Developments in State Takeover Regulation


Book Description

By the 1960's, use of the cash tender offer had become the predominant method for acquisition and control of publicly held companies, a method then virtually free of government regulation. However, in the absence of regulation, abuses emerged, underscoring the need for federal and state protection of investors in corporations targeted by an acquiring company's management. Governmental regulation of this type of takeover transaction originated at the state level with Virginia's enactment of the first state takeover statute in 1968, with thirty-six other states following suit. Several months after passage of the Virginia statute, Congress adopted the Williams Act, which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for regulation of cash tender offers. The extraterritorial reach of most state takeover statutes, together with the substantive differences between the state and federal scheme, led to the invalidation of numerous state takeover statutes under the commerce and supremacy clauses of the Constitution. This controversy between state and federal power was addressed, but not completely resolved by the now-familiar case Edgar v. MITE Corp. This decision and its aftermath are the primary focus of this article. The subsequent judicial efforts to interpret and apply the MITE precedent to takeover statutes of other states generally have been disastrous for the state regulatory schemes challenged. Ohio, Maryland, and Wisconsin developed new approaches in their efforts to revitalize their respective regulatory schemes through a perceived “window” left open by the MITE decision. After a discussion of this development, the article concludes with a summary of certain controversial proposals set forth in the final report of the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, issued approximately one year after MITE was decided. These recommendations presented important questions not only as to the future role of the states in the field of tender offer regulation, but also as to the vulnerability of state corporate law generally. Although opposition to those recommendations was extensive, the issues that they raise should be of particular concern to practitioners in virtually every area of corporate law.






















A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition


Book Description

The development of U.S. state takeover law in the past three decades has produced considerable and quite possibly excessive protection for incumbent managers from hostile takeovers. Although the shortcomings of state takeover law have been widely recognized, there has been little support for federal intervention because of the concern that such intervention might produce even worse takeover arrangements. This paper puts forward a novel form of federal intervention in the regulation of takeovers that would address these shortcomings without raising such a concern. Rather than mandating particular substantive takeover arrangements, this form of federal intervention would focus on increasing shareholder choice. Choice-enhancing' federal intervention would consist of two elements: (i) an optional body of substantive federal takeover law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for opting into (or out of) the federal takeover law. We argue that such a federal role in takeover law cannot harm and would likely improve the regulation of takeovers. Moreover, by showing how federal law can be used to improve regulatory competition in the provision of takeover law rather than preempt it, our analysis lays the groundwork for a more general reconsideration of regulatory competition in the corporate law area




New Directions in Financial Services Regulation


Book Description

Prominent policy makers, practitioners, and scholars discuss regulatory reform in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. The financial crisis of 2008 raised crucial questions regarding the effectiveness of the way the United States regulates financial markets. What caused the crisis? What regulatory changes are most needed and desirable? What regulatory structure will best implement the desired changes? This volume addresses those questions with contributions from an ideologically diverse group of scholars, policy makers, and practitioners, including Paul Volcker, John Taylor, Richard Posner, and R. Glenn Hubbard. New Directions in Financial Services Regulation grows out of a conference hosted by the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in October 2009, and the book reflects the dynamic give-and-take of the event. Each part of the book includes not only major papers and presentations but also a summary of the subsequent discussion. The book achieves a balance of academic and practitioner perspectives, with leaders of financial firms and regulatory bodies offering insights based on their experiences in the financial crisis of the year before.