Metaphysics and Cognitive Science


Book Description

This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the metaphysics of mind, but this volume mainly concerns the relevance of metaphysics to phenomena that are not themselves mental. The volume is thus a departure from standard analytical metaphysics. Among the issues to which results from cognitive science are brought to bear are the metaphysics of time, of morality, of meaning, of modality, of objects, and of natural kinds, as well as whether God exists. A number of chapters address the enterprise of metaphysics in general. In traditional analytical metaphysics, intuitions play a prominent role in the construction of, and assessment of theories. Cognitive science can be brought to bear on the issue of the reliability of intuitions. Some chapters point out how results from cognitive science can be deployed to debunk certain intuitions, and some point out how results can be deployed to help vindicate certain intuitions. Many metaphysicians have taken to heart the moral that physics should be taken into account in addressing certain metaphysical issues. The overarching point of the volume is that in many instances beyond the nature of the mind itself, cognitive science should also be consulted.




Metaphysics and Cognitive Science


Book Description

This volume illustrates how the methodology of metaphysics can be enriched with the help of cognitive science. Few philosophers nowadays would dispute the relevance of cognitive science to the metaphysics of mind, but this volume mainly concerns the relevance of metaphysics to phenomena that are not themselves mental. The volume is thus a departure from standard analytical metaphysics. Among the issues to which results from cognitive science are brought to bear are the metaphysics of time, of morality, of meaning, of modality, of objects, and of natural kinds, as well as whether God exists. A number of chapters address the enterprise of metaphysics in general. In traditional analytical metaphysics, intuitions play a prominent role in the construction of, and assessment of theories. Cognitive science can be brought to bear on the issue of the reliability of intuitions. Some chapters point out how results from cognitive science can be deployed to debunk certain intuitions, and some point out how results can be deployed to help vindicate certain intuitions. Many metaphysicians have taken to heart the moral that physics should be taken into account in addressing certain metaphysical issues. The overarching point of the volume is that in many instances beyond the nature of the mind itself, cognitive science should also be consulted.




Having Thought


Book Description

The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding. Haugeland addresses mind and intelligence; intelligibility; analog and digital systems and supervenience; presuppositions about the foundational notions of intentionality and representation; and the essential character of understanding in relation to what is understood.




Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science


Book Description

Psychology is the study of thinking, and cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence that also includes philosophy, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. In these investigations, many philosophical issues arise concerning methods and central concepts. The Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science contains 16 essays by leading philosophers of science that illuminate the nature of the theories and explanations used in the investigation of minds. Topics discussed include representation, mechanisms, reduction, perception, consciousness, language, emotions, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology. Comprehensive coverage of philosophy of psychology and cognitive science Distinguished contributors: leading philosophers in this area Contributions closely tied to relevant scientific research




Experimental Metaphysics


Book Description

Metaphysics, almost entirely neglected by experimental philosophers, is the central focus of Experimental Metaphysics. The volume brings together a range of views aimed at addressing the question of how cognitive science might be relevant to metaphysics. With contributions from cognitive scientists and philosophers, chapters focus on theoretical and empirical issues involving the potential role of cognitive science in metaphysics. Alongside topics such as free will, objects and causation, in which relevant empirical evidence is discussed and connected to relevant metaphysical issues, more programmatic papers explore theoretical issues centered on the connection between cognitive science and metaphysics. This balanced approach exposes metaphysicians to philosophically relevant work in cognitive science, while showing cognitive scientists the ways in which their work might be important for philosophers. Presenting cutting-edge empirical and theoretical research, Experimental Metaphysics pushes forward the discussion and encourages further engagement with issues at the intersection of cognitive science and metaphysics.




Current Controversies in Philosophy of Cognitive Science


Book Description

In this volume, leading researchers debate five core questions in the philosophy of cognitive science. For each topic, the volume provides two essays, each advocating for an opposing approach.




The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science


Book Description

This volume offers an overview of the philosophy of cognitive science that balances breadth and depth, with chapters covering every aspect of the psychology and cognitive anthropology.




Concepts


Book Description

Oxford Cognitive Science Series General Editors: Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, James Higginbotham, Professor of General Linguistics, University of Oxford, UK, John O'Keefe, Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK, Christopher Peacocke, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, and Kim Plunkett, University Lecturer in Psychology, University of Oxford, UK The Oxford Cognitive Science series is a forum for the best contemporary work in this flourishing field, where various disciplines—cognitive psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and computational theory—join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book will represent an original contribution to its subject, but will be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach a broad interdisciplinary readership. The series will be carefully shaped and steered by the general editors, with the aim of representing the most important developments in the field and bringing together its constituent disciplines. About this book The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, who has been a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and surprisingly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.




Experimental Metaphysics


Book Description




Psychological Metaphysics


Book Description

The research literature on causal attribution and social cognition generally consists of many fascinating but fragmented and superficial phenomena. These can only be understood as an organised whole by elucidating the fundamental psychological assumptions on which they depend. Psychological Metaphysics is an exploration of the most basic and important assumptions in the psychological construction of reality, with the aim of showing what they are, how they originate, and what they are there for. Peter White proposes that people basically understand causation in terms of stable, special powers of things operating to produce effects under suitable conditions. This underpins an analysis of people's understanding of causal processes in the physical world, and of human action. In making a radical break with the Heiderian tradition, Psychological Metaphysics suggests that causal attribution is in the service of the person's practical concerns and any interest in accuracy or understanding is subservient to this. Indeed, a notion of regularity in the world is of no more than minor importance, and social cognition is not a matter of cognitive mechanisms or processes but of cultural ways of thinking imposed upon tacit, unquestioned, universal assumptions.