National Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention


Book Description

Despite thirty years since entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) the majority of States Parties still have not implemented effective national measures to ensure compliance with Convention obligations. The combined lack of a multilateral organisation with responsibility to monitor Convention compliance and the growing threat of bio-terrorism highlight the imperative for more effective and widespread national implementation measures. This article briefly outlines Convention obligations and suggests alternative approaches to States Parties to ensure compliance. The article does not propose a model implementing legislation package because of the authors' shared view that one model simply cannot suit all States Parties. Individual states will need to consider existing legislative regimes - particularly those dealing with biological materials and activities - to determine the extent to which existing regulatory regimes might be adapted or amended to effectively cover BWC obligations. The authors discuss the explicit Convention obligation for the enactment of penal legislation but also discuss the practical issues to ensure compliance with Convention obligations such as the prohibition on transfers of biological agents and toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes and the requirement to gather, collate and share confidence building information with other States Parties. The article concludes with an overview of Australia's national implementation of BWC obligations to illustrate one particular State Party's approach to its treaty obligations.













Biological Weapons Convention protocols


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The Biological Weapon Convention


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The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention


Book Description

Incidents of bioterrorism and biowarfare are likely to recur, leading to increased public concern and government action. The deficiencies of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are in urgent need of attention: the BTWC is the central international agreement to prevent the proliferation of biological warfare programmes. Uniquely, this book is written by diplomats involved in the decade-long effort (1991-2001) in which State Parties to the BTWC tried to agree a Protocol to the Convention with legally binding measures to strengthen its effectiveness, and academics concerned with the negotiations. Just before negotiations foundered, when the Chairman's proposed text was virtually complete, the problems and proposed solutions were examined thoroughly, leading to this book. The book is wide-ranging in its review of the history of biological warfare, the reasons why the current biological revolution is of such concern, and the main features of the BTWC itself. The core of the book examines the key elements of the proposed protocol - declarations, visits, challenge-type investigations, and enhanced international cooperation - and the implications for government, industry and biodefence, giving us all a better understanding of what still remains to be done to avert a biowarfare catastrophe.




The New Chemical Weapons Convention - Implementation and Prospects


Book Description

The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on 29 April 1997. This text reviews the history of the chemical weapons negotiations and presents an analysis of the major features of the Convention.




Countering Biological Threats: National Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and Multinational Outbreak Response and Bioterrorism Investigation Demonstration


Book Description

The workshop on Countering Biological Threats: National Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and Multinational Outbreak Response and Bioterrorism Investigation Demonstration was organized by the US Department of Defense (US European Command, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency) and the US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) with the support of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health of Georgia (NCDC), the US-Georgia Central Public Health Reference Laboratory (CPHRL), and the Emergency Management Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, in Tbilisi, Georgia on 17-19 May 2011. It included awareness training, a tabletop exercise designed to review the technical guidelines and procedures associated with the United Nations Secretary General's Mechanism on Investigation of Alleged Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons (UNSGM), and a practical demonstration of consequence management capabilities of Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs CBRN Rapid Response Team.