The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies


Book Description

Legislatures are arguably the most important political institution in modern democracies. The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, written by some of the most distinguished legislative scholars in political science, provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description and critical assessment of the state of the art in this key area.




The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting


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Setting the agenda for parliament is the most significant institutional weapon for governments to shape policy outcomes, because governments with significant agenda setting powers, like France or the UK, are able to produce the outcomes they prefer, while governments that lack agenda setting powers, such as the Netherlands and Italy in the beginning of the period examined, see their projects significantly altered by their Parliaments. With a strong comparative framework, this coherent volume examines fourteen countries and provides a detailed investigation into the mechanisms by which governments in different countries determine the agendas of their corresponding parliaments. It explores the three different ways that governments can shape legislative outcomes: institutional, partisan and positional, to make an important contribution to legislative politics. It will be of interest to students and scholars of comparative politics, legislative studies/parliamentary research, governments/coalition politics, political economy, and policy studies.




Congressional Record


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How Our Laws are Made


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Oregon Blue Book


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The Presidential Agenda


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The Consequences of Clout


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This dissertation is a study of the underpinnings of party government. The logic of party government brings together the logic of a power-seeking entity that needs to build broad coalitions, whose members often do not agree with each other on policy, and a policy-seeking entity that requires taking a clear position on issues and taking action to advance its chosen cause. Successful party government requires striking a sustainable balance between these conflicting goals. I contend that, in the U.S. House, the solution lies in the "cohesive power of public plunder," dispensing targeted particularistic benefits to the policy dissidents in the majority party. These benefits help them counter the ill effects of their party affiliation among their constituents and keep their electoral prospects viable. They, in turn, provide the numbers to keep the majority's party hold on power secure. The balance between policy and particularism is struck through the elaborate intra-legislature distribution of procedural privileges and influence that I term clout among legislators that form the framework for complex logrolls. Party government maintains itself by assuring a greater share of clout for its members that can be traded for policy or pork that makes their party affiliation worthwhile. A key feature in assuring division of clout along the party line and thus providing for a stable party government is the centralized agenda setting regime that is answerable to the entire party. Such institutional setup provides majority party members with a privileged position in intralegislative bargaining over the minority. This dissertation investigates the consequences of centralized vs. decentralized agenda control regime for party government through the lens of partisan ties in state legislatures.




Hijacking the Agenda


Book Description

Why are the economic interests and priorities of lower- and middle-class Americans so often ignored by the U.S. Congress, while the economic interests of the wealthiest are prioritized, often resulting in policies favorable to their interests? In Hijacking the Agenda, political scientists Christopher Witko, Jana Morgan, Nathan J. Kelly, and Peter K. Enns examine why Congress privileges the concerns of businesses and the wealthy over those of average Americans. They go beyond demonstrating that such economic bias exists to illuminate precisely how and why economic policy is so often skewed in favor of the rich. The authors analyze over 20 years of floor speeches by several hundred members of Congress to examine the influence of campaign contributions on how the national economic agenda is set in Congress. They find that legislators who received more money from business and professional associations were more likely to discuss the deficit and other upper-class priorities, while those who received more money from unions were more likely to discuss issues important to lower- and middle-class constituents, such as economic inequality and wages. This attention imbalance matters because issues discussed in Congress receive more direct legislative action, such as bill introductions and committee hearings. While unions use campaign contributions to push back against wealthy interests, spending by the wealthy dwarfs that of unions. The authors use case studies analyzing financial regulation and the minimum wage to demonstrate how the financial influence of the wealthy enables them to advance their economic agenda. In each case, the authors examine the balance of structural power, or the power that comes from a person or company’s position in the economy, and kinetic power, the power that comes from the ability to mobilize organizational and financial resources in the policy process. The authors show how big business uses its structural power and resources to effect policy change in Congress, as when the financial industry sought deregulation in the late 1990s, resulting in the passage of a bill eviscerating New Deal financial regulations. Likewise, when business interests want to preserve the policy status quo, it uses its power to keep issues off of the agenda, as when inflation eats into the minimum wage and its declining purchasing power leaves low-wage workers in poverty. Although groups representing lower- and middle-class interests, particularly unions, can use their resources to shape policy responses if conditions are right, they lack structural power and suffer significant resource disadvantages. As a result, wealthy interests have the upper hand in shaping the policy process, simply due to their pivotal position in the economy and the resulting perception that policies beneficial to business are beneficial for everyone. Hijacking the Agenda is an illuminating account of the way economic power operates through the congressional agenda and policy process to privilege the interests of the wealthy and marks a major step forward in our understanding of the politics of inequality.




Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress


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This book explores why some members of Congress are more effective than others at navigating the legislative process and what this means for how Congress is organized and what policies it produces. Craig Volden and Alan E. Wiseman develop a new metric of individual legislator effectiveness (the Legislative Effectiveness Score) that will be of interest to scholars, voters, and politicians alike. They use these scores to study party influence in Congress, the successes or failures of women and African Americans in Congress, policy gridlock, and the specific strategies that lawmakers employ to advance their agendas.