Law, Economics, and Conflict


Book Description

In Law, Economics, and Conflict, Kaushik Basu and Robert C. Hockett bring together international experts to offer new perspectives on how to take analytic tools from the realm of academic research out into the real world to address pressing policy questions. As the essays discuss, political polarization, regional conflicts, climate change, and the dramatic technological breakthroughs of the digital age have all left the standard tools of regulation floundering in the twenty-first century. These failures have, in turn, precipitated significant questions about the fundamentals of law and economics. The contributors address law and economics in diverse settings and situations, including central banking and the use of capital controls, fighting corruption in China, rural credit markets in India, pawnshops in the United States, the limitations of antitrust law, and the role of international monetary regimes. Collectively, the essays in Law, Economics, and Conflict rethink how the insights of law and economics can inform policies that provide individuals with the space and means to work, innovate, and prosper—while guiding states and international organization to regulate in ways that limit conflict, reduce national and global inequality, and ensure fairness. Contributors: Kaushik Basu; Kimberly Bolch; University of Oxford; Marieke Bos, Stockholm School of Economics; Susan Payne Carter, US Military Academy at West Point; Peter Cornelisse, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Gaël Giraud, Georgetown University; Nicole Hassoun, Binghamton University; Robert C. Hockett; Karla Hoff, Columbia University and World Bank; Yair Listokin, Yale Law School; Cheryl Long, Xiamen University and Wang Yanan Institute for Study of Economics (WISE); Luis Felipe López-Calva, UN Development Programme; Célestin Monga, Harvard University; Paige Marta Skiba, Vanderbilt Law School; Anand V. Swamy, Williams College; Erik Thorbecke, Cornell University; James Walsh, University of Oxford. Contributors: Kimberly B. Bolch, Marieke Bos, Susan Payne Carter, Peter A. Cornelisse, Gaël Giraud, Nicole Hassoun, Karla Hoff, Yair Listokin, Cheryl Long, Luis F. López-Calva, Célestin Monga, Paige Marta Skiba, Anand V. Swamy, Erik Thorbecke, James Walsh




Law, Economics, and Conflict


Book Description

In Law, Economics, and Conflict, Kaushik Basu and Robert C. Hockett bring together international experts to offer new perspectives on how to take analytic tools from the realm of academic research out into the real world to address pressing policy questions. As the essays discuss, political polarization, regional conflicts, climate change, and the dramatic technological breakthroughs of the digital age have all left the standard tools of regulation floundering in the twenty-first century. These failures have, in turn, precipitated significant questions about the fundamentals of law and economics. The contributors address law and economics in diverse settings and situations, including central banking and the use of capital controls, fighting corruption in China, rural credit markets in India, pawnshops in the United States, the limitations of antitrust law, and the role of international monetary regimes. Collectively, the essays in Law, Economics, and Conflict rethink how the insights of law and economics can inform policies that provide individuals with the space and means to work, innovate, and prosper—while guiding states and international organization to regulate in ways that limit conflict, reduce national and global inequality, and ensure fairness. Contributors: Kaushik Basu; Kimberly Bolch; University of Oxford; Marieke Bos, Stockholm School of Economics; Susan Payne Carter, US Military Academy at West Point; Peter Cornelisse, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Gaël Giraud, Georgetown University; Nicole Hassoun, Binghamton University; Robert C. Hockett; Karla Hoff, Columbia University and World Bank; Yair Listokin, Yale Law School; Cheryl Long, Xiamen University and Wang Yanan Institute for Study of Economics (WISE); Luis Felipe López-Calva, UN Development Programme; Célestin Monga, Harvard University; Paige Marta Skiba, Vanderbilt Law School; Anand V. Swamy, Williams College; Erik Thorbecke, Cornell University; James Walsh, University of Oxford. Contributors: Kimberly B. Bolch, Marieke Bos, Susan Payne Carter, Peter A. Cornelisse, Gaël Giraud, Nicole Hassoun, Karla Hoff, Yair Listokin, Cheryl Long, Luis F. López-Calva, Célestin Monga, Paige Marta Skiba, Anand V. Swamy, Erik Thorbecke, James Walsh




Principles of Conflict Economics


Book Description

Provides comprehensive, up-to-date coverage of the key themes and principles of conflict economics.




Handbook on the Economics of Conflict


Book Description

The Handbook on the Economics of Conflict conveys how economics can contribute to the understanding of conflict in its various dimensions embracing world wars, regional conflicts, terrorism and the role of peacekeeping in conflict prevention. The economics of conflict is a relatively new branch of the discipline of economics. Conflict provides opportunities for applying game theory involving strategic behaviour, interactions and interdependence betweenadversaries. The Handbook demonstrates that conflict and its prevention is costly; it considers new dimensions such as ethnic cleansing, destructive power, terrorism, corruption, the impact of new technology, peacekeeping, the role of economists in defence ministries and the use of privatecontractors in conflict.




The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict


Book Description

This Handbook brings together contributions from leading scholars who take an economic perspective to study peace and conflict. Some chapters are largely empirical, exploring the correlates and quantifying the costs of conflict. Others are more theoretical, examining the mechanisms that lead to war or are more conducive to peace.







Law and Economics


Book Description

The character of economic life] in a society is dependent upon, among 2 other things, its political-legal-economic institutional setting. Within that institutional structure, the individuals who comprise that society attempt to cooperate with one another to their mutual advantage so as to accommodate their joint utility-maximizing endeavors. In addition, these same individuals call upon certain societal institutions to adjust the con flicting claims of different individuals and groups. In this regard, a society is perceived as both a cooperative venture for mutual advantage where there are an identity of interests and, as well, an arena of conflict where there exists a mutual interdependence of conflicting claims or interests. The manner in which a society structures its political-legal-economic institutions 1) to enhance the scope of its cooperative endeavors and 2) to channel internal political-legal-economic conflicts toward resolution, shapes the character of economic life in that society. In contemplating the structure of its institutions intended to promote cooperation and channel conflict, a society confronts several issues. At the most general level an enduring issue is how a society both perceives and then ideologically transmits (perhaps teaches or rationalizes), inter nally and/or externally, its perceptions of so-called "cooperative en deavors" and "arenas of conflict." There can be no doubt that the resultant structure of a society's institutions will reflect that society's perception as to what cooperation entails and what conflict constitutes.




Economics of Conflict of Laws


Book Description

Volume I Acknowledgements Introduction Erin O'Hara PART I ECONOMIC AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EXISTING APPROACHES A Theoretical Insights 1. William F. Baxter (1963), 'Choice of Law and the Federal System' 2. Larry Kramer (1991), 'On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code' B Empirical Insights 3. Michael E. Solimine (2002), 'The Law and Economics of Conflict of Laws' 4. Patrick J. Borchers (1992), 'The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study' 5. Stuart E. Thiel (2000), 'Choice of Law and the Home-Court Advantage: Evidence' PART II PROPOSALS FOR MORE EFFICIENT CHOICE-OF-LAW SYSTEMS A Alternative Efficiency-based Approaches to Choice of Law 6. Larry Kramer (1990), 'Rethinking Choice of Law' 7. Erin A. O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein (2000), 'From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law' 8. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'Choice of Law: New Foundations' 9. Erin Ann O'Hara (2002), 'Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws' 10. Paul B. Stephan (2002), 'The Political Economy of Choice of Law' 11. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition' B Choice of Law for Torts 12. Bruce L. Hay (1992), 'Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System' 13. Michael J. Whincop and Mary Keyes (1999), 'The Market Tort in Private International Law' 14. Michael Whincop and Mary Keyes (1998), 'Economic Analysis of Conflict of Laws in Torts Cases: Discrete and Relational Torts' Name Index Volume II Acknowledgements An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I PART I CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM PROVISIONS A Choice-of-Law Clauses 1. Paul B. Stephan (2000), 'Choice of Law and its Consequences: Constitutions for International Transactions' 2. Michael J. Whincop and Mary E. Keyes (1998), 'Statutes' Domains in Private International Law: An Economic Theory of the Limits of Mandatory Rules' 3. Erin Ann O'Hara (2000), 'Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law' 4. Larry E. Ribstein (2003), 'From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law' B Choice-of-Forum Provisions 5. Erin Ann O'Hara (2002), 'The Jurisprudence and Politics of Forum-Selection Clauses' PART II CHOICE OF LAW AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITON A Securities Regulation 6. Roberta Romano (1998), 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation' B Bankruptcy Rules and Courts 7. Robert K. Rasmussen (2000), 'Resolving Transnational Insolvencies through Private Ordering' C Law Firm Rules of Ethics 8. Larry E. Ribstein (2001), 'Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law' D Same-Sex Marriage 9. F.H. Buckley and Larry E. Ribstein (2001), 'Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars' E Asset-Protection Trusts 10. Stewart E. Sterk (2000), 'Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?' PART III JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND CHOICE OF LAW 11. Michael Whincop (1999), 'The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments' Name Index.




War Economies and International Law


Book Description

This book describes how international law regulates the problems that arise where economic activity meets violent conflict.




The International Law of Economic Warfare


Book Description

Since the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the resurgence of (economic) nationalism, economic warfare has become an increasingly important substitute for actual hostilities between states. Its manifestations range from medieval sieges to modern day trade wars. Despite its long history, economic warfare remains an elusive term, foreign to international law. This book seeks to identify those portions of international law that are applicable to economic warfare. What is the status quo of regulation? Is there a jus ad bellum oeconomicum? A jus in bello oeconomico? After putting forward its own definition of economic warfare, the book reviews historical case studies – reflecting the three main branches of international economic law: trade, investment and currency – to identify pertinent legal boundaries. While the case studies reveal that numerous rules of international (economic) law regulate (specific measures of) economic warfare, it remains to be seen whether – analogously to the prohibition of the threat or use of force – these selective limitations have the potential to coalesce into a general prohibition of economic warfare in the future.