Macarthur's Pacific Appeasement, December 8 1941


Book Description

As planned, military action in the U. S. Commonwealth of the Philippine Isles would be in consonance with the 1935 U. S. WAR PLAN ORANGE, Revision 3 (WPO-3). When war threatened in the Pacific theater, WPO-3 was amended in 1941 as a result of the Placentia Bay, Argentia, Newfoundland meeting between United States President Franklin Roosevelt and Great Britain Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and their respective War Staffs. This revision, renamed RAINBOW 5, included military and naval forces of Australia, Great Britain, The Netherlands (Dutch), and the United States (America) (ABDA) in a mutual defense pact. War Plan Rainbow 5 provided detailed, precise instructions the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater would execute in the event of hostilities with Japan. If it appeared hostilities were imminent, the President of the United States, Commander-in-Chief of all U. S. military and naval forces, would order execution of Phase One, RAINBOW 5. Phase One explicitly ordered the U.S. Army Air Force (FEAF), headquartered at Nielson Field, Manila, subordinate to the U.S. Army Far East Command (USAFFE), The Philippines, to send one Boeing B-17D Flying Fortress on a high altitude photo-reconnaissance mission over Japanese military targets in and around the island of Formosa. At the same time, the U.S. Navy Asiatic Fleet, except submarines, gunboats, PT boats, harbor vessels, and shore command, would depart for agreed upon ports in Java, Borneo, Celebes, and Singapore. (The U.S. Army Air Force was created on June 20, 1941, but elements of the U.S. Army Air Corps remained intact until 1947 when both USAAF and USAAC were abolished and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) was born. I decided to use USAAF throughout this book.)




Japan’s Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons


Book Description

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.




Strategy and Command


Book Description

For the United States, full involvement in World War II began and ended in the Pacific Ocean. Although the accepted grand strategy of the war was the defeat of Germany first, the sweep of Japanese victory in the weeks and months after Pearl Harbor impelled the United States to move as rapidly as it could to stem the enemy tide of conquest in the Pacific. Shocked as they were by the initial attack, the American people were also united in their determination to defeat Japan, and the Pacific war became peculiarly their own affair. In this great theater it was the United States that ran the war, and had the determining voice in answering questions of strategy and command as they arose. The natural environment made the prosecution of war in the Pacific of necessity an interservice effort, and any real account of it must, as this work does, take into full account the views and actions of the Navy as well as those of the Army and its Air Forces. These are the factors-a predominantly American theater of war covering nearly one-third the globe, and a joint conduct of war by land, sea, and air on the largest scale in American history-that make this volume on the Pacific war of particular significance today. It is the capstone of the eleven volumes published or being published in the Army's World War II series that deal with military operations in the Pacific area, and it is one that should command wide attention from the thoughtful public as well as the military reader in these days of global tension.




Pacific Campaign


Book Description

Naval history of the United States and Japan in the Pacific Ocean during World War II.




Winning a Future War


Book Description

"To win in the Pacific during World War II, the U.S. Navy had to transform itself technically, tactically, and strategically. It had to create a fleet capable of the unprecedented feat of fighting and winning far from home, without existing bases, in the face of an enemy with numerous bases fighting in his own waters. Much of the credit for the transformation should go to the war gaming conducted at the U.S. Naval War College. Conversely, as we face further demands for transformation, the inter-war experience at the War College offers valuable guidance as to what works, and why, and how."




