gained momentum in the recent 50 or 100 years following a general boom in science. Depending on the field of science, decision making can be viewed in different ways. The most general view can be that decision making boils down to some cognitive, mental process(es) that lead to the selection of an option or a course of action among several alternatives. Then, looking in a deeper way, from a psychological perspective this process proceeds in the context of a set of needs, preferences, rational choice of an individual, a group of individuals, or even an organization. From a cognitive perspective, the decision making process proceeds in the context of various interactions with the environment.







Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare


Book Description

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes