Joint Strategic Planning System Insights


Book Description

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This paper will first describe the Chairman's statutory responsibilities and strategic challenges, because this affects leaders and the focus of the strategic planning system. The paper then briefly examines how the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) changed in five major ways during the time period of 1990 to 2012 before describing in greater detail the key products and processes of the current system. The paper then goes on to summarize the more significant ways each Chairman used this system during the past 2 decades to produce specific planning products, which is part of their formal leadership legacy. During this time the Chairmen were Generals Powell (1989-93), Shalikashvili (1993-97), Shelton (1997-2001), Myers (2001-05), Pace (2005-07), and Admiral Mullen (2007-11). General Dempsey's current strategic planning focus, since he became Chairman in October 2011, is also summarized. This leadership focus and concluding thoughts provide broad insights into how senior leaders have used the strategic planning system to respond to internal and external challenges. These leadership and management insights are related to the importance of strategic vision, planning system and process characteristics, decisionmaking styles, and organizational change.




Joint Strategic Planning System Insights


Book Description

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This paper will first describe the Chairman's statutory responsibilities and strategic challenges, because this affects leaders and the focus of the strategic planning system. The paper then briefly examines how the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) changed in five major ways during the time period of 1990 to 2012 before describing in greater detail the key products and processes of the current system. The paper then goes on to summarize the more significant ways each Chairman used this system during the past 2 decades to produce specific planning products, which is part of their formal leadership legacy. During this time the Chairmen were Generals Powell (1989-93), Shalikashvili (1993-97), Shelton (1997-2001), Myers (2001-05), Pace (2005-07), and Admiral Mullen (2007-11). General Dempsey's current strategic planning focus, since he became Chairman in October 2011, is also summarized. This leadership focus and concluding thoughts provide broad insights into how senior leaders have used the strategic planning system to respond to internal and external challenges. These leadership and management insights are related to the importance of strategic vision, planning system and process characteristics, decisionmaking styles, and organizational change.




Joint Strategic Planning System Insights


Book Description

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation, while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This Letort Paper examines how the different Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 2012 used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their formal leadership responsibilities as outlined in Title 10 U.S. Code. As such, it provides an historic perspective in assessing the different Chairmen's leadership legacies in using and modifying their strategic planning system. It also has a contemporary focus as it describes the planning system's current processes and products. Because the strategic environment and its challenges can affect both a leader and staff's use of a planning system, this Paper examines major characteristics of the current strategic environment during this 2-decade-plus time frame. The current decade's challenges, which began in 2010 and are still evolving, appear to be significantly different from those of the previous decade in light of the nation's fiscal challenges, the military's departure from Iraq, and forecasted future force reductions in Afghanistan. The current decade's challenges associated with shifting, interest-driven conditions, and a multi-nodal world as described in the 2011 National Military Strategy are different from the rigid security competition between opposing blocks associated with the 1990s. To respond to these challenges, the planning system was formally revised five different times during this period. The most current revision in 2008 has specified processes and planning products under an overall framework of assess, advise, direct, and execute components. The assess component provides a comprehensive joint assessment of global challenges and joint capabilities, as well as force readiness and risk concerns. The advise component has specific resource, risk, and strategic assessment products to enable the Chairman to execute roles associated with being the principal military advisor, articulating combatant commander concerns, validating military requirements, and providing advice in other strategic documents. The direct component focuses on implementing the President and Secretary of Defense's guidance through strategies, plans, and doctrine. Finally, the execute component focuses on assisting with the command function through the National Military Command Center associated with planning and execution of orders. An examination of how the seven Chairmen used this planning system provides a formal leadership legacy and, most importantly, five broad decision making insights for future senior leaders. First, leaders need to articulate a vision to shape effectively any long-term change. Second, leaders need to ensure their planning system maintains a balance between flexibility and structure. Third, the strategic planning process needs to be inclusive and integrated with processes of leaders whose level of authority is above and below the Chairman. Fourth, leaders must modify the planning system to align with their decision making style and organizational challenges. Finally, a strategic planning system that has well-defined and inclusive processes and products can be a powerful mechanism to create a climate and help embed a culture.




Joint Strategic Planning System Insights


Book Description

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This paper will first describe the Chairman's statutory responsibilities and strategic challenges, because this affects leaders and the focus of the strategic planning system. The paper then briefly examines how the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) changed in five major ways during the time period of 1990 to 2012 before describing in greater detail the key products and processes of the current system. The paper then goes on to summarize the more significant ways each Chairman used this system during the past 2 decades to produce specific planning products, which is part of their formal leadership legacy. During this time the Chairmen were Generals Powell (1989-93), Shalikashvili (1993-97), Shelton (1997-2001), Myers (2001-05), Pace (2005-07), and Admiral Mullen (2007-11). General Dempsey's current strategic planning focus, since he became Chairman in October 2011, is also summarized. This leadership focus and concluding thoughts provide broad insights into how senior leaders have used the strategic planning system to respond to internal and external challenges. These leadership and management insights are related to the importance of strategic vision, planning system and process characteristics, decision making styles, and organizational change.







Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders


Book Description

This monograph examines how the three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff adapted and used the Joint Strategic Planning System from 1990 to 2000 to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. This strategic planning system is the primary formal means by which the Chairman executes his statutory responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Understanding this strategic planning system's evolution, reviewing its processes, and examining its products gives one great insight into how the three Chairmen provided direction that shaped the military to respond to the rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s. Senior leaders can learn from this comprehensive strategic planning and leadership review to enable them to better use a strategic planning system to transform their organizations for the future.




The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya


Book Description

On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to dead 2,000 civilians, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO's shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a "war of choice" rather than a "war of necessity," NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of "no boots on the ground" might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive -- that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate -- the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi's regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of "Responsibility to Protect." On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi's departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO's Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, not even UN observers. As the regime's security forces had virtually imploded, Libya's security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.




Operation Just Cause


Book Description




Capabilities for Joint Analysis in the Department of Defense


Book Description

This report stems from a congressional request for an independent report about the U.S. Department of Defense s capabilities for joint analysis and ways to improve them. Congressional concerns largely involved the activity called support for strategic analysis (SSA) and whether to revise it. The report recommends making fundamental revisions to the overall planning construct to which SSA contributes."




Council of War


Book Description

"Established during World War II to advise the President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and peacetime, also provides important insights into the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history of their activities be kept for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies is self-apparent... Adopting a broad view, it surveys the JCS role and contributions from the early days of World War II through the end of the Cold War. Written from a combination of primary and secondary sources, it is a fresh work of scholarship, looking at the problems of this era and their military implications. The main prism is that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in laying out the JCS perspective, it deals also with the wider impact of key decisions and the ensuing policies."--P. vii.