Modalities for Investment Protection and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in TTIP from a Trade Union Perspective


Book Description

The study discusses the impact of an investment protection chapter with Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement in the proposed transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on social and labour regulation and the autonomy of the social partners in regulating these matters through collective agreements.




Is There a Need for Investor-State Arbitration in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)?


Book Description

This short paper analyses the legal arguments forwarded by the European Commission to justify the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the current negotiations with the U.S. on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), notably U.S. cases that would show deficiencies of the U.S. judicial system that would need to be overcome by ISDS. Also discussed is whether ISDS would be necessary to overcome legal obstacles to ensure that U.S. courts give effect to the substantive investor protection provisions of TTIP. The paper concludes that these concerns are not sufficiently substantiated to show a need for ISDS in TTIP.




Investor-State Dispute Settlement


Book Description

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a provision in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other international investment agreements that allows investors to enter arbitration with states over treaty breaches. ISDS has become controversial in the United States and our negotiating partners; critics, including some governments, have argued that ISDS is unnecessary, while others insist it is illegitimate as public policy. Treaty-based investment protection represents a major advance in the fair treatment of aliens and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Given the alternatives, withdrawing from investment treaties—the logical conclusion of the critics’ position—would likely have negative consequences for economic growth and the rule of law. This report is an empirical review of ISDS, based on the record of disputes under existing investment treaties.




The Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)


Book Description

On July 8, 2013, the United States and the European Union launched talks for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a proposed international investment agreement. This agreement would create the world's largest free trade area and cover almost half of the entire global economic output. Other research has concluded that increasingly global trade has led to an increase in investment disputes between foreign investors and host nations and stressed the importance of investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Within an international investment agreement, investor-state dispute settlements provide investors a means of holding foreign states accountable to an international tribunal with repercussions of a binding, enforceable award of compensation.Even with a recognized public backlash, U.S. and EU leaders have publicly stated their intention of including investor-state dispute settlement provisions in the finalized TTIP and future international investment agreements, including any future multilateral agreement on investment. A U.S. Model text includes three significant changes that will impact the adoption of investor-state dispute settlement provisions in the bilateral investment treaty: transparency; third-party involvement; and consideration for future multilateral appellate procedures. The EU Draft text and corresponding negotiating directive address the following issues: transparency, tribunal creation, enforcement of arbitration awards and potential future appellate mechanisms. This Comment provides original analysis on specific provisions regarding each of these issues and seeks to prescribe reconciliation between the U.S. and EU texts. I find that reconciliation is possible on all ISDS provisions of the proposed TTIP. Then, I conclude with a summarization of all relevant discussions.










The Popular Legitimacy of Investor-State Dispute Settlement


Book Description

This book offers theoretical arguments and original empirical data on the legitimacy of the investor-state dispute settlement system in the eyes of the general public. The legitimacy of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system has become a major issue in recent negotiations on new trade and investment agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). This book considers the remarkable rise of investor-state arbitration, its politicization and the corresponding legitimacy crisis that has induced a political process of ISDS reform. The book applies theoretical arguments about legitimacy perceptions among the mass public and tests these arguments in survey experiments in Germany, France, and the United States to answer the question of whether ISDS reform can be successful. By showing that large parts of the population hold negative perceptions about the current system of private arbitration and believe that an international investment court and domestic courts are more legitimate dispute resolution systems, the book extends the debate on the legitimacy of the ISDS mechanism, which has so far been dominated by conflicting normative claims of supporters and critics. With regard to the academic debate about legitimacy in global governance, the author underlines that the legitimacy perceptions of ordinary citizens must be taken seriously to ensure the sustainability of global governance and international law in the long term. This book will be of interest to academics working in international relations, international political economy, international law, transnational law, authority, politicization, and legitimacy of global governance. It will also be of great use to practitioners in the field of international investment law, including lawyers, and government officials working in international dispute settlement.




TTIP and the Investment Court System


Book Description

In response to the recent outcry against the investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) system, the negotiators to the proposed EU-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) have developed an alternative means of investment dispute resolution: the so-called Investment Court System (“ICS”). News agencies, political leaders, and legal scholars have published myriad reactions to the proposal, many of them mixed. But relatively few have asked whether TTIP's negotiators should consider any alternative solutions to ISDS's problems, or whether any such opportunities even exist. To that end, this Note evaluates the ICS in light of the most cogent critiques lodged against ISDS, before considering three alternative modes of investment dispute resolution: a return to the pre-ISDS era, the adoption of a rule-of-law ratings mechanism, and a reformed and updated version of ISDS. Due to the problems inherent in the design of the ICS, including most notably the possibility that its judges would be beholden to state interests, this Note argues that it presents an imperfect solution to ISDS's critiques. Instead, a revised version of ISDS, updated to incorporate certain cost-reduction strategies, regulatory safeguards, and a multilateral ISDS appellate mechanism, theoretically offers the most promising long-term avenue for dealing with the unique circumstances inherent in investor-state disputes. However, because of the practical and political realities of TTIP, namely the souring of public sentiment towards anything ISDS, the most viable solution open to negotiators is a return to the pre-ISDS era.