Lessons Learned From Advising And Training The Republic Of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces


Book Description

The United States (US) has a long history of employing military advisors, from the American military occupation of the Philippines throughout the 19th century, and the Korea War in the 1950s, the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973, El Salvador 1984 to 1992, to current efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A strong Iraqi military is needed to support the future democratic government of Iraq. This will allow the US to disengage a large portion of its combat units from Iraq. The US must train the present Iraqi military to successfully take over responsibility for Iraq’s security and combat the current insurgency. The US Army and Marine Corps combat advisors will play a key role in ensuring the Iraqi military is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide for a secure Iraq. There are lessons learned from training and advising the Republic of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces (RVNAF) during the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973 that could be applied in the ongoing advisory effort in Iraq. The focus of this thesis is to determine the lessons learned from selecting, training, and the organization of US Army and Marine Corps advisors during the Vietnam War.




Lessons Learned from Advising and Training the Republic of South Vietnam's Armed Forces


Book Description

The United States has a long history of employing military advisors, from the American military occupation of the Philippines throughout the 19th century, the Korea War in the early 1950s, the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1973, El Salvador from 1984 to 1992, to current efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. A strong Iraqi military is needed to support the future democratic government of Iraq. The United States must train the present Iraqi military to successfully take over responsibility for Iraq's security and to combat the ongoing insurgency. When this happens, it will allow the United States to disengage a large portion of its combat units from Iraq. U.S. Army and Marine Corps combat advisors will play a key role in ensuring that the Iraqi military is properly organized, trained, and equipped. There are lessons learned from training and advising the Republic of South Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF) during the Vietnam War that could be applied to the ongoing advisory effort in Iraq. This thesis focuses on the lessons that were learned from selecting, training, and organizing U.S. Army and Marine Corps advisors during the Vietnam War.




Lessons Learned from Advising the Republic of South Vietnam Armed Forces During the Vietnam War


Book Description

The United States (US) has a long history of employing military advisors, from the American military occupation of the Philippines throughout the 19th century, and the Korea War in the 1950s, the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973, El Salvador 1984 to 1992, to current efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A strong Iraqi military is needed to support the future democratic government of Iraq. This will allow the US to disengage a large portion of its combat units from Iraq. The US must train the present Iraqi military to successfully take over responsibility for Iraq security and combat the current insurgency. The US Army and Marine Corps combat advisors will play a key role in ensuring the Iraqi military is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide for a secure Iraq. There are lessons learned from training and advising the Republic of South Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) during the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973 that could be applied in the ongoing advisory effort in Iraq. The focus of this thesis is to determine the lessons learned from selecting, training, and the organization of US Army and Marine Corps advisors during the Vietnam War.




Vietnam Studies - U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971


Book Description

Includes 6 Maps, 25 photo illustrations, 10 Charts and 8 Tables. “As long ago as 1957, U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers were in the Republic of Vietnam, going about their business of training, advising, and assisting members of the Vietnamese Army. Despite the old Army witticism about never volunteering for anything, the Special Forces soldier is, in fact, a double volunteer, having first volunteered for airborne training and then again for Special Forces training. From a very meager beginning but sustained by a strong motivation and confidence in his mission, the Special Forces soldier has marched through the Vietnam struggle in superb fashion. “In 1957 some fifty-eight Vietnamese soldiers were given military training by Special Forces troops. Ten years later the Special Forces were advising and assisting over 40,000 paramilitary troops, along with another 40,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces soldiers. This monograph traces the development and notes the progress, problems, successes, and failures of a unique program undertaken by the U.S. Army for the first time in its history. It is hoped that all the significant lessons learned have been recorded and the many pitfalls of such a program uncovered... “With the withdrawal of the Special Forces from Vietnam in 1971, the Army could honestly lay claim to a new dimension in ground warfare the organized employment of a paramilitary force in sustained combat against a determined enemy. I know I speak for my predecessors and successors in claiming that the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was the finest collection of professional soldiers ever assembled by the U.S. Army, anywhere, anytime.”




