No Quarter Given: The Change In Strategic Bombing Application In The Pacific Theater During World War II


Book Description

European airpower theorists of the 1920’s and 30’s envisioned the deliberate bombing of civilians in order to affect an enemy nation’s wartime production capabilities and national morale. However, American proponents of airpower were more exacting in their approach to the use of the airplane. The US Army Air Corps developed the idea of precision bombing as a means to destroy an enemy’s ability to prosecute war through the targeting of only an enemy’s means of production and state infrastructure while avoiding civilian casualties. World War II provided the US Army Air Force (USAAF) the opportunity to prove the effectiveness of this theory. However, as the war progressed, the USAAF targeted not just centers of production, but political targets as well as civilian populations. Thus, USAAF bombing came to resemble the type of application that was initially proffered by European theorists. Large-scale bombing of cities and populations became the mode of operation for the USAAF in the Pacific. Despite its policies and doctrine, the USAAF deliberately bombed civilian populations in conjunction with the Japanese means of production. Why did this targeting change take place? How did the USAAF eventually come to conduct indiscriminate area bombing of civilians despite the perception that it was contrary to our national mores?




Why Fight On? The Decision To Close The Kursk Salient


Book Description

The Battle of Kursk in July of 1943 was a pivotal battle in the Russian-German conflict, 1941-1945. After the German attack failed, the Russians responded with a major offensive and gained the strategic initiative. From then on, the German army was only capable of a series of defensive stopping actions in failed attempts to thwart the advancing Red Army. The inevitable outcome was the fall of Berlin in May of 1945. There were a number of options Hitler and the German high command could have chosen in lieu of attack. The decision to choose offensive action becomes even more interesting upon examination of Germany’s strategic situation. Tunisia, the last vestige of the German occupation of North Africa, was lost and Allied offensive action on the European continent was a real and imminent threat. There were also attrition issues, production problems, and differences of opinion between Hitler and key German generals. Finally, the northern and southern shoulders of the Kursk salient, the chosen points of attack, were heavily defended. What compelled Hitler and the German High Command to take such a gamble? What were the strategic issues that guided this decision? Was the outcome decisive? And finally, what other actions might have altered the outcome of the conflict?




Revolutionary Atmosphere


Book Description

"A massive, but little-known, facility in Cleveland, Ohio, played a vital role in the U.S. development of jets, in the training of NASA's first astronauts, and in making NASA's first missions beyond Earth orbit possible. Revolutionary Atmosphere tells the story of this obscure giant. Starting life in 1944 as the Altitude Wind Tunnel, it was the first wind tunnel that could study aircraft engines under realistic flight conditions; and it was enormous-in its original configuration, it could even accommodate full-size aircraft. The tunnel could not only simulate the high speeds of jet aircraft, like other wind tunnels, but could simulate the pressures and temperatures of higher elevation flight."--Publisher description.







The Bomber Mafia


Book Description

A “truly compelling” (Good Morning America) New York Times bestseller that explores how technology and best intentions collide in the heat of war—from the creator and host of the podcast Revisionist History. In The Bomber Mafia, Malcolm Gladwell weaves together the stories of a Dutch genius and his homemade computer, a band of brothers in central Alabama, a British psychopath, and pyromaniacal chemists at Harvard to examine one of the greatest moral challenges in modern American history. Most military thinkers in the years leading up to World War II saw the airplane as an afterthought. But a small band of idealistic strategists, the “Bomber Mafia,” asked: What if precision bombing could cripple the enemy and make war far less lethal? In contrast, the bombing of Tokyo on the deadliest night of the war was the brainchild of General Curtis LeMay, whose brutal pragmatism and scorched-earth tactics in Japan cost thousands of civilian lives, but may have spared even more by averting a planned US invasion. In The Bomber Mafia, Gladwell asks, “Was it worth it?” Things might have gone differently had LeMay’s predecessor, General Haywood Hansell, remained in charge. Hansell believed in precision bombing, but when he and Curtis LeMay squared off for a leadership handover in the jungles of Guam, LeMay emerged victorious, leading to the darkest night of World War II. The Bomber Mafia is a riveting tale of persistence, innovation, and the incalculable wages of war.










Armor


Book Description




The quest Haywood Hansell and American strategic bombing in World War II


Book Description

This book contains the following chapters concerning Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II: the problems of air power, (2) the early years: education and acts, (3) planning, (4) the frictions of war, (5) the global bomber force, (6) triumph, and (7) tragedy.




Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow


Book Description

Right after World War II, the United States felt secure in its atomic monopoly. With the American "Pax Atomica" in place, the free world held an apparent strategic advantage over the Soviet bloc and saw itself as a bulwark against communist expansion. But America's atomic superiority in the early postwar years was more fiction than fact. From 1945 until 1950, the U.S. atomic arsenal was poorly coordinated, equipped and funded. The newly formed Atomic Energy Commission inherited from the Manhattan Engineer District a program suffering from poor organization, failing infrastructure and internal conflict. The military establishment and the Air Force's Strategic Air Command little knew what to do with this new weapon. The Air Force and the AEC failed to coordinate their efforts for a possible atomic air offensive and war plans were ill-conceived, reflecting unrealistic expectations of Air Force capabilities and possible political outcomes. This lack of preparedness serves as a case study in the tenuous nature of American civilian-military relationships. Instructors considering this book for use in a course may request an examination copy here.