Book Description

The issue of what to do with excess fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons has been discussed for a number of years. The options or alternatives commanding the most attention were identified by the American National Academy of Sciences. For plutonium these options are: (1) the fabrication and use of mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel followed by the disposal of the spent fuel, or (2) vitrification (immobilization) of plutonium combined with highly radioactive material followed by direct disposal. The Academy report also identified the alternative of disposal in a deep borehole as requiring further study before being eliminated or accepted. The report emphasized security of nuclear materials as a principal factor in considering management and disposition decisions. Security of materials is particularly important in the near term-now-long before ultimate disposition can be accomplished. The MOX option was the subject of a NATO workshop held at Obninsk, Russia in October 1994. Hence this paper does not deal with the MOX alternative in detail. It deals with the following: materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC & A) for immobilization and disposal; the immobilization vs MOX alternatives; the security of disposed plutonium; the need to demonstrate MTC & A for plutonium disposition; and, finally, a recommended investment to quickly and inexpensively improve the protection of fissile materials in Russia. It is the author's view that near-term management is of overriding importance. That is, with respect to the ultimate disposition of excess nuclear materials, how we get there is more important than where we are going.