Leo Strauss and the Invasion of Iraq


Book Description

The political philosophy of Leo Strauss has been the subject of significant scholarly and media attention in recent years, particularly in the context of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Allegations that a group of Strauss-inspired Neo-conservatives intervened in the foreign policy establishment of the US in order to realise the policy of 'regime change' began to emerge soon after the invasion, and unanswered questions remain a decade later. This book addresses these claims, focusing specifically on a group of Straussians active in the spheres of intelligence production, think tanks, and the media during the period from the 9/11 attacks to the invasion in 2003. Such an examination is intended not simply to identify and expose their activities promoting the policy of 'regime change' in Iraq during this period, but also to challenge them and the Straussian logics underpinning them. Utilising the thought of Jacques Derrida, the book enacts a deconstructive challenge to Strauss’ political philosophy which unsettles the fundamental assumptions it relies upon. In doing so, it exposes the securitising imperative underpinning Straussian thought and the Straussian interventions. It thereby simultaneously addresses crucial issues in political theory and contemporary foreign policy studies, while asserting that these dimensions of international politics can and should be dealt with in conjunction with each other. This book would be of interest to students and scholars of Global Politics, Political Theory, Security Studies and US Foreign Policy, and those outside the academy interested in Neo-conservatism and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.




Leo Strauss and the Invasion of Iraq


Book Description

The political philosophy of Leo Strauss has been the subject of significant scholarly and media attention in recent years, particularly in the context of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Allegations that a group of Strauss-inspired Neo-conservatives intervened in the foreign policy establishment of the US in order to realise the policy of 'regime change' began to emerge soon after the invasion, and unanswered questions remain a decade later. This book addresses these claims, focusing specifically on a group of Straussians active in the spheres of intelligence production, think tanks, and the media during the period from the 9/11 attacks to the invasion in 2003. Such an examination is intended not simply to identify and expose their activities promoting the policy of 'regime change' in Iraq during this period, but also to challenge them and the Straussian logics underpinning them. Utilising the thought of Jacques Derrida, the book enacts a deconstructive challenge to Strauss’ political philosophy which unsettles the fundamental assumptions it relies upon. In doing so, it exposes the securitising imperative underpinning Straussian thought and the Straussian interventions. It thereby simultaneously addresses crucial issues in political theory and contemporary foreign policy studies, while asserting that these dimensions of international politics can and should be dealt with in conjunction with each other. This book would be of interest to students and scholars of Global Politics, Political Theory, Security Studies and US Foreign Policy, and those outside the academy interested in Neo-conservatism and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.




Cloaked in Virtue


Book Description

It is now commonly acknowledged that numerous key players in and around the Bush administration’s planning of the Iraq invasion were connected through a common background in the political philosophy of Leo Strauss, a German-born University of Chicago professor who died in 1973. These Straussian "neocons" were held responsible for exploiting the September 11th attacks in order to further their own foreign policy agenda. Cloaked in Virtue is the first book to take a critical view of the political ideas of Leo Strauss himself by careful attention to his own writings before and after his emigration to the United States. The result is a critical examination of the political theory of Leo Strauss, lifting the veil of intentional obfuscation, and its influence on the neoconservative foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of politics and international relations.




A Pretext for War


Book Description

A Pretext for War reveals the systematic weaknesses behind the failure to detect or prevent the 9/11 attacks, and details the Bush administration’s subsequent misuse of intelligence to sell preemptive war to the American people. Filled with unprecedented revelations, from the sites of “undisclosed locations” to the actual sources of America’s Middle East policy, A Pretext for War is essential reading for anyone concerned about the security of the United States. Acclaimed author James Bamford–whose classic book The Puzzle Palace first revealed the existence of the National Security Agency–draws on his unparalleled access to top intelligence sources to produce a devastating expose of the intelligence community and the Bush administration.




Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire


Book Description

This provocative book examines the teachings of political theorist Leo Strauss and the ways in which they have been appropriated, or misappropriated, by senior policymakers.




Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s


Book Description

The first comprehensive effort to examine Strauss's astonishingly wide-ranging writings of the 1930s (some of which have only recently been made available to English-speaking readers, including several herein) with a view to their unifying theme of recovering classical political philosophy.