Piercing the Fog


Book Description

From the foreword: WHEN JAPAN ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR on December 7, 1941, and Germany and Italy joined Japan four days later in declaring war against the United States, intelligence essential for the Army Air Forces to conduct effective warfare in the European and Pacific theaters did not exist. Piercing the Fog tells the intriguing story of how airmen built intelligence organizations to collect and process information about the enemy and to produce and disseminate intelligence to decisionmakers and warfighters in the bloody, horrific crucible of war. Because the problems confronting and confounding air intelligence officers, planners, and operators fifty years ago still resonate, Piercing the Fog is particularly valuable for intelligence officers, planners, and operators today and for anyone concerned with acquiring and exploiting intelligence for successful air warfare. More than organizational history, this book reveals the indispensable and necessarily secret role intelligence plays in effectively waging war. It examines how World War II was a watershed period for Air Force Intelligence and for the acquisition and use of signals intelligence, photo reconnaissance intelligence, human resources intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence. Piercing the Fog discusses the development of new sources and methods of intelligence collection; requirements for intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare; intelligence to support missions for air superiority, interdiction, strategic bombardment, and air defense; the sharing of intelligence in a coalition and joint service environment; the acquisition of intelligence to assess bomb damage on a target-by-target basis and to measure progress in achieving campaign and war objecti ves; and the ability of military leaders to understand the intentions and capabilities of the enemy and to appreciate the pressures on intelligence officers to sometimes tell commanders what they think the commanders want to hear instead of what the intelligence discloses. The complex problems associated with intelligence to support strategic bombardment in the 1940s will strike some readers as uncannily prescient to global Air Force operations in the 1990s.," Illustrated.




Douglas MacArthur


Book Description

Buhite offers a trenchant evaluation of Douglas MacArthur's career in east Asia and his role in some of the most important military and diplomatic issues of the twentieth century. Concise and highly readable, this biography considers diplomatic fact in light of psychological insight, and asks us to look anew at both MacArthur and American involvement in the region. From Manila to Washington, with Tokyo and Seoul in between, readers follow the course of American foreign diplomacy in East Asia via MacArthur's own career. This fascinating intersection of personality and policy would make for newsreel footage and newspaper headlines, such as when he waded ashore Luzon Island in the Philippines and sent Washington provocative communiqués about the People's Republic of China. Yet, as Buhite shows, grand gestures are not the substance of great foreign policy, and MacArthur's reputation merits critical reassessment. This is a must read for those interested in diplomatic and military history.




The Craft of International History


Book Description

This is a practical guide to the historical study of international politics. The focus is on the nuts and bolts of historical research--that is, on how to use original sources, analyze and interpret historical works, and actually write a work of history. Two appendixes provide sources sure to be indispensable for anyone doing research in this area. The book does not simply lay down precepts. It presents examples drawn from the author's more than forty years' experience as a working historian. One important chapter, dealing with America's road to war in 1941, shows in unprecedented detail how an interpretation of a major historical issue can be developed. The aim throughout is to throw open the doors of the workshop so that young scholars, both historians and political scientists, can see the sort of thought processes the historian goes through before he or she puts anything on paper. Filled with valuable examples, this is a book anyone serious about conducting historical research will want to have on the bookshelf.




Killing the Rising Sun


Book Description

The powerful and riveting new book in the multimillion-selling Killing series by Bill O'Reilly and Martin Dugard Autumn 1944. World War II is nearly over in Europe but is escalating in the Pacific, where American soldiers face an opponent who will go to any length to avoid defeat. The Japanese army follows the samurai code of Bushido, stipulating that surrender is a form of dishonor. Killing the Rising Sun takes readers to the bloody tropical-island battlefields of Peleliu and Iwo Jima and to the embattled Philippines, where General Douglas MacArthur has made a triumphant return and is plotting a full-scale invasion of Japan. Across the globe in Los Alamos, New Mexico, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer and his team of scientists are preparing to test the deadliest weapon known to mankind. In Washington, DC, FDR dies in office and Harry Truman ascends to the presidency, only to face the most important political decision in history: whether to use that weapon. And in Tokyo, Emperor Hirohito, who is considered a deity by his subjects, refuses to surrender, despite a massive and mounting death toll. Told in the same page-turning style of Killing Lincoln, Killing Kennedy, Killing Jesus, Killing Patton, and Killing Reagan, this epic saga details the final moments of World War II like never before.




The Cambridge History of the Second World War: Volume 2, Politics and Ideology


Book Description

War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.