Nuclear Nonproliferation


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Gao-05-828 Nuclear Nonproliferation


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GAO-05-828 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries







Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC & A) program activities in Russia. GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC & A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations.




Nuclear Nonproliferation


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Nuclear nonproliferation


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To address concerns about unemployed or underemployed Soviet-era weapons scientists in Russia and other countries, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program in 1994 to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in nonmilitary work in the short term and create private sector jobs for these scientists in the long term. GAO assessed (1) DOE's reported accomplishments for the IPP program, (2) DOE's exit strategy for the program, and (3) the extent to which the program has experienced annual carryovers of unspent funds and the reasons for any such carryovers. To address these issues, GAO analyzed DOE policies, plans, and budgets and interviewed key program officials and representatives from 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes. GAO recommends, among other things, that DOE assess the continuing need for the IPP program with input from other federal agencies, including State and the intelligence community. DOE and State generally agreed with GAO's recommendations, although DOE disagreed with the need to reassess the IPP program. However, the nature, scope, and volume of problems GAO identified during the course of its review necessitates such a reassessment to ensure that limited IPP program funds are directed to the scientists and institutes of highest proliferation risk.




Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Controls


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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation


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The U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences convened a joint workshop to identify methods of overcoming impediments to cooperation between the United States and Russia on nonproliferation. The workshop emphasized approaches and techniques that have already been shown to work in U.S.-Russian programs and that might be applied in other areas. The workshop was intended to facilitate frank discussion between individuals in the United States and Russia who have some responsibility for cooperative nonproliferation programs in the hope of identifying both the impediments to cooperation and potential methods of addressing them. This report summarizes the discussions at the workshop.




Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance


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Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in Nov. 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million to over $1 billion/year across 3 agencies. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and non-proliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists. This report discusses issues related to U.S. non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance. Illus.