Marine Corps Aviation: It's Time to Strengthen the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).


Book Description

The author asserts that in the next ten to fifteen years the probability of employing the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in limited conflicts on behalf of United States foreign policy interests will increase. Further, that the threat posed by likely enemies is sophisticated enough to require enhanced combat capability for the MEU to be an effective deterrent. The author proposes a solution to this problem with the assignment to the MEU of Marine Corps tactical fixed-wing aircraft and command and control assets in a composite for structure. This concept of employment of existing aviation assets is within the context of current Marine Corps doctrine but is not normally applied at the MEU level of operations.




The MEU (SOC) Without Fixed Wing


Book Description

The requirement for joint operations between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines requires new doctrine, doctrine which the Marine Corps pioneered years ago. This doctrine within the Marines is called the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTAF concept takes four elements: Command Element, Ground Combat Element (GCE), Air Combat Element (ACE), and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE), and fights them as one joint team. Organized into three different sizes -- the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)) -- each MAGTAF has the ability to conduct most aspects of warfare in and of itself. The MAGTF is a concept of which the Marine Corps should be proud. The integration of the four different aspects of war, and the extreme success with which these elements work together toward mission accomplishment, exemplify and justify the overwhelming unity felt within the Marines. The limitations of the MEU (SOC) that are explored in no way undermine the value of the forward deployed MAGTF. Removing fixed wing assets would only serve to allow greater flexibility in deck operations, and greatly enhance training opportunities for both fixed wing and rotary wing pilots. If the Marine Corps believes that fixed wing V/STOL aircraft are undeniably necessary to the MEU (SOC), a new plan needs to be incorporated regarding the training and use of these valuable assets. The future may depend on V/STOL, but a poorly trained force with dwindling assets will only create bigger problems in the long run.




The Impending Shortfall in Marine Corps Aviation Leadership Development


Book Description

The currently Marine Corps system of selecting and preparing aviators to command Aviation Combat Element (ACE) that support a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has become inadequate. The current practice of relying on a accumulated operational experience accumulated over a typical carrier to prepare ACE commanders is being negatively impacted by a shortened period of time spent in operational squadrons. flight operational experience. Compounding the problem of the diminishing operational experience is the growing requirement for ACE commanders educated in the art of employing different aircraft in joint environments. The Marine Expeditionary Unit is supported by a composite squadron built around a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter squadron. The Lieutenant Colonel commanding the CH-46E squadron is given detachments from CH-53E, AH-1W, UH-1N, AV-8B, Marine Air Control Group, and personnel and equipment. These detachments more than double the size of the original parent squadron. The composite squadron provides four out of six functions of Marine Air. Currently, the Marine Corps selects commanders of Ace's on a formal process. Yet, there is no formal requirements that an officer must meet in order to be selected as an ACE commander. There is neither a formalized career path nor training pipeline to prepare the CH-46E commander to employ the unique capabilities of the ACE. Prior experience, on the job training, and a six month predeployment workup are the primary means through which a commander is supposed to acquire the requisite ACE commander skills. With current trends of reduced flight experience and accelerated promotion rates, and expanded joint integration with more capable aircraft, the Marine Corps cannot afford to rely on OJT as a proper means of preparing ACE commanders.




The U.S. Marine Expeditionary Units at War


Book Description

Chronicles the history, participation in armed conflicts, weapons, and demanding training of the United States Marine Expeditionary Units.







Prepositioning Programs Handbook


Book Description

The Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway (MCPP-N) have been operationally invaluable in supporting our Nation's interests across the world. These two unique programs provide the essential elements needed to support and executive crisis response, global reach, and forward presence. The Marine Corps' Prepositioning Programs enable the rapid deployment of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and/or augment individual Marine units forward deployed. These forces are uniquely capable of strengthening alliances, securing strategic access, and defeating hostile adversaries. MPF and MCPP-N are keystones in the Marine Corps' capability for setting the conditions for national security. The prepositioning of equipment and supplies to support MAGTFs from Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MED), to Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level employment, enables Marine forces to fulfill their role and responsibility as our Nation's force in readiness. Our prepositioning programs will continue to enable operations across the Joint Operational continuum – including shaping, deterrence, seizing the initiative, domination, stabilization, and enabling civilian authorities. When combined with the forces and their equipment arriving in the fly-in echelon (FIE), prepositioning programs provide forward deployed equipment and supplies needed to sustain a MEB-sized MAGTF for 30 days of operations; thus reducing total strategic lift requirements. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Southwest Asia), Restore Hope (Somalia), and Iraqi Freedom have proven the value of our prepositioning programs. By prepositioning key warfighting equipment and supplies in support of forward presence, global reach, and crisis response, we have significantly reduced the time and strategic lift required to complete force closure of powerful and integrated warfighting capabilities for employment by Combatant Commanders. In turn, the successes and lessons learned from our past operations ultimately drive improvements for the future. Information in handbook provides an overview of our prepositioning programs.







