Is There a Need for Investor-State Arbitration in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)?


Book Description

This short paper analyses the legal arguments forwarded by the European Commission to justify the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the current negotiations with the U.S. on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), notably U.S. cases that would show deficiencies of the U.S. judicial system that would need to be overcome by ISDS. Also discussed is whether ISDS would be necessary to overcome legal obstacles to ensure that U.S. courts give effect to the substantive investor protection provisions of TTIP. The paper concludes that these concerns are not sufficiently substantiated to show a need for ISDS in TTIP.




The Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)


Book Description

On July 8, 2013, the United States and the European Union launched talks for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a proposed international investment agreement. This agreement would create the world's largest free trade area and cover almost half of the entire global economic output. Other research has concluded that increasingly global trade has led to an increase in investment disputes between foreign investors and host nations and stressed the importance of investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Within an international investment agreement, investor-state dispute settlements provide investors a means of holding foreign states accountable to an international tribunal with repercussions of a binding, enforceable award of compensation.Even with a recognized public backlash, U.S. and EU leaders have publicly stated their intention of including investor-state dispute settlement provisions in the finalized TTIP and future international investment agreements, including any future multilateral agreement on investment. A U.S. Model text includes three significant changes that will impact the adoption of investor-state dispute settlement provisions in the bilateral investment treaty: transparency; third-party involvement; and consideration for future multilateral appellate procedures. The EU Draft text and corresponding negotiating directive address the following issues: transparency, tribunal creation, enforcement of arbitration awards and potential future appellate mechanisms. This Comment provides original analysis on specific provisions regarding each of these issues and seeks to prescribe reconciliation between the U.S. and EU texts. I find that reconciliation is possible on all ISDS provisions of the proposed TTIP. Then, I conclude with a summarization of all relevant discussions.




TTIP


Book Description

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has stirred passions like no other trade negotiation in recent history. Its supporters maintain that TTIP will produce spectacular growth and job creation; claims that are wholeheartedly rejected by its critics, who regard TTIP as a direct assault on workers' rights, health and safety standards and public services. In this incisive analysis, Gabriel Siles-Brugge and Ferdi de Ville scrutinize the claims made by TTIP's cheerleaders and scaremongers to reveal a far more nuanced picture behind the headlines. TTIP will not provide an economic 'cure-all', nor will it destroy the European welfare state in one fell swoop. Thanks to unprecedented levels of protest and debate around TTIP, however, neoliberal trade negotiations are well and truly back in the spotlight. In this respect, TTIP could well prove to be a 'game-changer' - just not in the way imagined by its backers.




TTIP and the Investment Court System


Book Description

In response to the recent outcry against the investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) system, the negotiators to the proposed EU-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) have developed an alternative means of investment dispute resolution: the so-called Investment Court System (“ICS”). News agencies, political leaders, and legal scholars have published myriad reactions to the proposal, many of them mixed. But relatively few have asked whether TTIP's negotiators should consider any alternative solutions to ISDS's problems, or whether any such opportunities even exist. To that end, this Note evaluates the ICS in light of the most cogent critiques lodged against ISDS, before considering three alternative modes of investment dispute resolution: a return to the pre-ISDS era, the adoption of a rule-of-law ratings mechanism, and a reformed and updated version of ISDS. Due to the problems inherent in the design of the ICS, including most notably the possibility that its judges would be beholden to state interests, this Note argues that it presents an imperfect solution to ISDS's critiques. Instead, a revised version of ISDS, updated to incorporate certain cost-reduction strategies, regulatory safeguards, and a multilateral ISDS appellate mechanism, theoretically offers the most promising long-term avenue for dealing with the unique circumstances inherent in investor-state disputes. However, because of the practical and political realities of TTIP, namely the souring of public sentiment towards anything ISDS, the most viable solution open to negotiators is a return to the pre-ISDS era.




The Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership on International Cooperation


Book Description

The book examines diverse aspects of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The contributors analyze the improvement of the position of EU and US in the world economy, as well as in politics and international organisations. They analyse new regulatory standards and the impact on Polish and EU merchandise and services trade.




