Systemic Banking Crises Database


Book Description

We update the widely used banking crises database by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010) with new information on recent and ongoing crises, including updated information on policy responses and outcomes (i.e. fiscal costs, output losses, and increases in public debt). We also update our dating of sovereign debt and currency crises. The database includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises during the period 1970-2011. The data show some striking differences in policy responses between advanced and emerging economies as well as many similarities between past and ongoing crises.







Managing Systemic Banking Crises


Book Description

Recent financial sector crises and their resolution have raised new issues and provided additional experiences to draw on in the future. Banking sector problems in Russia, Turkey, and a few Latin American countries occurred within the context of highly dollarized economies, high levels of sovereign debt, severely limited fiscal resources, or combinations thereof. These factors have challenged the effectiveness of many of the typical tools for bank resolution. This publication focuses on the issues raised in systemic crises, not on the resolution of individual bank problems. Based on the lessons learned during the Asian crisis, it updates the IMF’s work on the general principles, strategies, and techniques for managing these crises.







Moody's Analyses of Railroad Investments


Book Description

Containing in detailed form an expert comparative analysis of each of the railroad systems of the United States, with careful deductions, enabling the banker and investor to ascertain the true values of securities by a method based on scientific principles properly applied to facts.




A Century of Sovereign Ratings


Book Description

The financial difficulties experienced by Greece since 2009 serve as a reminder that countries (i.e., sovereigns) may default on their debt. Many observers considered the financial turmoil was behind us because major advanced countries had adopted stimulus packages to prevent banks from going bankrupt. However, there are rising doubts about the creditworthiness of several advanced countries that participated in the bailouts. In this uncertain context, it is particularly crucial to be knowledgeable about sovereign ratings. This book provides the necessary broad overview, which will be of interest to both economists and investors alike. Chapter 1 presents the main issues that are addressed in this book. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide the key notions to understand sovereign ratings. Chapter 2 presents an overview of sovereign rating activity since the first such ratings were assigned in 1918. Chapter 3 analyzes the meaning of sovereign ratings and the significance of rating scales; it also describes the refinement of credit rating policies and tools. Chapter 4 focuses on the sovereign rating process. Chapters 5 and 6 open the black box of sovereign ratings. Chapter 5 compares sovereign rating methodologies in the interwar years with those in the modern era. After examining how rating agencies have amended their methodologies since the 1990s, Chapter 6 scrutinizes rating disagreements between credit rating agencies (CRAs). Chapters 7 and 8 measure the performances of sovereign ratings by computing default rates and accuracy ratios: Chapter 7 looks at the interwar years and Chapter 8 at the modern era. The two chapters assess which CRA assigns the most accurate ratings during the respective periods. Chapters 9 and 10 compare the perception of sovereign risk by the CRAs and market participants. Chapter 9 focuses on the relation between JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global spreads and emerging countries’ sovereign ratings for the period 1993–2007. Chapter 10 compares the eurozone members’ sovereign ratings with Credit Default Swap-Implied Ratings (CDS-IRs) during the Greek debt crisis of November 2009–May 2010.










Financial Shock


Book Description

“The obvious place to start is the financial crisis and the clearest guide to it that I’ve read is Financial Shock by Mark Zandi. ... it is an impressively lucid guide to the big issues.” – The New York Times “In Financial Shock, Mr. Zandi provides a concise and lucid account of the economic, political and regulatory forces behind this binge.” – The Wall Street Journal “Aggressive builders, greedy lenders, optimistic home buyers: Zandi succinctly dissects the mortgage mess from start to (one hopes) finish.” – U.S. News and World Report “A more detailed look at the crisis comes from economist Mark Zandi, co-founder of Moody's Economy.com. His “Financial Shock” delves deeply into the history of the mortgage market, the bad loans, the globalization of trashy subprime paper and how homebuilders ran amok. Zandi's analysis is eye-opening. ... he paints an impressive, more nuanced picture.” – Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine “If you wonder how it could be possible for a subprime mortgage loan to bring the global financial system and the U.S. economy to its knees, you should read this book. No one is better qualified to provide this insight and advice than Mark Zandi.” –Larry Kudlow, Host, CNBC’s Kudlow & Company “Every once in a while a book comes along that’s so important, it commands recognition. This is one of them. Zandi provides a rilliant blow-by-blow account of how greed, stupidity, and recklessness brought the first major economic crises of the 21st entury and the most serious since the Great Depression.” –Bernard Baumohl,Managing Director, The Economic Outlook Group and best-selling author, The Secrets of Economic Indicators “Throughout the financial crisis Mark Zandi has played two important roles. He has insightfully analyzed its causes and thoughtfully recommended steps to alleviate it. This book continues those tasks and adds a third–providing a comprehensive and comprehensible explanation of the issues that is accessible to the general public and extremely useful to those who specialize in the area.” –Barney Frank, Chairman, House Financial Services Committee The subprime crisis created a gigantic financial catastrophe. What happened? How did it happen? How can we prevent similar crises from happening again? Mark Zandi answers all these critical questions–systematically, carefully, and in plain English. Zandi begins with a fast-paced overview and then illuminates the deepest causes, from the psychology of homeownership to Alan Greenspan’s missteps. You’ll see the home “flippers” at work and the real estate agents who cheered them on. You’ll learn how Internet technology and access to global capital transformed the mortgage industry, helping irresponsible lenders drive out good ones. Zandi demystifies the complex financial engineering that enabled lenders to hide deepening risks, shows how global investors eagerly bought in, and explains how flummoxed regulators failed to prevent disaster, despite crucial warning signs. Most important, Zandi offers indispensable advice for investors who must recognize emerging bubbles, policymakers who must improve oversight, and citizens who must survive whatever comes next. Liar’s loans, flippers, predatory lenders, delusional homebuilders How the housing market came unhinged, and the whirlwind came together Alan Greenspan’s trillion-dollar bet Betting on the boom, ignoring the bubble The subprime market goes global Worldwide investors get a piece of the action–and reap the results Wall Street’s alchemists: conjuring up Frankenstein New financial instruments and their hidden contents Back to the future: risk management for the 21st century Respecting the “animal spirits” that drive even the most sophisticated markets




Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System


Book Description

Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System brings together the research of economists at New York University and the University of Maryland, along with those from the private sector, government bodies, and other universities. The first section of the volume focuses on the historical origins of the credit rating business and its present day industrial organization structure. The second section presents several empirical studies crafted largely around individual firm-level or bank-level data. These studies examine (a) the relationship between ratings and the default and recovery experience of corporate borrowers, (b) the comparability of credit ratings made by domestic and foreign rating agencies, and (c) the usefulness of financial market indicators for rating banks, among other topics. In the third section, the record of sovereign credit ratings in predicting financial crises and the reaction of financial markets to changes in credit ratings is examined. The final section of the volume emphasizes policy issues now facing regulators and credit rating agencies.