Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief


Book Description

The book offers new insights into the lottery paradox, and thereby into how categorical and graded beliefs are formally connected.




Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief


Book Description

We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical (yes/no) and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' – at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve that paradox has been a matter of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate.




Knowledge and Lotteries


Book Description

This work is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. The text explores questions on the nature and importance of knowledge.




Degrees of Belief


Book Description

This anthology is the first book to give a balanced overview of the competing theories of degrees of belief. It also explicitly relates these debates to more traditional concerns of the philosophy of language and mind and epistemic logic.




When is True Belief Knowledge?


Book Description

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.




Credition - An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Nature of Beliefs and Believing


Book Description

The concept of credition represents an innovative research field at the interface of the natural sciences and the humanities addressing the nature of beliefs and believing. Credition signifies the integrative information processing that is brought about by neurophysiologically defined neural activity in the brain affording decision making. In analogy to cognition and emotion it is mediated by neural processes and constrains behavior by predictive coding. Three categories of beliefs have been defined on the background of evolutionary biology that can be differentiated linguistically. The goal of the collection of research papers is to provide an interdisciplinary discourse on an international level in the emerging field of credition. On this basis individual, group-specific and cultural narratives of secular and non-secular origin can become normative, in particular, when enhanced by ritual acts. Also, the recently defined belief categories can pave the way for novel approaches of empirical research on the formation of civilizations and cultures as well as for new perspectives on the psychopathological understanding of mental disorders. The disciplines of empirical research such as cognitive science, neurophysiology, neuropsychology, social neuroscience shall counteract with theoretical disciplines such as anthropology, philosophy, and theology in order to elaborate premises that are suited to bridge the scientific gap. The potential contributors will submit their abstracts such that they are available for the International meeting, Credition - An Interdisciplinary Challenge, that is going to take place in October 2021 in Hannover, Germany. Following the symposium, the participants shall elaborate their perspective concerning beliefs and believing, based on their expertise, and the information they have learned during the symposium. The authors are expected to submit a concise paper of 2000 words (C Type Article).




Putting Logic in Its Place


Book Description

What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon. This picture (explored more bydecision-theorists and philosophers of science thatn by mainstream epistemologists) invites the use of probabilistic coherence to constrain rational belief. But this latter project has often involved defining graded beliefs in terms of preferences, which may seem to change the subject away fromepistemic rationality.Putting Logic in its Place explores the relations between these two ways of seeing beliefs. It argues that the binary conception, although it fits nicely with much of our commonsense thought and talk about belief, cannot in the end support the traditional deductive constraints on rational belief. Binary beliefs that obeyed these constraints could not answer to anything like our intuitive notion of epistemic rationality, and would end up having to be divorced from central aspects of ourcognitive, practical, and emotional lives.But this does not mean that logic plays no role in rationality. Probabilistic coherence should be viewed as using standard logic to constrain rational graded belief. This probabilistic constraint helps explain the appeal of the traditional deductive constraints, and even underlies the force of rationally persuasive deductive arguments. Graded belief cannot be defined in terms of preferences. But probabilistic coherence may be defended without positing definitional connections between beliefsand preferences. Like the traditional deductive constraints, coherence is a logical ideal that humans cannot fully attain. Nevertheless, it furnishes a compelling way of understanding a key dimension of epistemic rationality.




Epistemic Consequentialism


Book Description

An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to-and so face similar problems to-versions of consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.




Logic, Rationality, and Interaction


Book Description

This LNCS book is part of the FOLLI book series and constitutes the proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2023, held in Jinan, China, in October 2023. The 15 full papers presented together with 7 short papers in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 40 submissions. The workshop covers a wide range on the following topics such as agency; argumentation and agreement; belief representation; probability and uncertainty; belief revision and belief merging; knowledge and action; dynamics of informational attitudes; intentions, plans, and goals; decision making and planning; preference and utility; cooperation; strategic reasoning and game theory; epistemology; social choice; social interaction; speech acts; knowledge representation; norms and normative systems; natural language; rationality; philosophical logic.