Book Description

The Soviet Union has invested in India a large volume of material resources and diplomatic energy; the available evidence on the Soviet-Indian relationship in recent years, however, leads to the conclusion that the return of this Soviet investment, in terms of observable political influence, has been small. Since 1967, there appear to have been only three cases in which Moscow was able to cause New Delhi to do something which it would not have done otherwise. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Soviet Union has been rebuffed in its efforts to influence Indian behavior. In some cases there is an evident and mutual disposition to discuss differences in private to limit the impact of disagreements on a relationship both sides value highly. Indian decision makers perceive a well-defined need for Soviet support in both military and economic spheres, but India's growing self-reliance places definite limits on her perceived need of the Soviet Union. For its part, Moscow perceives that the special relationship with India has brought diplomatic and commercial benefits which the Soviets are reluctant to jeopardize. The evolution of Indo-Soviet relations has resulted in a symbiosis, but one in which the balance of dependency has changed dramatically. Developments since 1971 suggest that Soviet importance to India and its ability to influence Indian decisions peaked during the Indo-Pakistan crisis and have subsequently declined, whereas the Indian ability to exert influence in Moscow may be growing.