Building Trust Across the Taiwan Strait


Book Description

"In the 18 months since Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration, Taiwan's relations with mainland China have improved at a rapid pace. The resumption of quasi-official talks between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has led to a series of landmark agreements. Among other promising results, the commencement of direct flights, shipping, and postal services have been important steps toward reconciliation. Nevertheless, officials and scholars on both sides of the strait recognize that progress has thus far been limited to relatively easy issues and that addressing such delicate, yet critical, topics as sovereignty and military deployments will require a prolonged period of time and greater political trust. One such sensitive area is cross-strait military confidence-building measures (CBMs), that is, efforts to improve military-to-military relations in ways that reduce fears of attack and the potential for military miscalculation. In principle, both sides of the strait agree on the need for bilateral military CBMs, although Beijing is interested in CBMs primarily as a means to build political trust, while Taipei seeks CBMs to avoid accidents and create a more predictable security environment. More importantly, for Taiwan, CBMs should aid in preserving the status quo, whereas the mainland hopes that CBMs will promote reunification. In addition to differing priorities and objectives, there are other obstacles to an agreement on a cross-strait CBM agenda. Despite the challenges, there is great potential for implementing military CBMs between the two sides of the strait. The United States should continue to express its firm support for the ongoing process of easing cross-strait tensions and trust building and take reasonable steps to bolster Taipei's sense of security and confidence in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. ..."--Executive summary.










Application of INCSEA Principles to the Taiwan Strait


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The waters surrounding Taiwan are important international waterways. In addition to merchant ships of every nation, the warships of the United States, Japan, Russia, and China may appear in these waters. No hostility is expected between Taiwan and the United States, Japan, or Russia; however, Taiwan and China have a tense relationship, and both sides face a potential for naval incidents. As Taiwan and China expand their naval capability, the International Maritime Organization Convention for the lnternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea may not be sufficient to prevent naval incidents, any of which might develop into conflict or war. Therefore, China and Taiwan need to develop maritime confidence building measures (CBMs) that could reduce the chance of naval incidents and strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Among the variety of maritime CBM concepts for military purposes, the most successful and effective measure has been the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Union Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA). The success of the agreement demonstrates that CBMs represent a workable alternative to traditional arms controls. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a concrete approach to the constraint of naval activities between China and Taiwan to reduce accidents and misunderstandings. This paper outlines the categories and characteristics of incidents at sea. Next, the author identifies the successful factors of the U.S.-Soviet INCSEA and applies the INCSEA concept to the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the author develops a framework of options and a step-by-step approach for establishing an INCSEA between Taiwan and China.




The Role of CBMs in Cross-strait Relations


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