Measuring Agricultural Policy Bias


Book Description

Measurement is a key issue in the literature on price incentive bias induced by trade policy. We introduce a general equilibrium measure of the relative effective rate of protection, which generalizes earlier protection measures. For our fifteen sample countries, results indicate that the agricultural price incentive bias generally perceived to exist during the 1980s was largely eliminated during the 1990s. Results also demonstrate that general equilibrium effects and country-specific characteristics are crucial for determining the sign and magnitude of agricultural bias. Our comprehensive protection measure is therefore uniquely suited to capture the full impact of trade policies on relative agricultural price incentives.




Distortions to Agricultural Incentives


Book Description

This volume in the 'Distortions to Agricultural Incentives' series focus on distortions to agricultural incentives from a global perspective.




Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, Revisited


Book Description

Abstract: Notwithstanding the tariffication component of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, import tariffs on farm products continue to provide an incomplete indication of the extent to which agricultural producer and consumer incentives are distorted in national markets. Especially in developing countries, non-agricultural policies indirectly impact agricultural and food markets. Empirical analysis aimed at monitoring distortions to agricultural incentives thus need to examine both agricultural and non-agricultural policy measures including import or export taxes, subsidies and quantitative restrictions, plus domestic taxes or subsidies on farm outputs or inputs and consumer subsidies for food staples. This paper addresses the practical methodological issues that need to be faced when attempting to undertake such a measurement task in developing countries. The approach is illustrated in two ways: by presenting estimates of nominal and relative rates of assistance to farmers in China for the period 1981 to 2005; and by summarizing estimates from an economy-wide computable general equilibrium model of the effects on agricultural versus non-agricultural markets of the project's measured distortions globally as of 2004.




Correlated Non-Classical Measurement Errors, ‘Second Best’ Policy Inference and the Inverse Size-Productivity Relationship in Agriculture


Book Description

We show analytically and empirically that non-classical measurement errors in the two key variables in a hypothesized relationship can bias the estimated relationship between them in any direction. Furthermore, if these measurement errors are correlated, correcting for either one alone can aggravate bias in the parameter estimate of interest relative to ignoring mismeasurement in both variables, a ‘second best’ result with implications for a broad class of economic phenomena of policy interest. We illustrate these results empirically by demonstrating the implications of mismeasured agricultural output and plot size for the long-debated (inverse) relationship between size and productivity.
















Agricultural Bias in Focus


Book Description

The darker the shade of blue for the policy, the more direct the impact is on the agricultural bias, while the lighter shades are for policies that have less impact. [...] Other prices in the chain include the price that incorporates the cost of transportation to the export market or processor, the price paid on the wholesale market, the price at a terminal port if the commodity is to be exported, and the price paid by a contract holder on a futures exchange. [...] As noted previously, while indicators and methods exist to measure the degree of anti- agricultural bias, these indicators themselves do not pinpoint the causes of the problem.4 Indeed, a contributing factor toward a negative relative rate of assistance measurement could be the result of the presence of a detrimental policy or the absence-by design or oversight-of a basic policy that is a foundati [...] To diagnose the cause of a positive or negative agricultural bias requires answering the following questions: 1. Does the negative relative rate of assistance in agriculture mainly originate from policies tied to the agricultural sector or the non-agricultural sector? [...] The coloured bars indicate the relative contribution to the NRP by product, with bars to the right of the vertical axis indicating that the product has a positive NRP, while bars to the left indicate a negative NRP.