Book Description
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Author : Theodore Groves
Publisher : U of Minnesota Press
Page : 410 pages
File Size : 35,35 MB
Release : 1987
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1452908044
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Author : Donald E. Campbell
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 699 pages
File Size : 36,73 MB
Release : 2018-02-22
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1107035244
This book examines incentives at work to see how and how well coordination is achieved by motivating individual decision makers.
Author : Leonid Hurwicz
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 321 pages
File Size : 23,10 MB
Release : 2006-05-22
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 113945434X
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Author : Nancy L. Rose
Publisher : University of Chicago Press
Page : 619 pages
File Size : 45,59 MB
Release : 2014-08-29
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 022613816X
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.
Author : Günter Bamberg
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 538 pages
File Size : 19,88 MB
Release : 2012-12-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 3642750605
Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.
Author : Leonid Hurwicz
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 398 pages
File Size : 42,77 MB
Release : 1985-12-27
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780521262040
This book contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms.
Author : National Bureau of Economic Research
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 647 pages
File Size : 36,17 MB
Release : 2015-12-08
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1400879760
The papers here range from description and analysis of how our political economy allocates its inventive effort, to studies of the decision making process in specific industrial laboratories. Originally published in 1962. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author : John Eatwell
Publisher : Springer
Page : 321 pages
File Size : 47,92 MB
Release : 1989-09-21
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1349202150
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Author : Samuel Bowles
Publisher : Yale University Press
Page : 283 pages
File Size : 34,42 MB
Release : 2016-05-28
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0300221088
Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
Author : David Martimort
Publisher :
Page : 1904 pages
File Size : 36,30 MB
Release : 2017-11-24
Category : Economics
ISBN : 9781785364433
This comprehensive two-volume research collection recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. The carefully selected papers spanning forty years analyse and review collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. Together with an original introduction by the editor, this collection would be a valuable addition to the bookshelves of any serious scholar and student in the field.