Permanent Investment Courts


Book Description

This special issue focuses on the opportunities and challenges connected with investment courts. The creation of permanent investment courts was first proposed several decades ago, but it has only recently become likely that these proposals will be implemented. In particular, the European Commission has pushed for a court-like mechanism to resolve investment disputes in various recent trade and investment negotiations. Such a framework was included in some free trade agreements (FTAs) and investment protection agreements (IPAs) the European Union (EU) signed or negotiated with Vietnam, Singapore, Mexico and Canada. While it was shelved long before the publication of this Special Issue, the European Commission had also formally proposed a court system during the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement with the United States. The issue of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) has also been prevalent at the Working Group III proceedings of the UNCITRAL on investor-State dispute settlement reform, attracting scholarly and public attention.Will these developments lead to the creation of permanent investment courts? How will such courts change the future of international investment law? Will they bring about a real institutional change in adjudicatory mechanisms? Will they introduce a 'hybrid' system, which borrows important characteristics from both arbitration and institutional methods of international adjudication? How will the enforcement mechanisms work, and under which rules of ethics will its adjudicators function and exercise their duties? This special issue brings together leading scholars sharing a common interest in investment courts to address these questions.




HC 804 - Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership


Book Description

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is an ambitious attempt by the European Union and the United States to deliver a comprehensive trade and investment treaty. Negotiations between the two are currently underway and the Government hopes that an agreement can be reached by the end of 2015. The trade deal may be beneficial to the UK and EU economies but TTIP is not universally supported and the level of financial benefit to the UK is open to question. The lack of detail available on the negotiations means that it is difficult to assess which is the more accurate argument. However, this should not excuse the quality of debate which we have, on occasion, observed by campaigners and lobbyists on both sides of the argument. Everyone involved in the debate on TTIP - campaigners,lobbyists, the UK Government and the European Commission - must ensure that an evidence-based approach is at the heart of any TTIP debate. One of the key concerns about TTIP is the proposal to include Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions. These provisions - common in bilateral trade agreements - aim to protect foreign investors from illegal interference by the host government. However, campaigners have argued that such clauses could allow US healthcare investors to force the permanent privatisation of the NHS. Although this view has been rebutted repeatedly by the European Commission and the UK Government, until draft clauses are published, it will be difficult for them to convince those with concerns.




Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers?


Book Description

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an effort by the United States and the European Union to reposition themselves for a world of diffuse economic power and intensified global competition. It is a next-generation economic negotiation that breaks the mould of traditional trade agreements. At the heart of the ongoing talks is the question whether and in which areas the two major democratic actors in the global economy can address costly frictions generated by their deep commercial integration by aligning rules and other instruments. The aim is to reduce duplication in various ways in areas where levels of regulatory protection are equivalent as well as to foster wide-ranging regulatory cooperation and set a benchmark for high-quality global norms. In this volume, European and American experts explain the economic context of TTIP and its geopolitical implications, and then explore the challenges and consequences of US-EU negotiations across numerous sensitive areas, ranging from food safety and public procurement to economic and regulatory assessments of technical barriers to trade, automotive, chemicals, energy, services, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and regulatory cooperation. Their insights cut through the confusion and tremendous public controversies now swirling around TTIP, and help decision-makers understand how the United States and the European Union can remain rule-makers rather than rule-takers in a globalising world in which their relative influence is waning.




The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration


Book Description

Edited by Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration is a collection of contributions from lawyers, arbitrators and political scientists on the development of the concept of the “State” in a field that currently presents an increasing number of controversial disputes: Investor-State Arbitration. The book analyzes the limits of the host State as a regulator, studying issues such as attribution and the role of State-Owned Enterprises and sub-State entities; the changing role of the home State in Investor-State disputes, including its direct participation in Investor-State arbitration and State to State dispute settlement; and the overall role that both home and host States can play in the improvement of Investor-State Dispute Settlement.




Political Dimensions of Investment Arbitration


Book Description

The aim of this paper is to explore the political dimensions of investment arbitration. What drives the structures and rules of this institution of private-transnational dispute settlement? To define political dimensions and develop the basis of a political explanation of investment arbitration, we reconstruct the conflict about investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). We argue that the competing interests of different actors shape the design of the institution. Investment arbitration has become politicized. On a horizontal dimension, interest groups argue about the risks and benefits of arbitration. On a vertical dimension, government authorities struggle to balance national sovereignty and global interests. We indicate a political process, defined by the configuration of the horizontal and the vertical dimension, which drives the emergence and development of investment arbitration.