Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies


Book Description

We develop an empirical framework that allows us to analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, and we construct a new blockholder-firm panel data set in which we can track all unique blockholders among large U.S. public firms. We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. This evidence suggests that blockholders vary in their beliefs, skills, or preferences. Different large shareholders have distinct investment and governance styles: they differ in their approaches to corporate investment and growth, their appetites for financial leverage, and their attitudes towards CEO pay. We also find blockholder fixed effects in firm performance measures, and differences in style are systematically related to firm performance differences. Our results are consistent with influence for activist, pension fund,corporate, individual, and private equity blockholders, but consistent with systematic selection for mutual funds. Finally, we analyze sources of the heterogeneity, and find that blockholders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involvement as officers, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.




Executive Defense


Book Description

A quiet revolution came to corporate America during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Large shareholders - pension funds, insurance companies, money managers, and commercial banks - exercised new-found muscle, pressuring senior managers to improve disappointing financial results by reshaping their organizations. Michael Useem reveals how those investor pressures have transformed the inside structures of many corporations, better aligning them with shareholder interests. Useem draws on numerous sources, including interviews with senior managers and intensive studies of seven large corporations representing a range of restructuring experiences and industries - including pharmaceuticals, transportation, chemicals, retailing, and financial services. He shows that organizational changes have affected many areas of corporate life: headquarters staffs have been reduced, authority has filtered down to operating units, and compensation has become more closely tied to performance. Change also extends to corporate governance, where managers have fought back by seeking legal safeguards against takeovers and by staggering board terms. They've also put significant resources into building more effective relations with shareholders. As Useem demonstrates, this revolution has reached beyond the corporation, influencing American politics and law. As increasing ownership concentration has caused companies to focus more attention on shareholders, corporate political agendas have shifted from fighting government regulation to resisting shareholder intrusion. This book will be important reading for managers, economists, lawyers, financial analysts, and all observers of American business.




Shareholder Democracy


Book Description

Shareholders have important rights, which they can exercise democratically at a company's general meeting, such as the power to control and supervise management of the company. The term 'shareholder democracy' relates to the different ways in which shareholders can influence or even determine a company's course of life. One of the disadvantages of shareholder democracy is a risk that most democratic systems face - it can lead to opportunistic behavior of, in this case, influential shareholders with personal interests which are not in line with the interest of the company. Globalizing financial markets call for a general debate of this topic in an international context. Shareholder democracy does not only play a part in takeover situations, it touches the very core of every company law system. The position of shareholders within the company model, for example, influences the corporate interest definition, which in turn has significant consequences for the position of the board of directors. This book places the topic of shareholder democracy in an international context and deals with the topic from a comparative point of view. It contains contributions from authors from various legal systems discussing the issue of shareholder democracy within their own jurisdiction. The book covers, among other topics, the power of shareholders in Germany, the UK, South Africa, Belgium, and the Netherlands.




Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment


Book Description

In this volume, specialists from traditionally separate areas in economics and finance investigate issues at the conjunction of their fields. They argue that financial decisions of the firm can affect real economic activity—and this is true for enough firms and consumers to have significant aggregate economic effects. They demonstrate that important differences—asymmetries—in access to information between "borrowers" and "lenders" ("insiders" and "outsiders") in financial transactions affect investment decisions of firms and the organization of financial markets. The original research emphasizes the role of information problems in explaining empirically important links between internal finance and investment, as well as their role in accounting for observed variations in mechanisms for corporate control.




Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument


Book Description

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we develop an instrument - the density of wealthy individuals near a firm's headquarters - for the presence of a large, non-managerial individual shareholder in a firm. These shareholders have a large impact on firms, controlling for selection effects.










Quality Shareholders


Book Description

Anyone can buy stock in a public company, but not all shareholders are equally committed to a company’s long-term success. In an increasingly fragmented financial world, shareholders’ attitudes toward the companies in which they invest vary widely, from time horizon to conviction. Faced with indexers, short-term traders, and activists, it is more important than ever for businesses to ensure that their shareholders are dedicated to their missions. Today’s companies need “quality shareholders,” as Warren Buffett called those who “load up and stick around,” or buy large stakes and hold for long periods. Lawrence A. Cunningham offers an expert guide to the benefits of attracting and keeping quality shareholders. He demonstrates that a high density of dedicated long-term shareholders results in numerous comparative and competitive advantages for companies and their managers, including a longer runway to execute business strategy and a loyal cohort against adversity. Cunningham explores dozens of corporate practices and policies—such as rational capital allocation, long-term performance metrics, and a shareholder orientation—that can help shape the shareholder base and bring in committed owners. Focusing on the benefits for corporations and their investors, he reveals what draws quality shareholders to certain companies and what it means to have them in an investor base. This book is vital reading for investors, executives, and directors seeking to understand and attract the kind of shareholders that their companies need.