Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee


Book Description

The Treasury Committee has established a practice of holding hearings with persons appointed to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England and reporting on those hearings. This practice enhances the transparency of the appointment process and increases the level of information available to the public and to Parliament about the functioning of the MPC. The Committee has held a hearing with Professor David Blanchflower about his appointment to the MPC, and is satisfied that Professor Blanchflower meets the criteria for appointment.




Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England


Book Description

The Economic Affairs Committee was appointed in 2001, with a wide remit to consider all matters of economic affairs. It follows on from the MPC Committee (House of Lords Select Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England) and will continue its work. To this end this report contains evidence from the Governor of the Bank of England and the response of the Government and the MPC to the last report by the MPC Committee.







Elements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design


Book Description

The move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. This paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary policy committee design. While the preference aggregation literature points to the effect of committee structure on the extent of the time inconsistency problem and its associated costs, the belief aggregation literature analyzes how different committee structures affect the efficiency of information pooling, the process of social influence, and collective accuracy. In conclusion, we highlight the main tradeoffs that the analysis has brought to light and point to directions for future research.




The Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England


Book Description

This report continues the practice of holding hearings with persons appointed to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England, in order to enhance the transparency of the appointment process and increase the level of information available to the public and to Parliament about the functioning of the MPC itself. This report considers the appointment of Professor Tim Besley and Dr Andrew Sentance.










Select Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England


Book Description

This is the second House of Lords report on the working of the Monetary Policy Committee. The first part looks at the objective given to the MPC, whether the 2.5% inflation target is right and the co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policy. The second part looks at the transparency of the MPC and the information they publish to support their decisions. The third part examines the technical issues on the implementation of policy, such as why inflation is mostly below target, whether the index used is the appropriate measure of inflation, the record of forecasting and the success of the MPC. The fourth part is concerned with the membership of the MPC and the way it is appointed.




Monetary Policy Committee


Book Description

The establishment of an operationally independent central bank was the first major policy decision by the Chancellor in 1997. He set out the framework whereby he would set the objectives for monetary policy, in the form of an inflation target, but the Bank of England and the nine-member Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) would have the operational responsibility. This report is divided into four sections. The first assesses the performance of the MPC, whilst the second examines the components of the broader monetary framework. The third part looks at how the Treasury Committee has met its own objectives and the last section looks at the wider aspects of economic policy. They conclude that the record of the MPC is impressive and it has established a high level of credibility but there is a worry that there is a bias to undershooting the inflation target.