Road to Iraq


Book Description

The Iraq war "e; its causes, agency and execution "e; has been shrouded in an ideological mist. Now, Muhammad Idrees Ahmad dispels the myths surrounding the war, taking a sociological approach to establish the war's causes, identify its agents and describe how it was sold. Ahmad presents a social history of the war's leading agents "e; the neoconservatives "e; and shows how this ideologically coherent group of determined political agents used the contingency of 9/11 to overwhelm a sceptical foreign policy establishment, military brass and intelligence apparatus, propelling the US into a war that a significant portion of the public opposed. The book includes an historical exploration of American militarism and of the increased post-WWII US role in the Middle East, as well as a reconsideration of the debates that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt sparked after the publication of 'The Israel lobby and US Foreign Policy'.




Black Mass


Book Description

For the decade that followed the end of the cold war, the world was lulled into a sense that a consumerist, globalized, peaceful future beckoned. The beginning of the twenty-first century has rudely disposed of such ideas—most obviously through 9/11and its aftermath. But just as damaging has been the rise in the West of a belief that a single model of political behavior will become a worldwide norm and that, if necessary, it will be enforced at gunpoint. In Black Mass, celebrated philosopher and critic John Gray explains how utopian ideals have taken on a dangerous significance in the hands of right-wing conservatives and religious zealots. He charts the history of utopianism, from the Reformation through the French Revolution and into the present. And most urgently, he describes how utopian politics have moved from the extremes of the political spectrum into mainstream politics, dominating the administrations of both George W. Bush and Tony Blair, and indeed coming to define the political center. Far from having shaken off discredited ideology, Gray suggests, we are more than ever in its clutches. Black Mass is a truly frightening and challenging work by one of Britain's leading political thinkers.




Modernity and Its Discontents


Book Description

Steven B. Smith examines the concept of modernity, not as the end product of historical developments but as a state of mind. He explores modernism as a source of both pride and anxiety, suggesting that its most distinctive characteristics are the self-criticisms and doubts that accompany social and political progress. Providing profiles of the modern project’s most powerful defenders and critics—from Machiavelli and Spinoza to Saul Bellow and Isaiah Berlin—this provocative work of philosophy and political science offers a novel perspective on what it means to be modern and why discontent and sometimes radical rejection are its inevitable by-products.




Warring Friends


Book Description

Allied nations often stop each other from going to war. Some countries even form alliances with the specific intent of restraining another power and thereby preventing war. Furthermore, restraint often becomes an issue in existing alliances as one ally wants to start a war, launch a military intervention, or pursue some other risky military policy while the other ally balks. In Warring Friends, Jeremy Pressman draws on and critiques realist, normative, and institutionalist understandings of how alliance decisions are made. Alliance restraint often has a role to play both in the genesis of alliances and in their continuation. As this book demonstrates, an external power can apply the brakes to an incipient conflict, and even unheeded advice can aid in clarifying national goals. The power differentials between allies in these partnerships are influenced by leadership unity, deception, policy substitutes, and national security priorities. Recent controversy over the complicated relationship between the U.S. and Israeli governments—especially in regard to military and security concerns—is a reminder that the alliance has never been easy or straightforward. Pressman highlights multiple episodes during which the United States attempted to restrain Israel's military policies: Israeli nuclear proliferation during the Kennedy Administration; the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; preventing an Israeli preemptive attack in 1973; a small Israeli operation in Lebanon in 1977; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; and Israeli action during the Gulf War of 1991. As Pressman shows, U.S. initiatives were successful only in 1973, 1977, and 1991, and tensions have flared up again recently as a result of Israeli arms sales to China. Pressman also illuminates aspects of the Anglo-American special relationship as revealed in several cases: British nonintervention in Iran in 1951; U.S. nonintervention in Indochina in 1954; U.S. commitments to Taiwan that Britain opposed, 1954-1955; and British intervention and then withdrawal during the Suez War of 1956. These historical examples go far to explain the context within which the Blair administration failed to prevent the U.S. government from pursuing war in Iraq at a time of unprecedented American power.