The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) SMARTbook


Book Description

The Marine Expedtionary Unit (MEU) SMARTbook is designed to be a reference for MEU and PHIBRON Commanders, MEU and PHIBRON staffs and the commanders and staffs of the Major Subordinate Elements (MSE) and Naval Support Elements (NSE) of the ARG-MEU team. Topics include: MEU mission, organization, and capabilities; MEU staff functions; mission planning (R2P2 & MCPP); mission essential tasks; standing mission briefs; MEU liaison and survey elements; appendices and reference guides; abbreviations, acronyms and glossary. *** Find the latest edition of this book and the rest of our series of military reference SMARTbooks at the publishers website: www.TheLightningPress.com ***




The Reestablishment of the Amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Its Implication for the Aviation Combat Element


Book Description

Recently the 32d Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, reestablished the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) by re-designating the Marine Expeditionary Force (FWD) within each of the three MEFs as the First, Second, and Third MEBs. Although this middle tier Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) has been "doctrinally resurrected," deploying the MEB via amphibious shipping presents significant challenges for the Aviation Combat Element (ACE). If the Department of the Navy only procures a 36-ship amphibious fleet and continues with current ARG/MEU deployment requirements, the forcible entry MEB will only be capable of forming under ad hoc conditions. Faced with this reality, the only optimum alternative to the haphazard formation of a brigade-sized force is to muster all available shipping within the respective fleet command and composite the standing MEUs. This will require defined command relationships as well as the development of a MEB mission statement and associated core competencies. Additionally, MEU tables of equipment (T/Es) and tables of organization (T/Os) will require revision to enable the ARG/MEUs to form the MEB assault echelon without creating any deficiency in combat power. To accomplish this, it is imperative that the LHA and LHD damage stability modifications be completed to ensure that the ACE can adequately support the forcible entry MEB.




Commandant's Planning Guidance


Book Description

The Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) provides the 38th Commandant's strategic direction for the Marine Corps and mirrors the function of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It serves as the authoritative document for Service-level planning and provides a common direction to the Marine Corps Total Force. It also serves as a road map describing where the Marine Corps is going and why; what the Marine Corps force development priorities are and are not; and, in some instances, how and when prescribed actions will be implemented. This CPG serves as my Commandant's Intent for the next four years. As Commandant Neller observed, "The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment." I concur with his diagnosis. Significant change is required to ensure we are aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and DPG, and further, prepared to meet the demands of the Naval Fleet in executing current and emerging operational naval concepts. Effecting that change will be my top priority as your 38th Commandant. This CPG outlines my five priority focus areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. I will use these focal areas as logical lines of effort to frame my thinking, planning, and decision-making at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), as well as to communicate to our civilian leadership. This document explains how we will translate those focus areas into action with measurable outcomes. The institutional changes that follow this CPG will be based on a long-term view and singular focus on where we want the Marine Corps to be in the next 5-15 years, well beyond the tenure of any one Commandant, Presidential administration, or Congress. We cannot afford to retain outdated policies, doctrine, organizations, or force development strategies. The coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change - just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. The Arab Spring, West African Ebola Outbreak, Scarborough Shoal standoff, Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, and weaponization of social media are but a few recent examples illustrating the point. While we must accept an environment characterized by uncertainty, we cannot ignore strong signals of change nor be complacent when it comes to designing and preparing the force for the future. What is abundantly clear is that the future operating environment will place heavy demands on our Nation's Naval Services. Context and direction is clearly articulated in the NDS and DPG as well as testimony from our uniformed and civilian leadership. No further guidance is required; we are moving forward. The Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. In crisis prevention and crisis response, the Fleet Marine Force - acting as an extension of the Fleet - will be first on the scene, first to help, first to contain a brewing crisis, and first to fight if required to do so. The Marine Corps will be the "force of choice" for the President, Secretary, and Combatant Commander - "a certain force for an uncertain world" as noted by Commandant Krulak. No matter what the crisis, our civilian leaders should always have one shared thought - Send in the Marines.