Vietnam Studies


Book Description

As long ago as 1957, U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers were in the Republic of Vietnam. going about their business of training, advising, and assisting members of the Vietnamese Army. Despite the old Army witticism about never volunteering for anything, the Special Forces soldier is. in fan, a double volunteer, having first volunteered for airborne training and then again for Special Forces training. From a very meager beginning but sustained by a strong motivation and confidence in his mission, the Special Forces soldier has marched through the Vietnam struggle in superb fashion. In 1957 some fifty-eight Vietnamese soldiers were given military training by Special Forces troops. Ten years later the Special Forces were advising and assisting over 40,000 paramilitary troops, along with another 40,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces soldiers. This monograph traces the development and notes the progress, problems. successes, and failures of a unique program undertaken by the U.S. Army for the first lime in its history. It is hoped that all the significant lessons learned have been recorded and the many pitfalls of such a program uncovered. I am responsible for the conclusions reached, yet my thought processes could not escape the influence of the many outstanding officers and men in the Special Forces who joined in the struggle. Particularly, I must lake note of the contributions of the Special Forces noncommissioned officers, without question the most competent soldiers in the world. With the withdrawal of the Special Forces from Vietnam in 1971, the Army could honestly lay claim to a new dimension in ground warfare-the organized employment of a paramilitary force in sustained combat against a determined enemy. I know I speak for my predecessors and successors in claiming that the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was the finest collection of professional soldiers ever assembled by the U.S. Army, anywhere, anytime. Francis John Kelly Colonel, Armor 1972







The US Adviser


Book Description

Includes over 30 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The United States advisory mission in South Vietnam encompassed many fields of endeavor and affected almost every level of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It was a demanding exercise of professional duties and a unique human experience for the American adviser who had not only to struggle with problems of environment and culture differences and face the complexities and hazards of the war, but also devote his time and energy to supplement our Vietnamese experience with US Army professionalism. The total effort by US advisers contributed directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. To the Vietnamese officers and men who benefited from his expertise and experience, the US adviser was both a mentor and a Samaritan. Regardless of his level of assignment or branch of service, he could be subsumed by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and devotion to those he advised. Whatever his approach to advisory duties, he always performed with dedication and competence. For nearly two decades, these qualities were the hallmark of the US adviser in South Vietnam. To analyze and evaluate the United States advisory experience in its entirety is not an easy task. It cannot be accomplished thoroughly and effectively by a single author since there were several types of advisers representing different areas of specialty but all dedicated to a common goal. Therefore, each member of the Control Group for the Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program has made a significant contribution as we presented the Vietnamese point of view.”-Author’s preface.




Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam


Book Description

Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.




Military Assistance Advisory Group-Vietnam (1954-1963): The Battle Of Ap Bac


Book Description

The performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) at the Battle of Ap Bac, January 2, 1963, established a narrative that the South Vietnamese were unwilling to fight or lacked aggressiveness. At the time of the Battle of Ap Bac, the South Vietnamese had been receiving direct military aid from the US and under the tutelage of American advisors for over eight years. Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann was the senior US Army advisor present and remarked after the battle, “It was a miserable damn performance, just like it always is. These people won’t listen. They make the same mistake over and over again in the same way.” In the context of those comments, ARVN did not show an appreciable increase in combat effectiveness with years of direct American support. The larger narrative surrounding the battle indicates that the performance of ARVN was a harbinger for future challenges and setbacks in South Vietnam. This battle and subsequent evaluation of the ARVN attribute the cause for combat ineffectiveness was the South Vietnamese lacking leadership and not possessing the necessary fighting spirit. Is the evaluation that the outcome of the Battle of Ap Bac hinged on the ARVN’s lack of aggressiveness still valid when put in the broader cultural, social, and political context that existed at its birth?




Vietnam Studies - The Development And Training Of The South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 [Illustrated Edition]


Book Description

Includes 2 maps & 21 photos “In 1954 the Army of South Vietnam was a collection of former French colonial troops with little command experience and no support forces worthy of mention. Gradually and despite a considerable degree of political and social instability, the Army, with strong American assistance, was molded into an effective fighting force by the efforts of Vietnamese leaders. After 1960 the South Vietnamese Army also acquired a counterinsurgency capability, but by 1965 increased political turmoil had undermined its effectiveness and necessitated the intervention of strong US combat forces. “From 1965 to 1968, while US forces bore the brunt of the fighting, the South Vietnamese slowly regrouped and, with increasing American advisory assistance and matériel support, once again became an effective fighting force. During this period the military provided security for the civilian population and administration and, in schools and training centers, laid the basis for a larger and more responsive military force. The battles of the Tet offensive of 1968 were followed by the general mobilization of South Vietnam and, one year later, by the decision of the U.S. to begin troop redeployments. These moves set the stage for the third phase in the Army’s development, Vietnamization. The years from 1968 to 1972 saw a great expansion of South Vietnam’s territorial security forces and militia, and the continual improvement and modernization of the regular Army as it once again assumed complete responsibility for the war effort. This monograph, covering the three stages in the growth and development of the South Vietnamese Army, highlights the role of the US Army, especially the MACV advisory system. While such a study can do no more than survey these activities, it does reflect the deep and continuous commitment by thousands of American soldiers to make the South Vietnamese Army a self-sufficient force capable of defending itself with minimum outside assistance.”