Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement


Book Description

This is the second of three reports in SIGIR's Lessons Learned Initiative (LLI). Begun in September 2004, the LLI focuses on three areas of the U.S. relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq: (1) Human Capital Management, (2) Contracting and Procurement, and (3) Program and Project Management. SIGIR's review of each area includes thorough background research and extensive interviews with a broad spectrum of persons possessing first-hand experience in the Iraq reconstruction program. The collected findings from this research are then provided to a panel of senior executives and experts drawn from the U.S. Government, industry, and academia, many of whom served in Iraq. These experts convene for a full-day forum to evaluate the findings and provide recommendations. The first LLI Report, "Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management," was released in January 2006. SIGIR will publish the third and final paper in this series, "Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management," in the fall of 2006. This report provides a chronological review of the U.S. Government's contracting and procurement experience during the Iraq relief and reconstruction program. It begins by examining contracting activity early in the Iraq program and traces its evolutionary development through the effort's succeeding phases. The concluding section lays out a series of key lessons learned followed by six recommendations for improving the U.S. Government's capacity to support and execute contracting and procurement in contingency environments. SIGIR divides this report into four chronological periods and one functional concept area: Summer 2002 to January 2003: The Pre-ORHA Period; January 2003 to August 2003: The ORHA and Early-CPA Period; August 2003 to June 2004: The Later CPA Period; June 2004 to Present: The Post-CPA Period; and June 2003 to present: CERP and CHRRP.




Iraq Reconstruction


Book Description

This report provides a chronological review of the US government's contracting and procurement experience during the Iraq relief and reconstruction program. It begins by examining contracting activity early in the Iraq program and trace its evolutionary development through the efforts' succeeding phases. The concluding section lays out a series of key lessons learned followed by six recommendations for improving the U.S. government's capacity to support and executive contracting and procurement in contingency environments.




Iraq Reconstruction


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שער לספרות


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Hard Lessons: the Iraq Reconstruction Experience


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A combination of poor planning, weak oversight and greed cheated U.S. taxpayers and undermined American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. taxpayers have paid nearly $51 billion for projects in Iraq, including training the Iraqi army and police and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electric, justice, health and transportation sectors. Many of the projects did not succeed, partly because of violence in Iraq and friction between U.S. officials in Washington and Iraqi officials in Baghdad. The U.S. gov¿t. "was neither prepared for nor able to respond quickly to the ever-changing demands" of stabilizing Iraq and then rebuilding it. This report reviews the problems in the war effort, which the Bush admin. claimed would cost $2.4 billion. Charts and tables.




Iraq Reconstruction


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Deconstructing Reconstruction


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Networks of Domination


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In the nineteenth century, European states conquered vast stretches of territory across the periphery of the international system. Much of Asia and Africa fell to the armies of the European great powers, and by World War I, those armies controlled 40 percent of the world's territory and 30 percent of its population. Conventional wisdom states that these conquests were the product of European military dominance or technological superiority, but the reality was far more complex. In Networks of Domination, Paul MacDonald argues that an ability to exploit the internal political situation within a targeted territory, not mere military might, was a crucial element of conquest. European states enjoyed greatest success when they were able to recruit local collaborators from within the society and exploit divisions among elites. Different configurations of social ties connecting potential conquerors with elites were central to both the patterns of imperial conquest and the strategies conquerors employed. MacDonald compares episodes of British colonial expansion in India, South Africa, and Nigeria during the nineteenth century, and also examines the contemporary applicability of the theory through an examination of the United States occupation of Iraq. The scramble for empire fundamentally shaped, and continues to shape, the international system we inhabit today. Featuring a powerful theory of the role of social networks in shaping the international system, Networks of Domination bridges past and present to highlight the lessons of conquest.