Israel’s Military Doctrine


Book Description

Israel’s military doctrine was aimed at defeating powerful Arab militaries, mostly those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In the years 1948-1982 Israel and Arab states had a series of wars i.e. high intensity wars. Israel, since 1948, also dealt with guerrilla and terror attacks. Since 1982 and mostly in the last 15 years Israel faced hybrid forces, Hamas and Hezbollah. Those groups are a mix between a conventional military and a guerrilla group. Israel fought against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, mostly in two wars, in 2008-2009 and in 2014. This book begins with explaining Israel’s national security policy. Then it focuses on how the IDF (Israel defense forces) had to adjust its doctrine and build up to confront hybrid forces, by examining Israel’s air and the ground corps and major issues such as offense and defense, infrastructure and manpower. The IDF can inflict heavy casualties and damages to a hybrid foe. Yet destroying the latter is a tall order because Hezbollah and Hamas are too elusive, they hide inside populated areas etc. However, compared with past wars against Arab states, there is much less danger to Israel let alone to its survival since even a coalition between Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups can’t defeat the IDF. Furthermore since fighting a hybrid force is less demanding than running a high intensity war against an Arab state, then Israel does not rely that much on the United States in receiving weapon systems, ammunition and spare parts.




Offense And Defense In Israeli Military Doctrine


Book Description

This book discusses the existing literature on military doctrines in general, and offensive doctrines in particular, as well as on causes of their stagnation and sources of innovation. It provides the backdrop for an analytical historical review of Israel's offensive military doctrine.




Israel's Political-military Doctrine


Book Description




The Israel Defense Forces


Book Description

Insiders view of the Army of Israel, its structure, its men and women and its most memorable actions.




Israel's Second Nature


Book Description

Israel's military doctrine, the tacit organising principles of Israel's armed fo rces, was designed for targeting states. Developed in the 1950's, the doctrine s ought to ensure that war was fought on non-Israeli territory, that victory was a chieved as fast as possible and that attritional conflict was avoided. The doctr ine was modelled on the blitzkrieg, and sought to achieve victory by the indirec t method. This thesis establishes that Israel possessed only this one offensive doctrine, until the 1990's. During the 1990's Israel, influenced by Effects Base d Operations, changed its doctrine from combined arms to air power. The failure of Israel's second military doctrine in the July War, together with the changes in the nature of the threats facing the country, entail that the next war will u tilise combined arms, in a war of occupation and destruction, as opposed to foll owing the indirect approach, of either blitzkrieg or air power.




Israel's Strategic Doctrine


Book Description

Seeks to provide a contemporary picture of Israel's political-military doctrine. Focuses on its conditioning factors, such as Israel's view of the military threat to its security, the constraints under which it operates, and the assets it disposes of. Political-military elements of the doctrine include Israeli approaches to deterrence, war objectives, "defensible borders," and others; operational elements of the doctrine include emphasis on swift offensives, indirect approach, the special role of the Air Force and Armored Corps, and others. The study analyzes past posture and behavior, but discusses evolution and change only selectively with the purpose of elucidating the contemporary relevance of various themes and concepts.




We Were Caught Unprepared


Book Description

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The fact that the outcome of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige tarnished. This historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. The IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force. ¿An insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.¿ Illustrations.







Key to the Sinai


Book Description

In both the 1956 and 1967 wars, Abu Ageila was the main gateway to the Sinai for the Israel Defense Forces. Yet there were marked differences between Egyptian and Israeli war plans, preparations, operations, and results in the two battles for the area. In 1956, Israel carried the burden of a constricting alliance with Britain and France and faced other extensive military problems. The result was that Israel fought a difficult and costly battle for Abu Ageila. In contrast, in 1967, the Israel Defense Forces developed a brilliant operational plan and achieved effective unit command and control and attained a decisive victory.




The Making of Israel's Army


Book Description

“Allon recounts the growth of the Israeli army from its inception in the 1880’s, when Jewish communities in Palestine formed their first small self-defence groups, through the Haganah’s clandestine period in the 1920’s and 30’s and the fighting after 1945 when army and state together achieved legality, to the Sinai Campaign of 1956 and the Six-Day War in June 1967 when the army reached maturity... His precise, economical narrative, interspersed with brief passages of analysis, is supplemented by extensive documentation, which is especially interesting in the way it traces the development of attitudes and doctrine in the Israeli forces. The work is a valuable contribution... It tells us a great deal about the organization, in its various stages, that fought the wars, and helps explain why these assumed the forms that they did, and why they succeeded... a study that is more than a history of a military organization.” — Middle Eastern Studies “Allon has contributed an extended essay concerned with the Israeli Government’s military philosophy, policy, and strategy rather than an administrative and technical history... half the book contains several important reports and policy statements, not easily available in English, describing military actions undertaken between 1941 and 1967. Allon... was an important contributor to the development of the Israeli Defense Forces... a rather breathtaking sweep in which hardly a word is wasted.” — The American Political Science Review “Allon seeks to explain in concise format, the development of Israel’s military doctrines of defense. The author... was former Palmach commander, one of the architects of the IDF, and a commander of various military units and on several battlefronts during Israel’s War of Independence.” — Middle East Journal “The development of Israel’s armed forces and military doctrine in the context of that country’s unique strategic needs... Especially interesting are the criticisms of some of [the Israeli] government’s decisions taken just before and during the Six Day War.” — Foreign Affairs “[A]n account, authoritative in content, modest in tone, of the growth and character of the Israeli army by one of its principal creators and leaders.” — International Affairs “Allon... gives a short historical and technical account of the evolution of an Israeli fighting capability over the past 70 years. The exploits of this army are significant and should be analyzed... No less interesting are the book’s descriptions of individual actions by participants in the first and second of Israel’s wars... The value of the book stems partly from a continuity of perspective on Israel’s strategic problems from 1948 to August, 1969... [a] useful book.” — Military Affairs