Interest-rate Smoothing


Book Description

The paper develops a model in which targeting of the nominal interest rate is a reasonable guide for monetary policy. Expected real interest rates and output are exogenous with respect to monetary variables, and the central bank ends up influencing nominal interest rates by altering expected inflation. In this model the monetary authority can come arbitrarily close in each period to its (time-varying) target for the nominal interest rate, even while holding down the forecast variance of the price level. The latter objective pins down the extent of monetary accommodation to shifts in the demand for money and other shocks, and thereby makes determinate the levels of money and prices at each date. Empirical evidence for the United States in the post-World War II period suggests that the model's predictions accord reasonably well with observed behavior for nominal interest rates, growth rates of the monetary base, and rates of inflation. Earlier periods, especially before World War I, provide an interesting contrast because interest-rate smoothing did not apply. The behavior of the monetary base and the price level at these times differed from the post-World War I1 experience in ways predicted by the theory







Term Structure Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing and Monetary Policy Inertia


Book Description

The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco presents the full text of an article entitled "Term Structure Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing and Monetary Policy Inertia," by Glenn D. Rudebusch. The article discusses how quickly central banks adjust monetary policy in response to developments in the economy.




Term Structure Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing and Monetary Policy Inertia


Book Description

Numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate. The conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks. However, such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than three months, which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates. The illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face.







Interest Rate Smoothing in New Zealand and Other Dollar Bloc Countries


Book Description

This paper utilises the partial adjustment approach of Judd and Rudebusch (1998) to empirically estimate the degree of short-term interest rate smoothing by central banks in the dollar block countries. All countries appear to smooth short-term interest rates significantly, with New Zealand and Canada smoothing rates by less than what appears to be the case for Australia and the United States. We then examine the macroeconomic implications of interest rate smoothing using the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's macro model. The model is constructed such that the more interest rates are smoothed in the short-term, the larger inflation and output variability will be over the cycle. However, at least over the narrow range of the empirically based smoothing approaches, the results suggest that there may be little cost in smoothing short-term interest rates in New Zealand to the degree seen in Australia or the United States.










Interest Rate Smoothing and Financial Stability


Book Description

Central banks smooth fluctuations in interest rates based on a belief that this policy promotes financial stability. This belief is based on a presumption that the direct effect of less interest rate volatility on a bank's likelihood of insolvency is the predominant effect of this policy. The main point of this paper is that these policies also give rise to indirect effects that lower financial stability. These indirect effects occur because the policy itself alters bank behavior. In effect, if the central bank provides (liquidity) insurance (at zero premia), it may introduce a classic moral hazard problem that encourages risk-taking by banks. As a result, to maintain a given degree of financial stability, a bank regulator may, in fact, need to impose a higher prudential capital requirement when an interest rate smoothing policy is in place. The paper concludes that the link between interest rate smoothing policy and financial stability may be more complicated than is generally recognized.